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Abstract 
In this thesis, we use the methodology of experimental economics to investigate issues 
of trust and trustworthiness in procurement and the supply chain. 
First, we develop a procurement model in which both seller-side and buyer-side de-
cisions are endogenous to the trading relationship. We investigate how a real-world con-
tractual incentive mechanism, retainage, can be used to overcome the seller-side moral 
hazard problem. We find that retainage can improve trade efficiency but increases mar-
ket prices and may deter participation. We offer managerial insights on how to design 
the retainage mechanism, conditional on levels of trust and trustworthiness. 
Second, we extend the procurement model to incorporate a contingent contract and 
show analytically that this contract can mitigate the seller-side moral hazard problem. 
We observe in a lab experiment that suppliers strategically adjust their bids with a 
contingent contract and that the contingent contract has unintended behavioural con-
sequences, with buyers rewarding sellers less for the quality of works delivered. The 
results have managerial implications for the use of hierarchical elements in contracts. 
Third, we analyse theoretically and experimentally the horizontal effects of supply 
chain late payments. We show that if firms discount payment received after the standard 
term, then late payments feed into higher prices and reduced competition. Reneging on 
a standard payment term entails a penalty for the buyer set by a third-party. If this 
penalty is not set carefully, a welfare loss arises due to price externalities. We demon-
strate how free-riding payment behaviours may emerge among financially weaker buyers 
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1 Motivation and Related Literature 
A tension between competition and cooperation characterises many long-term rela-
tionships between firms and suppliers. Recent decades have seen auctions, and compet-
itive tender processes more generally, emerge as important mechanisms for the selection 
of suppliers and the determination of contractual terms in the presence of scarcity and 
market imbalances. A distinguishing feature of procurement auctions (or reverse auc-
tions), as opposed to sales auctions, is that the bidding process represents the beginning 
rather than the end of the transaction (Fugger, Gretschko and Pollrich 2019). Thus, 
there is scope for moral hazard to become a major source of friction during the trading 
relationship.  
Overcoming this tension between competition and cooperation requires the careful 
design of incentives to foster trust and trustworthiness among the agents involved. Mu-
tual trust and trustworthiness underpin the majority of successful economic relation-
ships. The oft-cited quotation from Nobel Laureate Kenneth J. Arrow bears repeating: 
“Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly 
any transaction conducted over a period of time” (Arrow 1972, p. 357).  
This thesis uses the methodology of experimental economics to investigate issues of 
trust and trustworthiness in procurement and the supply chain. We take inspiration 
from Özer and Zheng (2019), who argue that “developing structurally new games and 
experimental design … are necessary to better understand the role of trust and trust-
worthiness in decision-making because they are not abstract issues” (Section 14.4.3). 
This thesis consists of three independent experimental studies, each addressing a distinct 
economic issue in which trust and trustworthiness influence the outcome of the trading 
relationship. 
In Chapter 2, we analyse a procurement setting in which it is difficult to write en-
forceable contracts that condition price upon quality. If higher quality is also costly to 
deliver, supplier non-performance becomes an acute risk, particularly when there is in-
tense competition for the contract. An established incentive mechanism used to mitigate 
the problem of supplier non-performance is retainage, in which the buyer sets aside a 
portion of the purchase price. After project completion, the buyer determines the 
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amount of retainage that is released to the seller, considering any defects that arise. 
While generally a feasible contract form to implement, the practical difficulties in as-
sessing completion introduce a moral hazard for the buyer. We develop a structurally 
new game and experimental design to offer managerial insights on how retainage prin-
ciples mediate trust and trustworthiness in competitive procurement settings with moral 
hazard. The results suggest that retainage can deliver a significant quality improvement 
but inflates tender prices. In high retainage structures, there is a trade-off between trade 
efficiency and supplier participation in request for bids. We further develop a model of 
fair payment norms and offer managerial insights on how to design the retainage mech-
anism, conditional on prevailing levels of trust and beliefs about fairness. 
In Chapter 3, we extend the environment considered in Chapter 2 to incorporate a 
contingent contract. A characteristic feature of procurement relationships is the sup-
plier’s ability to influence the buyer’s valuation after allocation of the contract. Since it 
is difficult to write a contract that accounts for all possible contingencies, parties to the 
contract may understand their performance obligations differently. We use laboratory 
experiments to investigate the behavioural consequences of contingent contracting in 
procurement relationships characterised by two-sided moral hazard. The contract is al-
located at a sealed-bid reverse auction (tender), contains a minimum payment obligation 
on the buyer, and specifies a deferred payment that is tied to the buyer’s and supplier’s 
performance. Verification of supplier performance is imperfect, and so contractual dis-
putes may arise. We develop a game-theoretic procurement model and find qualitative 
support in the experiment for the model’s prediction that suppliers strategically adjust 
their bids with a contingent contract. In contrast with the theory, the contingent con-
tract crowds out buyer reciprocity, who reward suppliers less for quality delivered. Thus, 
the contingent contract does not significantly increase the efficiency of trade relative to 
a non-contingent contract. The findings have managerial implications for the establish-
ment of trust in procurement relationships and for the unintended effects of hierarchical 
elements in contracts. 
In Chapter 4, we model issues of trust and trustworthiness in relation to the payment 
term. Specifically, we analyse how the expectation of a late payment affects market entry 
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and price competition. Buyers first send a signal to potential suppliers about their in-
tended payment term, which may be standard (e.g., 30 days) or extended (e.g., 60 to 
120 days). Suppliers then decide whether to incur a fixed and irreversible cost to enter 
into price competition. After the seller and winning bid is determined, the buyer chooses 
the ex-post payment date, which may or may not coincide with the ex-ante payment 
term. We show theoretically that if firms discount payment received after the standard 
term, then payment delays feed into higher consumer prices and reduced competition. 
Reneging on a standard payment term entails a penalty for the buyer set by a third-
party. If this penalty is not set carefully, a welfare loss may arise due to price spillover 
effects in the market. We provide experimental evidence that the probability of an on-
time payment responds to the penalty for reneging and demonstrate that free-riding 
behaviour may emerge among financially weaker buyers. We also find that seller over-
entry may distort payment behaviours in the market. The findings have economic im-
plications for the horizontal effects of supply chain payment practices and for the design 
of regulatory interventions to deter late payments. 
1.1. Reverse Auctions with Moral Hazard 
Related studies in the economics and operations management literatures have em-
phasised the role of the auction institution in determining procurement efficiency. When 
quantifiable attributes such as reliability and expertise vary across sellers, ex-ante auc-
tion scoring rules that commit the buyer to an allocation may be used to achieve efficient 
outcomes (e.g. Che 1993, Santamaria 2015). Often, however, this is not the case and 
buyers must rely on price-based selection mechanisms. In (first-price) reverse auctions, 
buyers must select the bidder offering the lowest price as the auction winner. In buyer-
determined auctions, buyers are free to choose a price from among competing suppliers.  
Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (2007) observe experimentally that buyer-determined 
auctions are welfare-improving only if enough suppliers compete and the correlation 
between the supplier’s cost and value generated is high. Dynamic-bid price-based auc-
tions with bidding credits can also generate greater aggregate and individual surplus for 
buyers and sellers than sealed-bid buyer-determined mechanisms (Shachat and 
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Swarthout 2010). High levels of price transparency in open-bid relative to sealed-bid 
auctions generate consistently lower levels of buyer surplus, and this differential effect 
intensifies when the quality of individual bidders is common knowledge (Haruvy and 
Katok 2013). Price transparency can also damage inter-firm relationships and deter 
relationship-specific investments by heightening supplier suspicions of buyer opportun-
ism (Jap 2007). 
The first experimental study of procurement contracts in reverse auctions with moral 
hazard was conducted by Cox et al. (1996). They compare the efficiency of fixed-price 
and cost-sharing contracts. In a fixed-price contract, the buyer pays an amount equal to 
the lowest or second-lowest bid depending on the auction format. In a cost-sharing 
contract, the buyer pays this amount plus (or minus) an agreed proportion of the cost 
overrun (or saving). The seller’s hazard of opportunism is increasing in the cost-sharing 
rate. Cox et al.’s main finding is of a trade-off between budgetary expense and efficiency. 
Although contracts with a greater cost-sharing element result in a lower procurement 
expense, they are also less efficient due to the heightened seller-side moral hazard prob-
lem.1  
Reverse auctions with seller-side moral hazard have also been studied in the behav-
ioural operations management literature (for a survey of this literature, see Elmaghraby 
and Katok 2018). Closely related to the experiments reported in Chapters 2 and 3 are 
two behavioural studies that examine the efficiency of fixed-price (i.e., zero retainage) 
contracts in reverse auctions with moral hazard when quality is endogenous to the trad-
ing relationship. Fugger, Katok and Wambach (2019) show that simply giving buyers 
the option to select a seller who did not place the lowest bid significantly raises prices 
and quality levels relative to a binding price-based auction. Interactions are one-shot, 
no reputation information is available, and buyers must accept vulnerability to loss so 
as to incentivise high quality. Fugger et al. employ a multi-level cost and quality design, 
across two different buyer valuation schedules. Their data reveal that buyer-determined 
 
1 Cost-sharing arrangements tend to be more appropriate for complex projects, accompanied by 
low degrees of design completeness (Bajari and Tadelis 2001). In these situations, a buyer com-
mitment to negotiate with one seller can outperform an auction when there is adverse selection, 
scope for product improvements and/or costly renegotiation (Herweg and Schmidt 2017). 
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auctions yield a robust improvement in cooperation and efficiency, which is explained 
using a model of inequity-averse preferences.  
An earlier experiment was conducted by Brosig-Koch and Heinrich (2014), who con-
sider a buyer-determined auction in which buyers can condition procurement acceptance 
decisions on past seller performance. Providing reputation information in this way sig-
nificantly increases buyer profits and procurement quality, relative to the price-based 
auction format. 
Buyer-determined auctions clearly have an important trust-building role in procure-
ment. They are not, however, always palatable from a regulatory standpoint, not least 
because they may facilitate bidder collusion if there is uncertainty as to how non-price 
seller attributes affect a buyer’s decision (Fugger et al. 2016), or if there is discrimination 
in the award decision (Verdeaux 2003). 
1.2. Social Norms, Competition, and Contract Types 
Chapter 2 is further related to the well-established experimental economics literature 
examining the influence of social norms on competition. Separating these motives is 
rarely possible using field data; the experimental method enables us to control prefer-
ences and the institutions involved. Our baseline model integrates the gift-exchange 
game of Fehr et al. (1993) into an auction setting. In a typical gift-exchange game, 
participants are assigned to the role of either buyer or seller and participate in a two 
stage exchange. First, the buyer sets a price. Second, the seller produces a costly quality 
level that maps to the buyer’s value. In the absence of reputational information, and if 
there is a preannounced and finite number of repetitions, then the standard perfect 
equilibrium has the seller incurring the minimum production cost and receiving the 
lowest available price.  
In contrast to the equilibrium prediction with rational profit maximisers, experi-
mental labour market studies of the gift exchange game observed a positive relationship 
between price and quality which is robust to the market environment (Anderhub et al. 
2002, Brandts and Charness 2004, Fehr et al. 1997, Fehr et al. 1998, Keser and Willinger 
2000). This data supports the fair wage–effort hypothesis (Akerlof 1982, Akerlof and 
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Yellen 1990). That norms exert a significant behavioural influence in competitive mar-
kets is particularly suggestive of their economic importance: in market experiments, 
convergence to competitive equilibria usually obtains within a few rounds (see Smith 
1982 for a seminal discussion). 
Reciprocal behaviour can be rationalised with theories of social preferences (e.g., 
Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Charness and Rabin 2002, Fehr and Schmidt 1999). It is 
less pronounced in one-shot interactions than under relational contracting (Brown et al. 
2004) and when outcomes are a stochastic rather than deterministic function of agent 
effort (Rubin and Sheremeta 2016). Previous gift-exchange experiments have also ob-
served differences in the relative effectiveness of contract types. Fehr et al. (2007) find 
that contracts in which the principal promises a voluntary bonus payment to the agent 
can incentivise greater effort than monitoring contracts that impose a probabilistic fine. 
This result is explained theoretically by the interaction of fair and self-interested types 
in the population. Karakostas et al. (2017) challenge the generality of this finding. If 
agents perceive an output-contingent fine as a hostile act, then they may be predisposed 
to shirking in the monitoring contract. The authors support this assertion with experi-
mental evidence that a revenue-sharing contract is preferred by most principals to a 
bonus contract. 
1.3. Incomplete Contracting 
Chapter 3 is further related to the economics literature on incomplete contracting in 
procurement. In a seminal contribution, Tirole (1986) discusses the implications of con-
tract design for non-contractible relation-specific investments in a bilateral buyer-seller 
relationship. Relatively few papers address the issue of a buyer’s inability to commit not 
to renegotiate in competitive procurement.2 Waehrer (1995) permits sellers to renege on 
their auction bids after cost uncertainty is resolved. Anticipating this, bidding competi-
tion is more intense. Wang (2000) and Shachat and Tan (2015) also consider forms of 
renegotiation after a price-based reverse auction. A feature shared by these studies and 
 
2 Renegotiation may also arise for informational purposes (Onderstal and Yang 2020). 
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the model developed here is that the auction institution allocates the contract but the 
initial price is non-binding. 
Herweg and Schwarz (2018) consider the effects of renegotiation due to a contingency 
not specified in the initial procurement contract (cost overruns). Sellers are endowed 
with a private cost type, which is observed by the buyer after the auction and before 
contract renegotiation. The buyer can specify one of two designs during the initial con-
tracting stage, which differ according to their complexity. The cost advantage of the 
efficient seller type is increasing in the design complexity and the generalised Nash bar-
gaining solution implies that the buyer should minimise this cost differential by speci-
fying the less complex design up front. The final price is higher if either the cost of the 
more complex design is higher for the winning seller, or if the winning seller is endowed 
with enough bargaining power. Since the low cost type always wins the auction, the 
outcome is efficient when there are no bargaining frictions. 
 Herweg and Schmidt (2020) analyse inefficiencies associated with ex-ante infor-
mation asymmetries in procurement project design. If a price-based auction allocates 
the procurement contract, sellers have no incentive to reveal their private information 
about potential design flaws. This can produce inefficient renegotiation, inefficient pro-
duction and/or inefficient design. The authors show that a two-stage auction process 
relying on an independent arbitrator to ex-post verify the payoff consequences of un-
foreseen events can implement an efficient procurement outcome, even when the set of 
all possible events is unknown. This stands in contrast to the usual assumption in the 
mechanism design literature that all model parameters are common knowledge ex-ante 
when implementing an allocation. Ex-post verifiability enables the arbitrator to com-
plete the mechanism by separating the problems of inducing truthful reporting of design 
flaws and truthful reporting of production costs. This is motivated by the established 
role of arbitrators in real-world dispute resolution of complex goods. 
Gretschko and Pollrich (2021) abstract from frictions in renegotiation and identify 
an alternative, information revelation, channel through which incomplete procurement 
contracts may be costly for the buyer. They consider a dynamic model in which pro-
duction takes place over two periods. In each period, sellers submit bids based on their 
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private cost information. An exogenous shock is realised at the beginning of the second 
period, which affects the value – but not ranking – of the sellers’ production costs. Thus, 
the optimal mechanism selects the same seller in each period. In the absence of contrac-
tual incompleteness, an option contract can implement the surplus-maximizing alloca-
tion. When contracts cannot be conditioned on cost realizations, the buyer must nego-
tiate prices in the second period. Implementing the efficient allocation now requires 
restricting the buyer’s information about the seller’s cost type. Gretschko and Pollrich  
show that this can be achieved in equilibrium by using an English auction with optimal 
reserve price, followed by a take-it-or-leave-it offer, if the exogenous production cost 
shock is publicly observable and there is no supplier switching during the procurement 
relationship. 
McAfee and McMillan (1986) show that, with seller-side moral hazard, the best linear 
contract under risk-neutrality trades off the expected marginal benefit to the buyer of 
sharing in more of the seller’s cost uncertainty (lower payment due to greater bidding-
competition) against the expected marginal cost (higher payment due to a distortion in 
effort incentives).3 The seller’s cost in this context consists of a base cost drawn from a 
known distribution, a random cost shock and a discretionary cost reduction. While the 
total cost is observable by everyone after procurement occurs, the discretionary cost 
reduction is decided by the seller after submitting his bid and has an effort cost that is 
unobservable to the buyer. If sellers are risk-averse, then there is an additional benefit 
to the buyer of sharing in more of the seller’s cost uncertainty, as in the classic principal-
agent analysis (e.g., Weitzman 1980). 
1.4. Bertrand Entry Games 
Chapter 4 is further related to industrial organization models with non-zero entry 
costs. Lang and Rosenthal (1991) show that with symmetric randomization over entry 
and bids, the expected price is non-decreasing in the number of potential entrants. This 
 
3 Linear contracts are commonly used in practice due to their ease of implementation. McAfee 
and McMillan (1987b) show that there are many cases in which the optimal general mechanism 
is a linear contract. 
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counter-intuitive result arises from a trade-off: while the larger number of potential 
entrants pushes down the lowest-order bidding statistic, this effect is overshadowed by 
the combination of each supplier being less likely to submit a bid, and any bid that is 
submitted being at a higher level. Sharkey and Sibley (1993) set out a similar model, 
permitting non-linear pricing in the form of two-part tariffs. An alternative approach 
allows for observed entry and yields similar qualitative predictions for the case of sym-
metric firms (Elberfeld and Wolfstetter 1999). 
The Bertrand competition model with entry is related to the theoretical literature 
on auctions with an endogenous number of bidders. Herein, equilibrium is also formu-
lated in terms of symmetric mixed strategies (Levin and Smith 1994, Samuelson 1985). 
These models arose as a response to dissatisfaction with deterministic entry and asym-
metric equilibria in pure strategies (Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1987, McAfee and McMillan 
1987a). Pevnitskaya (2004) extends the endogenous auction entry model to account for 
risk preferences. Lu (2010) and Moreno and Wooders (2011) incorporate heterogeneous 
entry costs. The main result of this literature is that it is not always optimal for a 
reserve price to exceed the auctioneer’s valuation and screen potential bidders. This 
contrasts to the case of a fixed number of bidders.  
A series of experiments test the performance of the stochastic entry model in inde-
pendent private value auctions with endogenous entry. Smith and Levin (2001) find 
support for the mixed strategy equilibrium, using a one-stage entry game in which pay-
offs are linked to the number of market participants via the risk-neutral Nash bidding 
function. This design ensures that incentives are not influenced by differences in sub-
jects’ bidding abilities. Cox et al. (2001) test the behavioural validity of the model in a 
common value first-price auction where private signals are learnt after the entry cost is 
sunk. Subjects are informed about the market size before bidding and the opportunity 
cost of submitting a bid is varied between subjects. Observed behaviour is consistent 
with the comparative statics of the model. Subjects tend not to enter in periods where 
the entry cost exceeds expected equilibrium profits.4  
 
4 In a follow-up experiment, Casari and Cason (2016) incorporate qualified entry into a common 
value auction experiment with voluntary entry. A separate experimental literature examines 
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Palfrey and Pevnitskaya (2008) test the stochastic entry model in a first-price private 
value auction setting. They find over-entry across a range of outside option levels and 
value distributions. There is strong evidence of a self-selection effect, with less risk-
averse bidders reaching the second stage. 
Reverse auctions with wealth-constrained bidders have been studied theoretically and 
empirically by Chang et al. (2016).5 Their environment is based on a private plus com-
mon cost structure. Sellers are endowed with the same degree of bargaining power but 
differ in their ability to absorb losses. Strong sellers can accommodate any loss without 
defaulting, whereas wealth-constrained sellers always default. Both buyers and sellers 
incur a cost in the event of seller bankruptcy. In a standard first-price auction, strong 
sellers can afford to bid relatively more aggressively. The addition of a post-auction 
opportunity to renegotiate the price changes the predictions when there are wealth-
constrained sellers in the population. These sellers can use the credible threat of default 
to renegotiate higher prices, thereby distorting their strategic incentives at the auction. 
A trade-off emerges between the probability of default and the higher prices paid by 
buyers. Chang (2019) observes that renegotiation opportunities may even induce sellers 
to increase their credibility of default, in anticipation of greater bargaining power. 
Finally, Chapter 4 also connects with research at the intersection between operations 
management and finance, in particular on trade credit (for a survey, see Seifert et al. 
2013). Operations models typically specify that buyers are willing to pay a premium for 
the vertical operational role of trade credit, such as to deter moral hazard (Babich and 
Tang 2012) or share demand risk (Kouvelis and Zhao 2012). Suppliers may in turn make 
financing agreements available as a signal of quality (Long et al. 1993). The horizontal 
effects of trade credit are less well developed. Peura et al. (2017) use a Bertrand model 
with liquidity shocks to show how suppliers might benefit from the use of trade credit 
 
subjects’ selection into and valuation of different auction formats (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and 
Katok 2005, Ertaç et al. 2011, Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon 2008, 2011). Aycinena et al. (2018) 
compare revenue outcomes across independent private value auction formats and information 
structures in which potential bidders know their valuation before making the entry decision. 
5 Engelmann et al. (2020) study the effects of buyer default at online consumer auctions. In this 
setting, strategic behaviour comes from the bidders rather than the auctioneer, while there is 
typically a reserve bidder to ensure that trade occurs. 
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contracts because of a softening in horizontal price competition. Firms in a stronger 
financial position may be able to use trade credit to exclude their weaker competitors. 
These studies, however, assume timely payment and no supplier reaction to payment 
beyond the agreed term, which differs from the model developed here.  
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2 Procurement Contracts with Retainage 
“Many transactions will potentially be too costly to undertake if the participants 
cannot rely on efficient and equitable adaptation to those unforeseen contingencies”  
- David M. Kreps (1990, p. 92). 
2.1. Introduction 
It is common practice for public and private sector entities to rely on competitive 
procurement to obtain goods and deliver projects.6 For standardised goods, price com-
petition promotes productive efficiency. For non-standardised goods, such as complex 
construction or infrastructure projects, the benefits of competition are less straightfor-
ward. Procurers often rely on ex-post incentives to mitigate the risk of supplier non-
performance.7 It can be difficult, however, for the procurer to write complete and en-
forceable agreements ex-ante that condition price on the quality of works delivered 
(Chakravarty and MacLeod 2009, Gretschko and Pollrich 2021). Supplier cost-cutting is 
an ever-present issue (Lo et al. 2007, Midler 2007). This may manifest itself in reduced 
quality materials or unethical/unsustainable production processes (Chen and Lee 2016, 
Guo et al. 2015). Intense competition for the contract may further increase suppliers’ 
incentives to cut corners later on (Chaturvedi 2021), or adversely affect relationship-
building (Emiliani and Stec 2005). 
An understudied incentive mechanism used in procurement to mitigate supplier 
moral hazard is retainage. A retainage provision, or retention as it is known outside the 
United States, is a pre-agreed percentage of the contractual price withheld from a seller 
by the buyer. The buyer in this context might be a client, main contractor or sub-
contractor withholding money from a lower tier. Retainage has its origins in nineteenth-
 
6 The World Bank estimates that, on average, public procurement constitutes 14.5% of gross 
domestic product globally (Djankov et al. 2017). 
7 See, e.g., Bajari et al. (2014) in highway procurement. An alternative mechanism to overcome 
the tension between competition and cooperation in procurement is proposed by Chakraborty et 
al. (2021). In a mixed adverse selection and moral hazard model, they show that incentives to 
mitigate shirking by sellers can be provided either by limiting the number of bidders, or by using 
an inefficient auction allocation rule. 
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century British railway construction, when it was set at 20% of contractual value (Baus-
man 2004). Today, typical provisions range from 3% to 10% and provisions are found 
across most standard construction contract types (Cox et al. 2011, Nabi Mohamad et 
al. 2021).8 On substantial completion, retainage is released back to the seller, minus any 
deductions for defects. Measures to safeguard retainage vary by country and locale.9 
In this chapter, we develop a structurally new game and experimental design to offer 
managerial insights on how retainage principles mediate trust and trustworthiness in 
procurement settings with moral hazard. Specifically, we investigate how and when con-
tractual retainage can be used to mitigate the seller moral hazard problem in a two-tier 
supply chain. If operating as intended, retainage circumvents the difficulties in writing 
a complete contract and effectively aligns project incentives (Raina and Tookey 2013). 
An alternative view cited among practitioners is that retainage negatively impacts con-
tractors’ cashflow, thereby acting as a financial constraint and generating a counter-
productive increase in procurement costs. Recognition of a potential hidden cost of re-
tainage has driven a downward trend in the maximum retainage provision permitted by 
several US states (ASA 2018). The efficiency of using retainage to mitigate moral hazard 
is understudied and is challenging to measure using empirical data due to the nuances 
and complexity of each construction project. The lab enables us to isolate the causal 
effect of retainage on bids, quality and profits, without the confounds of project-specific 
factors or alternative mechanisms (e.g., repeated interactions) observed in the real world.  
An important consideration in the implementation of retainage is what, in practice, 
constitutes substantial completion. Legal scholars have long recognised the difficulties 
 
8 In the UK, standard building contracts are produced by the Joint Contracts Tribunal, which 
encourages the holding of retention monies until practical completion. In the US, standard De-
sign-Build agreements include those produced by the American Institute of Architects, Consen-
susDocs and the Engineers Joint Contract Documents Committee. These contracts often specify 
that half of the retainage money be released immediately, while the remainder is released after 
the expiration of a defects liability period. 
9 The European Commission (2009, clause 41) prescribes that retainage monies “are not paid 
until the satisfaction of conditions specified in the contract for the payment of such amounts or 
until defects have been rectified”. In New Zealand, the Construction Contracts Amendment Act 
2015 provides additional protection for the payment of retainage monies to sub-contractors. In 
China, retainage applies to pre-specified defects liability periods and at the time of writing enjoys 
additional financial guarantees from the Agricultural Bank of China. 
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inherent in determining such a doctrine (Thomas et al. 1995).10 Failure of trade parties 
to understand their contractual obligations is one of the leading causes of construction 
disputes (Arcadis 2020). Litigation is often lengthy to pursue. A costly dispute between 
the Californian construction contractor, FTR, and its client Rio School District, over 
the latter’s failure to release more than half a million dollars of retainage persisted for 
many years before being resolved in FTR’s favour in 2015.11 Recently, a construction 
sector consultation commissioned by the UK Department of Business, Energy & Indus-
trial Strategy (Pye Tait Consulting 2017) found that late and non-payment of retainage 
monies from clients to contractors is commonplace, especially among lower tier suppliers. 
Whether or not the withholding of retainage monies is justified is often unclear, precisely 
because of the difficulties in verifying substantial performance. What is clear from the 
report is that a substantial fraction of clients believes their overall project costs are 
higher because of retainage, that retainage induces the possibility of opportunistic pay-
ment behaviour and that tender prices reflect this countervailing buyer moral hazard. 
The buyer moral hazard problem is accentuated when suppliers make relation-specific 
investments before a contract is confirmed. In 2016, German automaker Volkswagen 
(VW) cancelled orders worth 500 million euros with two component suppliers, in the 
wake of the emissions scandal that forced VW to cut approximately one billion euros in 
costs. The cancellation came too late for their suppliers, however, who had already spent 
58 million euros making factory alterations in preparation to receive the order (Rauwald 
2016).  
Similar situations can arise in the construction industry. One example is when a 
project proceeds based on a letter of intent (LOI). There are various types of LOI, from 
a mere handshake agreement stating the intention of parties to trade, to an interim 
contract that is replaced by a binding contract on expiration, to a non-binding trade 
agreement in its own right. The peril of supplying under an LOI, without a concrete 
 
10 Corbin (1919) captured the essence over a century ago: “What constitutes substantial perfor-
mance must be determined with reference to the particular facts in each case. The question is 
always one of degree and its solution must be doubtful in many cases” (p. 761). 
11 FTR International, Inc. v Rio School District. California Court of Appeal, 2015. 
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payment schedule, is demonstrated by a notable English contract law case.12 In 2005, 
RTS Systems won a competitive tender to supply improved food packaging for the Ger-
man dairy manufacturer Müller. Work began based on an LOI and Müller paid RTS 
only 30% of the agreed price up front and a further 40% later on. After expiration of 
the LOI and repeated deferral in the execution of a binding contract, Müller alleged 
product defects and refused to pay RTS the remaining 30% of the tender price. A pro-
tracted and costly legal battle ensued, centred around the basis for which a contractual 
agreement existed. The Supreme Court Justice pronounced on judgement day that “the 
moral of the story is to agree first and to start work later”.  Nevertheless, today “the 
use of LOIs remains widespread in the construction industry” (Wevill 2015, p. 29). The 
buyer, while not explicitly designating withheld monies as retainage, withholds a high 
percentage of the purchase price up front. It is not difficult to specify cost structures 
which expose suppliers to losses and deter them from participating in requests for bids. 
The previous anecdotal evidence suggests that, by varying the percentage of the 
contract price withheld by the buyer until after delivery of the project, we shift the 
relative burdens of trust between buyer and seller. To that end, we compare the perfor-
mance of procurement contracts in which there is either (i) zero retainage – a fixed-
price contract, (ii) a retainage provision set such that suppliers can adjust their bid 
upwards to compensate for the increased risk of non-payment of monies, or (iii) high 
retainage in which the buyer pays only a small percentage of the contract price up front, 
and consequently suppliers cannot fully compensate for future production costs incurred 
by bidding higher. These three arrangements approximate the market conditions (rather 
than specific parameters) discussed above. That is, there is either a one-sided seller 
moral hazard problem, a two-sided buyer and seller moral hazard problem, or a one-
sided buyer moral hazard problem.  
We develop an analytical model that consists of a sealed-bid reverse auction (tender) 
followed by a bilateral trade interaction. Specifically, a single buyer seeks to procure one 
unit of an indivisible good (e.g., construction of a new school) from a pool of multiple 
 
12 RTS Flexible Systems Limited v Molkerei Alois Müller GmbH [2010] 14 UKSC. 
16 
 
pre-qualified suppliers. There is a commitment to procure at the lowest price (if at all) 
and the contract contains a fixed retainage provision. After allocation of the contract, 
the seller takes costly action to deliver the project and the buyer realizes the project 
value as a function of the seller’s action. The buyer then has discretion over the retainage 
return decision. In other words, the buyer decides how to allocate retainage monies to 
compensate the seller for performance delivered. 
The retainage-related part of the transaction is predicated on trust, and so game-
theoretic arguments based on standard preferences predict that the retainage mechanism 
generates no quality improvement. Trust between agents (i.e., managers) is an important 
driver of supply chain success (Cerić 2016). Thus, we develop a model of fair payment 
norms, in which the buyer may be trustworthy or untrustworthy. We adopt Özer and 
Zheng’s (2019, p. 497) definition of trustworthiness as a voluntary behaviour “in a way 
not to take advantage of the trustor’s vulnerable position when faced with a self-serving 
decision that conflicts with the trustor’s objective”. Whereas an untrustworthy buyer 
always withholds retainage from the seller, a trustworthy buyer distributes retainage 
according to some known and exogenous fairness norm. Trust is defined as the seller’s 
belief about interacting with a trustworthy buyer (Herold 2010). 
Standard preferences imply that trade efficiency will be low in procurement contracts 
(i) and (ii) as a consequence of the seller moral hazard problem, and nil in contract (iii) 
as the market unravels. By contrast, our model of fair payment norms demonstrates 
that if there exists sufficient trust in the market then high quality delivery emerges as 
an equilibrium outcome in anticipation of a reciprocal retainage payment. Designed 
appropriately and considering what constitutes a fair outcome in a particular procure-
ment relationship, retainage can mitigate the seller moral hazard problem. We fit our 
behavioural model to the data  and provide a characterization of the optimal retainage 
level, given prevailing levels of trust and beliefs about fairness. By doing so, we contrib-
ute to a growing behavioural operations literature addressing how social preferences 
influence supply chain contracting (Beer et al. 2018, Cui et al. 2007, Davis and Hyndman 
2018, Hu et al. 2017, Katok and Pavlov 2013, Loch and Wu 2008). 
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Our experimental data offers several insights for practitioners in construction and 
related procurement settings: (1) retainage mitigates the seller moral hazard problem 
and increases trade efficiency; (2) retainage provisions inflate tender prices; (3) high 
retainage structures deter supplier participation in the contracting process and under-
mine overall procurement efficiency (which we will refer to here as global efficiency); and 
(4) suppliers may inadequately adjust their bids in anticipation of uncertain retainage 
returns, leaving them vulnerable to losses for production costs incurred. 
2.2. Model and Theory 
Consider a one-shot interaction in which a single buyer seeks to procure one unit of 
an indivisible good from a group of 𝑛 pre-qualified suppliers, indexed by 𝑖. A first-price 
sealed-bid reverse auction determines selection of the winning supplier (henceforth the 
seller) and the contract price. Auction participation is voluntary for suppliers, and the 
buyer can choose to not purchase after observing the contract price.13 The seller can 
produce either a high- or low-quality unit, but the setting prohibits quality contingent 
contracts. 
In our setting, the contract price is less binding than usual as purchases are made 
with retainage provisions. Such a provision includes a retainage proportion 𝜌, which is 
a fraction of the contract price withheld from the seller until after unit production. A 
general interpretation of 𝜌 is as the degree of price flexibility. After production, the 
buyer observes her valuation and (indirectly) the seller’s action. The amount of retainage 
released to the seller is then at the buyer’s discretion. The retainage proportion thus 
regulates each party’s trust burden: at low levels, the buyer possesses limited insurance 
against low quality production; at high levels, the seller is vulnerable to financially 
damaging retainage return decisions. The sequence of events is displayed in Figure 2.1.  
In the Bidding Stage, each supplier simultaneously submits his bid, 𝑏 , or chooses 
not to participate in the auction process. If at least one seller submits a bid, the one 
submitting the lowest bid wins the auction and the contract price is the winner’s bid, 
 
13 Discretion clauses are common in construction tenders. 
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𝑝 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑏 ,⋯ , 𝑏 }. Ties are broken randomly. If no bid is submitted, all parties earn 
zero and we call this outcome “market unravelling”. When an auction succeeds, the 
profile of bidding-stage actions is announced before the next stage. 
In the Procurement Stage, the buyer either accepts the winning bid and pays (1 − 𝜌)𝑝 
to the winner, or she accepts it resulting in all parties earning zero. The buyer’s Pro-
curement Stage action is 𝑎 ∈ {𝑎 , 𝑎 }, where 𝑎  is a rejection and 𝑎  is an acceptance. 
A buyer’s agreement to purchase initiates a fundamental transformation (Williamson 
1985), which describes the transition from an ex-ante competitive market in which mul-
tiple suppliers have the opportunity to tender their bid, to an ex-post bilateral trade 
relationship between the buyer and seller. 
In the Production Stage, the seller chooses to produce either a high- or low-quality 
unit, 𝑞 ∈ {𝑞 , 𝑞 }. The seller incurs a sunk production cost 𝑐  for quality level 𝑗.  Pro-
duction cost schedules are the same across suppliers and this is common knowledge. A 
seller’s cost of producing high quality is greater than his cost of producing low quality, 
𝑐 > 𝑐 > 0. Likewise, the buyer’s valuation of the unit is increasing in quality and 
given by 𝑣 . Trade is preferred to no trade and surplus is increasing in quality, i.e.,  𝑣 −
𝑐 > 𝑣 − 𝑐 ≥ 0.  
Finally, in the Payment Stage, the buyer observes the seller’s chosen quality level 
and then selects a fraction, 𝑟, of the retainage money to return to the seller. The inter-
action ends and profits are realised. 
Formally, a supplier 𝑖’s strategy has two components. These are a Bidding Stage 
action 𝑏 ∈ {[𝑐 , 𝑣 ], 𝑏 } and a quality choice function 𝑞 (𝑏 |𝑏 = 𝑝, 𝑎 = 𝑎 ). Bids can be 
submitted from a continuous interval between the seller’s minimum production cost and 
a reserve price, which without loss we set to equal the buyer’s maximum valuation for 
the unit, and 𝑏  is non-participation. A buyer’s strategy also has two components: a 
procurement decision function, 𝑎(𝑝); and a retainage return function, 𝑟(𝑝, 𝑞 | 𝑎 = 𝑎 ). 
The profits of the transacting buyer and seller are, 
Buyer’s profit : Π = 𝑣 − (1 − 𝜌)𝑝 − 𝑟𝜌𝑝 




Figure 2.1. The sequence of events in our procurement model. 
 
Notes: This is an extensive game tree representation of the strategic interaction. 
Suppliers move first and either submit a bid 𝑏  at auction or choose not to partici-
pate. If a market forms, the buyer can either accept to trade with the lowest bidder 
and make a guaranteed payment equal to (1 − 𝜌)𝑝, or refuse the transaction. The 
winning supplier (seller) then selects to produce a high quality, 𝑞 , or low quality, 
𝑞 , product and incurs the production cost . The buyer is informed about the 
product value, 𝑣 , and decides on a discretionary proportion 𝑟 of the retainage 
money 𝜌𝑝 to return to the seller. The seller earns a profit equal to the difference 
between total payment received and the cost incurred. The buyer earns a profit 
equal to the difference between value received and the total payment made. Non-
trading parties earn zero profit. 
 
 
Our primary interest is in whether and under what conditions there exists an equi-
librium solution that implements high quality. High quality is implementable if it yields 
a non-negative expected payoff to the transacting parties (buyer and seller participate 




2.2.1.  Standard theory 
In a first approach, we assume that the buyer and sellers act as strict expected profit-
maximisers. We proceed to solve for the subgame perfect equilibria (SPNE) of the game 
using backward induction.14 
Proposition 2.1.  
A. For 𝜌 ≤ 1 − , there is a unique SPNE in which 𝑏∗ =
( − )
∀ 𝑖 , 𝑎∗ = 𝑎 , 
𝑞∗ = 𝑞  and 𝑟∗ = 0. 
B. For 𝜌 > 1 − , there is a unique SPNE in which 𝑏∗ = 𝑏  ∀ 𝑖 , and the market 
unravels; off the equilibrium path, 𝑎∗ = 𝑎 , 𝑞∗ = 𝑞  and 𝑟∗ = 0. 
Proof. A. The trade quality and contract price are known in the Payment Stage (for the 
special case of zero retainage, the Payment Stage is obsolete). Since the buyer’s profit 
is decreasing in the retainage return fraction 𝑟, the buyer will always choose 𝑟 = 0. In 
the Production Stage, with certain zero retainage payment, low quality always yields 
higher profit than high quality. In the Procurement Stage, the buyer anticipates this 
and accepts to procure for all 𝑝 ≤ 𝑣 /(1 − 𝜌). In the Bidding Stage, each seller’s 
expected profit maximizing bid is the cost of low quality marked up in proportion to 
the retainage money vulnerable to loss, generating an expected profit of zero. Deviation 
to a higher price would also yield zero profit, due to the binding auction selection rule. 
Since 𝜌 ≤ 1 − 𝑐 𝑣⁄ , withdrawing from the market would not improve their position. 
For all bids strictly above 𝑐 /(1 − 𝜌), a supplier has an incentive to unilaterally undercut 
his competitors in the continuous bid interval: by doing so, he can increase the 
probability of trade from 1/𝑛 to one. The full trade surplus accrues to the buyer.  B. 
For higher retainage proportions, 𝜌 > 1 − 𝑐 𝑣⁄ , there exists no price in the available 
bid interval that would induce a seller to participate. Thus, the only rationalizable action 
in the Bidding Stage is 𝑏 . Participation would enable the buyer not only to appropriate 
 
14 Other Nash equilibria exist at higher prices and which are associated with non-participation, 
but since none of these outcomes are compatible with the production of a high quality unit, we 
ignore them here. 
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the transaction surplus, but to appropriate part of the seller’s cost outlay. Off the 
equilibrium path, the rationale for payment, production and procurement decisions are 
the same as in part A. ∎ 
Proposition 2.1 describes how the retainage proportion regulates the burden of trust 
between buyer and seller. Since the buyer always returns zero retainage, the proportion 
only influences seller participation and bids. Below a retainage threshold determined by 
the ratio of a seller’s minimum production cost to the buyer’s maximum unit valuation, 
suppliers will participate in the reverse auction, submit a bid that covers their marginal 
cost and is acceptable to the buyer, and produce low quality; the equilibrium bid in this 
interval is strictly increasing in the retainage proportion.  Above said threshold, no 
supplier wishes to participate in the auction process – no available bid at least breaks 
even – and so the market unravels. 
Corollary 2.1. Under standard preferences, (i) high quality is not an implementable 
outcome, (ii) equilibrium bids and the probability of market unravelling are non-
decreasing in 𝜌. 
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 2.1. ∎ 
2.2.2.  A model of fair payment norms 
Let us consider an alternative approach in which we depart from standard assump-
tions on the buyer’s preferences. The buyer is one of two types: with probability 𝛼, the 
buyer is trustworthy (𝑇 ); with probability (1 − 𝛼), the buyer is untrustworthy (𝑈). The 
prior probability 𝛼 is common knowledge to all agents. An untrustworthy buyer returns 
zero retainage, as before. A trustworthy buyer can be relied upon to make a fair re-
tainage return decision in exchange for high quality, constrained by the terms of the 
contract. That is, whereas low quality unambiguously warrants zero retainage return, 
the buyer moral hazard permits subjectivity in what constitutes fair compensation for 
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good performance. This formulation permits us to incorporate both positive and nega-
tive reciprocity in the model.15 
Models of distributional fairness were originally proposed to explain individual be-
haviour (e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Fehr and Schmidt 1999) and typically assume 
that the fair reference point in a bilateral relationship is the 50-50 surplus split. While 
this assumption may be appropriate to describe some firm relationships, not all supply 
chain relationships are created equal. Thus, following Cui et al. (2007), we specify that 
the fair reference point for a trustworthy buyer is 𝛾 multiplied by the seller’s profit. 
Production costs are included in profit comparisons, based on prior evidence from hold-
up experiments that buyers consider sunk costs when making decisions on surplus divi-
sions (Ellingsen and Johannesson 2004). The parameter 𝛾 is exogenous and represents 
a fairness norm, which in practice may be specific to the industry, locale or transaction. 
There are some notable special cases in this model of fair payment norms. The stand-
ard theory is captured by 𝛼 = 0. When 𝜌 = 0, the model collapses to an extensive-form 
game of complete information and Proposition 2.1 applies. In fixed-price contracts, high 
quality is never an implementable outcome regardless of the degree of trust. From now 
on we assume price flexibility (𝜌 > 0) and some probability that the buyer is trustworthy 
(𝛼 > 0). The model is analysed as an extensive-form game of incomplete information. 
We apply a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) solution concept and restrict attention 
to pure strategy equilibria. This requires that beliefs correspond to objective probabili-
ties for all equilibrium actions. 
Suppose again that suppliers compete anonymously in the Bidding Stage and that 
in the Procurement Stage, the buyer accepts any bid from which she expects to profit. 
After the fundamental transformation takes place, the seller is uncertain as to the prob-
ability with which the buyer is trustworthy. Trust is defined in our setup as the seller’s 
belief 𝛼 about interacting with a trustworthy buyer.  There is a direct mapping between 
trust beliefs and the seller’s choice to produce high quality. Our approach enables the 
 
15 The model generalises straightforwardly to the case in which low quality is also rewarded by 
trustworthy types. We find little evidence for this in our experiment. The alternate specification 
introduces a non-monotonicity into the relationship between trust and the incentive compatibility 
of high quality, which we return to below.  
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characterization of threshold trust levels at which high quality may emerge at the pop-
ulation level. Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) provide a similar application of their ERC 
theory (“the 𝛼 model”) to data from gift-exchange experiments.16 
In the Payment Stage, the buyer returns zero retainage with probability at least (1 −
𝛼). An untrustworthy buyer will always return zero (𝑟 = 0). A trustworthy buyer also 
returns zero on receipt of low quality. If the seller delivers high quality, then a trustwor-
thy buyer returns the retainage fraction necessary to achieve a profit distribution as 
close as possible to the fair reference point. In this situation, the best-response retainage 
return function for a trustworthy buyer is as follows:  
𝑟 (𝑝, 𝑞 ; 𝛾) =
𝑣 + 𝛾𝑐 + (𝜌 −  1)𝑝(1 + 𝛾)
𝜌𝑝(1 + 𝛾)
, (2.1) 
where the return in (2.1) is bounded in the unit interval. Thus, conditional on the 
winning bid, the optimal return for a trustworthy buyer produces either an interior or 
corner solution. For ease of notation, we define 𝑟 = 𝑟 (𝑝, 𝑞 ; 𝛾). The main insights of 
this section would be unchanged by assuming that a trustworthy buyer offers a large 
enough flat reward to the seller for producing high quality. By introducing a fairness 
norm into the environment, we consider a variable reward and provide some foundation 
as to how this might be determined in practice. 
Corollary 2.2. The trustworthy buyer’s retainage return fraction is (i) non-decreasing 
in quality, and (ii) non-increasing in 𝛾. 
Proof. Follows directly from  𝑣 − 𝑐 > 𝑣 − 𝑐  and inspection of the trustworthy 
buyer’s best-response retainage return function, = (𝑐 − 𝑣 ) 𝜌𝑝(1 + 𝛾)⁄ < 0. ∎ 
In the Production Stage, the seller anticipates the retainage return decision of the 
buyer and chooses a quality level 𝑗 to maximise his expected monetary payoff as follows: 
 
16 Bolton and Ockenfels succinctly explain the rationale for such an approach as follows: “much 
of what we need to know has to do with the thresholds at which behaviour deviates from the 
‘more money is preferred to less’ assumption” (p. 167). 
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𝐸[Π ] = (1 − 𝜌)𝑝 + 𝐸 𝑟 𝜌𝑝 − 𝑐   ,  
where a seller’s expectation of the retainage return fraction given his quality and bid is 
driven by his posterior belief about the buyer’s trustworthiness, with 𝐸(𝑟 ) = 0 and 
𝐸(𝑟 ) = 𝛼𝑟 . 
Definition 2.1. The breakeven bid associated with quality level 𝑗 is 𝑏 =
− ( − )
. 
Intuitively, the higher the seller’s trust and/or the trustworthy buyer’s retainage return, 
the lower the bid that a seller can profitably submit. For correct beliefs on 𝛼, any bid 
accompanying 𝑞  below the breakeven level is weakly dominated by a bid equal to 𝑏 . 
Corollary 2.3. Equilibrium bids and the probability of market unravelling are (i) non-
decreasing in 𝜌, (ii) non-increasing in 𝛼, and (iii) non-increasing in 𝛾. 
Proof. If 𝑏 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑏 , 𝑏 } always forms part of an equilibrium supplier bidding strategy, 
then this result follows directly from Definition 2.1, Corollary 2.2 and the upper bound 
restriction on the bid interval. Suppose instead that there is an equilibrium supplier 
strategy that contains a bid other than 𝑏. Holding constant the quality level, any bid 
below 𝑏 would be strictly dominated by a bid equal to 𝑏. Given the binding auction 
selection rule, it would also be a weakly dominant strategy for a competitor to undercut 
any bid above 𝑏 and deliver the quality level associated with 𝑏. Thus, any alternative 
bid cannot be part of an equilibrium supplier strategy. ∎ 
We can now characterise the conditions under which there exists a PBE associated 
with the production of a high quality unit in our environment. 
Proposition 2.2.  
If 
− ( − )
≤ 𝜌 ≤ , where 𝐴 = 1 − , 𝐵 = 1 − , 𝐶 = 1 − 𝛼𝑟 , then there exists a 




Proof. Given Corollary 2.3, the proof amounts to showing that there exist feasible 
conditions under which 𝑏 ≤ 𝑏 . This constitutes the condition on 𝜌. The left-hand 
inequality is obtained by equating the quality-specific breakeven bids per Definition 2.1. 
An additional condition necessary for this result to hold, 𝑏 > 𝑐 , is never binding 
because 𝐶(1 − 𝐴) > 0. The right-hand inequality is obtained by setting 𝑏 ≤ 𝑣 . 
Suppose the condition on 𝜌 is satisfied and so the seller prefers high quality during the 
Production Stage in anticipation of the expected retainage return equal to 𝛼𝑟 . In the 
Procurement Stage, the buyer will accept a price equal to 𝑏  independently of her type, 
because it guarantees her a non-negative profit. The procurement decision is 
uninformative, and the seller does not update his prior belief about 𝛼. In the Bidding 
Stage, there is no incentive for a supplier to deviate to a bid other than 𝑏  (Corollary 
2.3). Thus, there exists a PBE in pure strategies characterised as follows: 𝑏∗ = 𝑏  ∀ 𝑖, 
𝑎∗ = 𝑎 , 𝑞∗ = 𝑞 , 𝑟∗ = 𝑟  and 𝑟∗ = 0. ∎ 
Proposition 2.2 states that conditional on the prevailing levels of trust and beliefs 
about fairness, the retainage proportion can be set appropriately to incentivise high 
quality as an equilibrium strategy and mitigate the seller moral hazard problem. We 
call this the implementable retainage interval. The equilibrium bid is 𝑏  and so the 
buyer appropriates all the gains from trade. The buyer will always find such an outcome 
profitable and the buyer types will separate in their final retainage return decision per 
the discussion above. The two inequalities that define this interval ensure that 𝑏 ∈
[𝑐 , 𝑣 ] and 𝑏 < 𝑏 . In other words, the breakeven bid associated with high quality is 
feasible and below that of low quality. 
To understand the bounds on the implementable retainage interval intuitively, note 
that 𝐴 is a measure of seller moral hazard, 𝐵 is a measure of the trade surplus generated 
by high quality, and C is a measure of the expected retainage return fraction lost if the 
seller produces a high quality unit. As 𝐴 approaches one from below, the seller has 
greater cost incentive to produce low quality. As 𝐵 approaches one from below, there 
are greater potential gains from producing a high quality unit. Conditional on the win-
ning bid, high quality is more difficult to implement using retainage (i.e., the interval 
narrows) the larger the seller moral hazard and the smaller the trade surplus from high 
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quality. Similarly, high quality is easier to implement using retainage the smaller the 
associated expected loss of retainage.  
Corollary 2.4.  There is a direct and positive correspondence between trust and the size 
of the implementable retainage interval. 
Proof. Follows directly from inspection of the implementable retainage interval. ∎ 
To demonstrate the trade-offs between bids, participation and quality in our envi-
ronment, consider an example. Suppose that 𝑛 = 2 suppliers compete to win a procure-
ment contract, with 𝑐 = 0.30, 𝑐 = 0.40, 𝑣 = 0.35 and 𝑣 = 0.80 (units in tens of 
thousands).17 The contract contains a retainage provision, with 𝜌 = 0.50 or 𝜌 = 0.75. 
We will test these parameter values in the experiment. Figure 2.2 presents the spectrum 
of PBE outcomes in the (𝛼, 𝛾) space that are supported by the model of fair payment 
norms for each retainage arrangement. Blue circles (green squares) in the figure indicate 
beliefs for which the seller delivers low quality (high quality) as part of the equilibrium 
strategy. The number inside the shape indicates the equilibrium bid. The empty region 
indicates market unravelling. 
In the implementable regions, the equilibrium bid is (weakly) decreasing in 𝛼 and 
increasing in 𝛾. Fixing 𝛾 and moving horizontally from left to right, high quality out-
come is implementable above a certain trust threshold. Similarly, fixing 𝛼 and moving 
vertically downwards, high quality is implementable above a certain fairness threshold, 
provided 𝛼 is high enough. The right panel demonstrates that in a high retainage ar-
rangement, the behavioural model can support high quality in addition to market un-




17 By setting 𝑐𝐻 > 𝑣𝐿, we ensure that with zero retainage provision, the buyer accepts vulnera-
bility due to uncertain seller production. This is in-keeping with Özer and Zheng’s (2019) defi-
nition of trust. 
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Figure 2.2. Example: equilibrium outcomes supported by the behavioural model. 
 
Notes: The figure displays equilibrium bidding strategies in (𝛼, 𝛾) space for 𝜌 =
0.50 and 𝜌 = 0.75. All computations are based on the following cost and valuation 
parameter values: 𝑐 = 0.30, 𝑐 = 0.40, 𝑣 = 0.35 and 𝑣 = 0.80. The numbers 
inside the shapes are the equilibrium bid amounts associated with the indicated 
quality level. The empty regions indicate market unravelling. Due to space con-
straints, we only consider 𝛾 ≤ 3. Bids are discrete with minimum increment 0.01, 
which reflects the experimental implementation. 
 
We remark that if trustworthy buyers were also to reward low quality according to 
some – same or different – fairness norm 𝛾, uncertainty about the buyer’s type (i.e., 0 <
𝛼 < 1)  would become a necessary condition to incentivise sellers to deliver high quality. 
That is, a non-monotonicity would be introduced into the relationship between trust 
and the implementable retainage interval. Above a certain threshold, the high probabil-
ity of encountering a trustworthy buyer would allow the seller to submit a low bid and 
still be insured against loss in case of producing a low quality unit. In this situation, the 
lower bound on the implementable retainage interval becomes 𝐴/(𝐷 − 𝐶(1 − 𝐴)), where 
𝐷 = 1 − 𝛼𝑟  is the expected retainage return fraction lost if the seller produces a low 
quality unit. From Corollary 2.2, we have 𝐷 ≥ 𝐶, and so this new lower bound is non-
decreasing in 𝛼. As a consequence, the seller would have an incentive to undercut his 
competitor in the Bidding stage and produce low quality (𝑏 < 𝑏 ). This is always the 
case for 𝛼 = 1, i.e., when the seller knows that the buyer is trustworthy. 
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2.3. Experiment and Hypotheses 
2.3.1.  Experimental design and procedures 
To isolate the effect of contractual retainage on trade outcomes in the absence of 
confounds typically observed in the field, we conduct an experiment. In our lab setting, 
we consider the case of two suppliers.  
We employed a between-subjects design with three treatments that varied the re-
tainage provision, 𝜌 ∈ {0, 0.50, 0.75} – see Table 2.1. The 𝜌 = 0 treatment benchmarks 
previous experiments for which payment of the winning bid in full is binding on the 
buyer, i.e., a fixed-price contract (cf. Auction in Fugger, Katok and Wambach 2019). 
The 𝜌 = 0.50 treatment simulates a setting in which suppliers can fully offset the risk 
of partial or non-receipt of retainage monies by increasing their bids at auction. By 
contrast, in the 𝜌 = 0.75 treatment, there is no bid available at which a supplier can 
ensure to avoid a loss during trade. Thus, in this treatment, profitable trade can proceed 
based on the buyer’s intent to compensate the seller for costs incurred. We selected 
values 𝜌 = 0.50 and 𝜌 = 0.75 for the non-zero retainage treatments because they are the 
easiest retainage provisions for subjects to comprehend within the appropriate intervals 
from Proposition 2.1. The valuation and cost parameters associated with high and low 
quality are also summarised in Table 2.1. These values were displayed on the computer 
screens of all subjects. We restrict bids to be integers. 
Subjects were randomly allocated to one of the three treatments and no subject 
participated in more than one session. Each treatment included six independent cohorts. 
There were three cohorts of the same treatment in every session. Each cohort consisted 
of three buyers and six sellers, who were randomly matched across 30 procurement 
interactions.18 A bespoke algorithm guaranteed that no participant in a cohort played 
with the same pair of individuals in any two consecutive interactions. A total of 162 
human subjects participated in our sessions, which were conducted at the lab of a large 
public university in the United States. Participants were students recruited using web-
 
18 We did not inform subjects of the cohort size, to mitigate the possibility of tacit collusion in 
what might be considered a small cohort (see Katok 2011 for a discussion). 
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based recruitment software. Students and professionals appear to demonstrate qualita-
tively similar behaviours in the lab (Fréchette 2015). Of particular relevance for the 
generalisability of the experiments reported in this chapter and the next, procurement 
managers and construction industry professionals have also been observed to display the 
same decision-making biases as students (Dyer et al. 1989, Bolton et al. 2012). 
 
Table 2.1 – Experimental treatments and parameter values. 
Treatment Retainage Level 
Buyer’s valuation 
(𝑞 , 𝑞 ) 
Seller’s cost  
(𝑞 , 𝑞 ) 
1 𝜌 = 0.00 
(35, 80) 
 
2 𝜌 = 0.50 (30, 40) 
3 𝜌 = 0.75  
 
All sessions followed the same protocol. Upon arrival, participants were seated at 
computer terminals and handed a written copy of the instructions to read in private. 
Terminals had physical dividers to prevent subjects from seeing the screens of other 
participants. The instructions were played from an audio recording at the front to ensure 
the description of the game was common knowledge and delivery consistent across ses-
sions. The task was explained to subjects using a cover story related to the application 
of interest and the instructions included concrete terms such as “Buyer” and “Seller”. 
This was a deliberate choice to improve subject understanding (see Cooper and Kagel 
2003) and increase external validity (see Katok 2017).19 Participants completed a com-
puterised test of understanding before being assigned to their role as a buyer or seller 
and matched into their first interaction group. Roles remained fixed throughout. Com-
munication was prohibited and all interactions were anonymous. Own-group feedback 
was provided between periods. This information remained available in a history table to 
reinforce the game-theoretic assumption of “perfect recall”. At the end of a session, 
participants answered a non-incentivised questionnaire to elicit demographic 
 
19 The instructions were framed in neutral language (see Zizzo 2010). We avoided the term “re-
tainage”. Audio recordings are available on request. 
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information, and attitudes to trust and risk. The experimental interface was pro-
grammed using oTree software (Chen et al. 2016).  
Subjects received monetary incentives. Each subject was paid his or her summed 
experiment earnings privately and in cash at the end of a session, in addition to a $5 
show-up fee. Payment was made sequentially, with sufficient time intervals between any 
two subjects to mitigate against the possibility of side-payments. We used a symmetric 
exchange rate of 20 experiment currency units (ECU) to $1. Average subject earnings 
were $17.70 in the 𝜌 = 0 treatment, $22.70 in the 𝜌 = 0.50 treatment and $25.00 in the 
𝜌 = 0.75 treatment. Sessions lasted 60 to 75 minutes. Each subject received a non-re-
fundable endowment of 7 ECU per period to cover potential losses. Subjects were in-
formed that they would not leave the session with less than the show-up fee.20 To rein-
force the one-shot nature of interactions, we did not inform subjects about cumulative 
earnings until after the final period. 
2.3.2.  Hypotheses 
Below we outline the key hypotheses of interest in our experiment, based on the 
standard theory (ST) and the behavioural model of fair payment norms (BM). Our first 
two hypotheses relate to the ex-ante competitive market. 
Hypothesis 2.1. Participation. ST and BM both predict that the probability of market 
unravelling will be highest in 𝜌 = 0.75; unravelling is an absolute prediction of ST only. 
Hypothesis 2.1 captures the potential anti-competitive effect of a procurement ar-
rangement in which the seller cannot guarantee to cover future production costs. Market 
unravelling is the unique equilibrium prediction under ST. Thus, observing substantial 
participation rates in 𝜌 = 0.75 would offer support for the relevance of BM. No set of 
beliefs under BM can sustain non-participation in 𝜌 = 0 or 𝜌 = 0.50 and so market 
unravelling in these treatments is expected to be negligible. 
 
20 In 𝜌 = 0.75, limited liability was imposed for two sellers. All results reported below hold if we 
exclude these two subjects from our analysis. In a pilot experiment, we tested the most extreme 
seller trust arrangement of 100% retainage. Seller losses, however, became a problem. Summary 
statistics for this variant are available on request. 
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Hypothesis 2.2. Prices. ST predicts prices will be rank ordered 𝑝 < 𝑝 . < 𝑝 . ; 
BM predicts bids will be lowest in 𝜌 = 0. 
Hypothesis 2.2 captures the potential inflationary effect of retainage, as reflected in 
tender prices. ST predicts that, conditional on trade, as the retainage proportion in-
creases bidders will submit higher prices. BM offers no belief-independent comparative 
static between the non-zero retainage treatments but does predict that sellers will bid 
lowest in 𝜌 = 0. 
The next two hypotheses incorporate the ex-post bilateral trade relationship between 
the buyer and seller. At this point, we define a measure of trade efficiency as the pro-
portion of trade surplus realized out of the total available given the sellers’ bidding 
decisions. For our parameter values, low (high) quality corresponds to trade efficiency 
of 0.125 (1.00). 
Hypothesis 2.3. Trade efficiency. ST predicts no difference in trade efficiency among 
treatments; BM predicts that trade efficiency is weakly higher in 𝜌 > 0 than in 𝜌 = 0. 
Hypothesis 2.3 represents the main empirical test of interest: can retainage mitigate 
the moral hazard problem and incentivise high quality? Our theoretical analysis suggests 
that in 𝜌 = 0.50 and 𝜌 = 0.75, high quality is implementable under BM but not under 
ST. In 𝜌 = 0, neither model can rationalise high quality as an equilibrium outcome. In 
𝜌 = 0.75, if we observe trade then BM tells us that it is most likely to be efficient. The 
full set of equilibrium seller strategies under BM are provided in Figure 2.2. Our measure 
of trade efficiency does not consider the surplus-reducing effect of market unravelling. 
To this end, we construct an additional global efficiency measure defined as the propor-
tion of trade surplus realised out of the total attainable, i.e., if the market always at-
tracts at least one bid. To what extent the higher likelihood of market unravelling in 
𝜌 = 0.75 undermines global efficiency, relative to the other retainage arrangements, is 
an empirical question and so we do not place a formal hypothesis on the trade-off be-
tween market unravelling and trade efficiency. 
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Hypothesis 2.4. Reciprocity. ST predicts that the retainage return will be independent 
of quality; BM predicts that the retainage return will be positively correlated with the 
seller’s quality choice.  
Hypothesis 2.4 tests for the presence of buyer reciprocity. Prior economic experiments 
suggest that the existence of positive and negative reciprocity is robust in the lab to the 
imposition of demanding market institutions (e.g., Fehr and Falk 1999). If a positive 
correlation is observed between quality and the retainage return in our experiment, this 
type of behaviour would be consistent only with BM. 
2.4. Experimental Results 
In this section, we first outline the main aggregate results in relation to our four 
experimental hypotheses. Second, we analyse outcomes at the cohort-level, to gain 
greater insight into the evolution of market dynamics. Finally, we examine market 
choices at the individual-level, to better understand how retainage influences buyer and 
seller decision-making and conduct a robustness analysis to check for possible experi-
ment confounds. 
2.4.1.  Aggregate findings 
Table 2.2 summarises average seller participation rates, prices and quality levels, 
along with buyer acceptance rates and the retainage returns. The table also presents 
summary statistics on market unravelling, our efficiency measures and profits.21 Con-
sistent with Hypothesis 2.1, sellers nearly always bid in 𝜌 = 0 and 𝜌 = 0.50. By pairwise 
comparisons, the percentage of participating bidders is significantly lower (64%) in 𝜌 =
0.75 (both p-values = 0.015). This variable seller participation is reflected in different 
 
21 For each treatment, we have data from 540 matching groups. Since there is no interaction 
between subjects playing in different cohorts, each cohort is considered a statistically independent 
observation. We employ two-tailed Signed-Rank tests for one-sample comparisons and Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney tests for two-sample comparisons, correcting for multiple testing using Holm’s 
(1979) p-value adjustment method. We acknowledge the potential caveat of arbitrary static cor-
relations within sessions (Fréchette 2012). 
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rates of market unravelling. In 𝜌 = 0.75, 22% of auctions fail to attract a single bidder. 
By contrast, no market unravels in the lower retainage arrangements.  
Result 2.1. High retainage structures deter supplier participation in the contracting 
process. 
 
Table 2.2 – Cohort means and standard deviations. 
 𝜌 = 0 𝜌 = 0.50 𝜌 = 0.75 
Panel A: Decision variables 
Seller participation 0.99 0.98 0.64 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.26) 
Price 35.1 57.8 57.2 
 (1.72) (5.42) (8.08) 
Buyer acceptance 0.60 0.91 0.98 
 (0.20) (0.08) (0.01) 
High quality 0.06 0.30 0.50 
 (0.02) (0.20) (0.19) 
Retainage return (low)  0.06 0.16 
  (0.07) (0.08) 
Retainage return (high)  0.32 0.40 
  (0.16) (0.16) 
Panel B: Market outcomes 
Market unravelling 0.00 0.00 0.22 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.26) 
Trade efficiency 0.11 0.36 0.56 
 (0.03) (0.17) (0.17) 
Global efficiency 0.11 0.36 0.46 
 (0.03) (0.17) (0.25) 
Buyer profit 2.83 15.8 31.4 
 (1.07) (7.65) (2.49) 
Seller profit 4.43 -0.25 -8.75 
 (1.54) (1.60) (5.71) 
Notes: Mean (SD) values for the key parameters in our experiment based on cohort averages. 




That sellers in 𝜌 = 0.75 still choose to submit a bid in the majority of auctions, 
despite the high vulnerability to loss due to uncertain retainage return behaviour of the 
buyer, is preliminary evidence to suggest a role for trust in the decision-making process. 
BM thus provides a more satisfactory description of sellers’ participation behaviours 
than ST. Further evidence that the retainage level shifts the burden of trust in trade 
relationships away from the buyer can be inferred from buyers’ acceptance behaviours. 
The acceptance rates are increasing in the retainage level, from 60% in 𝜌 = 0 to 91% in 
𝜌 = 0.50 and 98% in 𝜌 = 0.75. 
Average contract prices are higher in 𝜌 = 0.50 (57.8) and in 𝜌 = 0.75 (57.2) than in 
𝜌 = 0 (35.1). These pairwise differences versus the zero retainage treatment are highly 
significant (both p-values < 0.01). We also reject the point prediction of ST that prices 
equal 30 in 𝜌 = 0 (p-value = 0.031); we fail to reject an average price of 60 in 𝜌 = 0.50 
(p-value = 0.563).  There is no significant difference in prices between the two non-zero 
retainage treatments, although prices are more variable when 𝜌 = 0.75. Thus, the ag-
gregate price data supports the price differences of BM outlined in Hypothesis 2.2, but 
rejects the rank ordering of ST.  
Result 2.2. Retainage provisions inflate tender prices. 
Results 2.1 and 2.2 underscore the potential for retainage to have an anti-competitive 
effect on the procurement process. The flip side is that retainage significantly improves 
average quality levels. In 𝜌 = 0, low quality is chosen by the seller in 93.9% of transac-
tions. We fail to reject the null that trade efficiency attained its Nash level of 12.5% (p-
value = 0.31). In 𝜌 = 0.50, the  proportion of transactions associated with high quality 
is 30.2%, and in 𝜌 = 0.75 it is 50.4%. The difference in quality levels between the non-
zero retainage treatments is significant at the 10% level (p-value = 0.093) and is con-
sistent with the prediction of BM that, conditional on attracting seller bids, trade in the 
high retainage arrangement is more likely to be of high quality. The relative quality 
choice frequencies in these treatments generate significant trade efficiency gains when 
compared to 𝜌 = 0 (both p-values < 0.01). As stated in Hypothesis 2.3, such an im-
provement can be rationalised only by BM. 
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Result 2.3a. Retainage mitigates the seller moral hazard problem and increases trade 
efficiency. 
Owing to the observed market unravelling, global efficiency in 𝜌 = 0.75 is 10 percent-
age points lower than trade efficiency and is not significantly higher than in 𝜌 = 0.50 (p-
value = 0.589). To further investigate the trade-off between the seller’s quality and 
participation decisions, in Figure 2.3 we plot a time series of the market unravelling 
complement and trade efficiency across the 30 periods in our experiment. The trend 
differences in trade efficiency are pronounced. In 𝜌 = 0, trade efficiency fluctuates about 
its Nash equilibrium level within the 0-25% interval. In 𝜌 = 0.50, trade efficiency fluc-
tuates within the 25-50% interval. In both of these treatments, the variability of trade 
efficiency declines over time, while the market never unravels. 
 
Figure 2.3. Decomposition of market unravelling and trade efficiency over time. 
  
Notes: Based on 18 matching groups per treatment in a period. Unravelling Com-
plement is one minus the proportion of auctions which failed to attract a single 





Most interesting is 𝜌 = 0.75, in which trade efficiency begins in the 25-50% interval 
then trends upwards over time. By the end of the session and notwithstanding an end-
game effect, nearly all transactions that take place are of high quality, which as we 
observed in Figure 2.2 (right panel) is a direct prediction of BM. Meanwhile, after period 
five, there is a marked fall in the number of auctions attracting at least one bidder. This 
trend continues into the final period, at which point around half of markets unravelled. 
Notably, in the second half of the experiment, the difference in global efficiency between 
𝜌 = 0 and 𝜌 = 0.75 is not significant at conventional levels (p-value = 0.13). On the 
other hand, global efficiency remains significantly higher in 𝜌 = 0.50 than in 𝜌 = 0 after 
period 15 (p-value = 0.015). 
Result 2.3b. High retainage structures undermine global efficiency. 
In Figure 2.4 we present relative frequencies of trade by price and quality, conditional 
on at least one bid submitted and on buyer acceptance. Prices are in intervals of 10. 
More than 85% of transactions in 𝜌 = 0 are in the 30-39 interval and the quality of these 
transactions is near-uniformly low. The majority of transactions in 𝜌 = 0.50 fall into the 
interval 50-69, with low quality most commonly observed at prices above 60, and high 
quality more likely at prices below 60. In 𝜌 = 0.75, high quality is the majority choice 
for sellers at prices above 50. These patterns offer indirect evidence to support BM.  
Turning to Hypothesis 2.4, we reject the null of independence between the quality 
level and the buyer’s retainage return predicted by ST, in favour of the reciprocal rela-
tionship predicted by BM. In 𝜌 = 0.50, the seller’s probability of receiving a non-zero 
retainage return is 31% after choosing low quality and 61.3% after choosing high quality. 
Buyers in this treatment return just 6.1% in exchange for low quality and 31.9% of 
retainage monies in exchange for high quality. In 𝜌 = 0.75, where the retainage repre-
sents a larger share of the price, return rates are 15.6% and 40.4%, respectively. The 
premiums paid for high quality in each treatment are significant (both p-values = 0.031). 
Positive reciprocity is evident in the comparative distributions of non-zero retainage 
returns by quality level (see Figure 2.5). 
Result 2.4. Buyers reciprocate high quality with a more generous retainage return. 
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Figure 2.4. Relative frequencies of trade by price group and quality level. 
 
Notes: Relative frequencies are conditional on trade. 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Distributions of non-zero retainage returns by quality level. 
 
Notes: Histograms of strictly positive retainage returns.  
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Retainage also has implications for the distribution of profits. In 𝜌 = 0, sellers are 
able to maintain a positive profit and even earn slightly more (4.43) than buyers (2.83) 
on average, although this difference is not significant (p-value = 0.156). Buyers gain 
substantially from the introduction of retainage. In 𝜌 = 0.50, sellers earn approximately 
zero (which would be expected given the market imbalance) and buyers earn 15.8, a 
significant profit differential (p-value = 0.031).  Sellers fare significantly worse in 𝜌 =
0.75, incurring an average loss of 8.75, suggesting that their trust in the buyer’s willing-
ness to reciprocate is often misplaced. 
Our theoretical analysis is equilibrium-based. To check whether subjects’ learning in 
the experiment is an important behavioural factor, we split the dataset into three blocks 
of 10 periods and conduct a formal analysis of the differences in decision-making over 
time. The full results of this analysis are provided in the appendix. There is some evi-
dence of learning early on, but that behaviour appears to converge after period 10, with 
no significant differences in buyer or seller decisions between the second and third blocks. 
2.4.2.  Cohort dynamics 
To obtain insight into the market dynamics observed over the course of the 
experiment, we consider each cohort separately and plot the outcomes per interaction 
group and period, in relation to the winning bid (Figure 2.6). This approach yields 90 
observations per cohort. The figure displays outcomes for two representative cohorts per 
treatment, which capture the main trends that emerge. An open triangle is an instance 
of market unravelling and a cross is transaction failure due to buyer rejection of the 
winning bid. A solid circle (square) is an accepted winning bid at which the seller 
produced low (high) quality, and an open circle (square) is the corresponding total 
payment. The arrows capture the differential between agreed price and total payment.  
The top two panels in Figure 2.6 correspond to 𝜌 = 0. The top-left cohort exemplifies 
the disciplining power of competition with a fixed-price contract: after some early 
adjustments, sellers submit bids in the 30-35 interval and choose low quality. The top-
right cohort reveals a different dynamic: sellers attempt to elicit buyer acceptances at 





Figure 2.6. Representative cohort outcomes over time. 
 
Notes: Panels display procurement outcomes over time in the specified treatment 
and cohort. An open triangle is an instance of market unravelling, in which neither 
seller submitted a bid. A cross is a transaction failure, in which a buyer rejected 
the winning bid. A solid circle is an accepted winning bid at which the seller pro-
duced low quality. A solid square is an accepted winning bid at which the seller 
produced high quality. An open circle (square) are the corresponding total payments 
in instances where these differ from the winning bid. In such instances, the vertical 





The middle two panels in the figure reveal a reverse bidding trend in 𝜌 = 0.50, as 
sellers learn to adjust their bids upwards to account for retainage monies lost over time. 
In the middle-left cohort, sellers produce low quality, marking up their bids proportional 
to the associated cost. In the middle-right cohort, sellers produce high quality and buyers 
reward this with a positive retainage return, compensating sellers for the increased 
delivery cost.  
The bottom two panels in the figure highlight variable participation in 𝜌 = 0.75. In 
the bottom-left cohort, sellers gradually choose not to participate in request for bids. 
Two-thirds of markets unravel in this cohort. Sellers in the bottom-right cohort are 
willing to participate and produce high quality. Where a buyer fails to reciprocate, the 
seller’s downside is larger than in 𝜌 = 0.50, resulting in losses on average. 
2.4.3.  Individual decision-making 
To analyse individual bidding decisions in the ex-ante competitive market, we code 
each seller non-participation decision as a bid at one increment above the highest 
available. We then use a Tobit estimator that censors the bid from above (Table 2.3). 
We include the once-lagged competitor’s bid and once-lagged trade as predictors, along 
with a time trend and control variables from the post-experiment questionnaire. 
Standard errors are clustered at the subject-level.22  
In all three treatments, we infer that bids exhibit a positive dependency on the most 
recently matched competitor’s bid and that subjects who traded in the most recent 
period learn to submit lower bids. The smaller sample size in column (3) reflects the 
elevated seller non-participation in 𝜌 = 0.75. In an (unreported) regression, we further 
estimate determinants of participation in 𝜌 = 0.75. Only the (negative) time trend is a 
significant predictor of entry decisions (p-value = 0.011). 
 
22 All results reported in this section are qualitatively unchanged if we account for non-independ-
ence of observations by clustering standard errors at the cohort-level or using a random effects 
estimator. A few subjects did not provide a complete set of responses in the post-experiment 
questionnaire. The results are robust to dropping the control variables and using the full dataset. 
The once-lagged competitor’s bid and once-lagged trade variables are correlated and so problem-
atic for causal inference; the sign and significance of the partial effects are unchanged by running 
separate regressions in which we include only one of the two variables as a predictor. 
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Table 2.3 – Censored regression of sellers’ bids in the ex-ante competitive market. 
 Bid 
 𝜌 = 0 𝜌 = 0.5 𝜌 = 0.75 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Competitor’s bid t-1 0.24*** 0.51*** 0.38*** 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) 
Trade t-1 -4.68*** -6.35*** -5.76* 
 (0.86) (1.04) (2.48) 
Period -0.16* 0.16*** 0.55*** 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.12) 
Constant 26.73*** 29.98*** 48.99*** 
 (5.90) (8.76) (12.78) 
Control variables1 Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -3390 -3448 -2033 
Observations 942 995 603 
Notes: The models were estimated using a Tobit regression; seller non-participation decisions are 
coded as bids equal to 81. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the subject level.  
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.  
1 The controls include self-reported risk and trust indices, dummies for female and economics or 
business major, age and income rank (coefficient estimates are available on request). 
 
In Table 2.4 we conduct a series of Logit regressions to investigate the determinants 
of buyer and seller decisions in the ex-post trade relationship with a retainage contract.23 
In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is a dummy variable for high quality 
seller production. In columns (3) and (4), we consider specifications in which the 
dependent variable is the buyer’s retainage return fraction and fit a fractional response 
model.  
There is a significant quadratic relationship between price and quality in both 
treatments. For 𝜌 = 0.50, this is consistent with the observation from BM that above a 
certain price, low quality is the unique equilibrium choice (left panel in Figure 2.2). The 
positive and significant coefficient estimate on the once-lagged retainage return in 𝜌 =
0.50 suggests that retainage provisions are most effective at mitigating seller-side moral 
hazard when the seller has had a recent positive trade experience with this type of 
contract. In 𝜌 = 0.75, we also observe a positive effect of the once-lagged return on the 
 
23 We also conducted regression analyses for 𝜌 = 0 with the buyer’s acceptance and seller’s quality 
decision as dependent variables. Acceptances are significantly decreasing in winning bid (p-value 
= 0.001) and high quality is more likely at higher prices (p-value = 0.029). 
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probability of high quality (p-value = 0.083). There is also a highly significant positive 
time trend in this treatment. This appears to capture the withdrawal of less trusting 
sellers from the market (see next section) and suggests that high retainage structures 
are most effective at inducing high quality once trust is established.  
There is strong evidence to support the positive reciprocity prediction of BM in 
Hypothesis 2.4 – high quality has a significant positive effect on the retainage return in 
both treatments. The significant negative relationship between price and the retainage 
return suggests that buyers are concerned about distributional outcomes in their return 
decision. 
 
Table 2.4 – Logit regression analysis of buyer and seller decisions in the ex-post bi-
lateral trade relationships with the retainage contract. 
 High quality  Retainage return2 
 𝜌 = 0.50 𝜌 = 0.75  𝜌 = 0.50 𝜌 = 0.75 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Price 0.95* 0.35**  -0.07*** -0.02** 
 (0.40) (0.11)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Price^2 -0.01* -0.003**    
 (0.004) (0.001)    
Retainage return t-1 1.72** 0.68    
 (0.58) (0.39)    
High quality    3.16*** 1.84*** 
    (0.48) (0.33) 
Period 0.01 0.16***  -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.04)  (0.02) (0.01) 
Constant -27.61* -4.75  12.02*** -0.74 
 (11.66) (3.29)  (2.29) (1.77) 
Control Variables1 Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Log Likelihood -120.04 -73.22  -121.5 -200.3 
Observations 236 178  492 415 
Notes: Coefficient estimates are on the logit scale with robust standard errors in parentheses, 
clustered at the subject level. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.  
1 The controls include self-reported risk and trust indices, dummies for female and economics or 
business major, age and income rank (coefficient estimates are available on request).  




Finally, we conduct a robustness analysis to test for the presence of two possible 
experiment confounds in the 𝜌 = 0.50 and 𝜌 = 0.75 treatments. We use the distinctive-
ness, relevance and plausibility (DRP) method of Zizzo (2013). 
(i) Wealth effects. Subjects’ behaviour might change as they accumulate earnings 
over the course of the experiment at variable rates. Wealth effects are distinctive from 
the determinants of behaviour considered in the behavioural model. They are same-
direction relevant for the seller’s choice of high quality. If subjects exhibit decreasing 
absolute risk aversion, then the accumulation of earnings over the experiment may lead 
them to choose the riskier choice (high quality) more often in the knowledge that they 
have a buffer against possible losses. 
 (ii) Limited liability. Limited liability is distinctive and relevant in the opposing 
direction to wealth effects: as cumulative earnings fall towards zero, sellers may exhibit 
more risk-seeking behaviour in the knowledge that their downside is limited to zero. It 
is not “magnifying glass relevant” to the extent that firms entering into procurement 
transactions are vulnerable to going out of business if they make losses on multiple 
transactions. 
To investigate the plausibility of these possible confounds, we re-run the regression 
analyses in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.4, with the additional inclusion of a seller’s 
unlimited cumulative earnings as a regressor. The results are presented in Table 2.5. 
The determinants of high quality are qualitatively unchanged in both treatments. Cu-
mulative earnings display no statistical relationship with the seller’s choice of high qual-
ity in the 𝜌 = 0.50 treatment. In the 𝜌 = 0.75 treatment, there is a positive effect of 
cumulative earnings on the probability of high quality, although the effect size is small. 
There remains a significant upward trend in market quality over time in the 𝑝 = 0.75 
treatment which is independent of earnings.  
We will provide evidence in the next section to suggest that this trend captures the 





Table 2.5 – Cumulative earnings and sellers’ quality decisions. 
 High quality 
 𝜌 = 0.50 𝜌 = 0.75 
 𝛽 ̂ 𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑥⁄  𝛽 ̂ 𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑥⁄  
Price 0.91* 0.15** 0.25* 0.03* 
 (0.39) (0.06) (0.12) (0.01) 
Price ^ 2 -0.01* -0.001** -0.002 -0.0003* 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0001) 
Retainage return t-1 1.86** 0.31*** 0.48 0.06 
 (0.62) (0.09) (0.39) (0.05) 
Period 0.09 0.02 0.17*** 0.02*** 
 (0.07) (0.01) (0.04) (0.004) 
Cumulative earnings < t -0.01 -0.002 0.01** 0.001** 
 (0.01) (0.002) (0.003) (0.0004) 
Constant -26.66*  -2.25  
 (11.24)  (3.54)  
Control Variables1 Yes Yes 
Log Likelihood -118.8 -70.12 
Observations 236 178 
Notes: Coefficient estimates (𝛽)̂ are on the logit scale, with average marginal effects (𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑥⁄ ) 
reported alongside. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the subject level.  
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.  
1 The controls include self-reported risk and trust indices, dummies for female and economics or 
business major, age and income rank (coefficient estimates are available on request). 
 
2.5. Behavioural Model Estimation 
The findings outlined in the previous section suggest that our model of fair payment 
norms can organise several behavioural patterns observed in the data. In the theoretical 
analysis, we reduced the buyer population to two types: trustworthy and untrustworthy. 
A crude look at the individual-level buyer return data after period 10 supports the 
existence of different buyer types in the experiment. Across the pooled retainage data, 
18 out of 36 buyers either returned zero or made a partial retainage return in exchange 
for high quality which resulted in the seller incurring a loss. This number increases to 
28 in exchange for low quality, which suggests that buyers exhibit both positive and 
negative reciprocity in the experiment and provides some empirical justification for our 
assumption that trustworthy buyers reward only high quality. Moreover, 15 buyers 
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always returned some positive fraction to the seller in exchange for high quality, with 
mean returns among these subjects often exceeding 50% of the retainage amount. 
To examine seller trust and beliefs about fairness, we conduct a maximum likelihood 
estimation of our behavioural model’s parameters in a logit choice framework. The prob-
ability that seller 𝑖 chooses high quality in period 𝑡 conditional on price 𝑝 and retainage 
𝜌 is: 
𝑃𝑟 (𝑞 ) =
𝑒 ∙
1 + 𝑒 ∙
, (2.2) 
where ∆𝑈 = 𝛼𝑟 (𝑝 , 𝑞 ; 𝛾)𝜌𝑝 − (𝑐 − 𝑐 ), and 𝜆 is the rationality parameter which 
is inversely related to the level of decision error (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995). For the 
trust parameter, we specify 𝛼 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐼 + 𝛽 𝑡 + 𝛽 𝑡 ∙ 𝐼 , where 𝐼  is a 
dummy variable for 𝜌 = 0.75, which captures level and trend differences between our 
retainage treatments. We restrict 𝛾 > 0 by transforming 𝛾̃ = ln(𝛾) to keep the optimi-
zation problem unconstrained. The resulting likelihood function is given by: 
𝐿(𝛼, 𝛾, 𝜆) = [𝑃𝑟 (𝑞 )] [1 − 𝑃𝑟 (𝑞 )] −
==
, (2.3) 
where the total number of sellers is 𝑁  and the total number of periods is 𝑇 . We cluster 
robust standard errors at the subject level. Based on our learning analysis in the previ-
ous section and to mitigate issues of serial correlation (Davis 2015, p. 334), we drop 
observations from the first block of 10 periods. This leaves us with a total of 573 trans-
actions across the two treatments, of which 322 are from 𝜌 = 0.50 and 251 are from 𝜌 =
0.75. The results of this estimation are presented in Table 2.6. We consider three speci-
fications.  
First, we consider the standard theory (Baseline) in which we restrict the behavioural 
model parameters to equal zero. The standard theory does not explain the data well, 
with low seller rationality and an estimated 𝜆 not significantly different from zero (i.e., 
all errors).  
Second, we estimate the constant parameters of our behavioural model (BM-1). The 
parameter estimates suggest that on average, sellers believe that there is a one in three 
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chance of encountering a trustworthy buyer and that the fair reference point yields the 
buyer approximately 1.3× the seller’s profit. The 95% confidence interval for our 𝛾 
estimate includes equal profit-sharing. The 𝛼 and 𝛾 parameter estimates are significantly 
different from zero (both p-values < 0.001) and rationality increases. The behavioural 
model also overwhelmingly outperforms the baseline when comparing the log-likelihood, 
AIC and BIC values and based on the results from a nested likelihood ratio test (𝜒 =
133.86, p-value < 0.001).  
 
Table 2.6 – Results of the structural estimation. 
 Baseline BM-1 BM-2 
 (1) (2) (3) 
𝛼     
   𝛽    0.312*** 0.392*** 
  (0.019) (0.024) 
   𝛽     -0.170*** 
   (0.038) 
   𝛽     -0.002 
   (0.001) 
   𝛽     0.005* 
   (0.002) 
𝛾   1.297*** 1.489*** 
  (0.291) (0.195) 
𝜆  0.019 0.452*** 0.820*** 
 (0.020) (0.076) (0.204) 
AIC 791.44 661.58 638.42 
BIC 795.79 674.63 664.53 









Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the subject level. *** 
p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. The estimation is based on the Logit choice 
framework in (2). We specify 𝛼 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐼 + 𝛽 𝑡 + 𝛽 𝑡 ∙ 𝐼 , where 
𝐼  is a dummy variable for 𝜌 = 0.75. 
 
Third, we re-estimate the behavioural model and allow 𝛼 to vary as a function of the 
retainage level and time (BM-2). In this specification, trust starts off higher in 𝜌 =
0.50, with sellers assigning 40% probability to the probability of buyer trustworthiness. 
The results reinforce our earlier observation that trust increases over time in 𝜌 = 0.75, 
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with a significant positive interaction between the treatment dummy and the time trend 
(p-value < 0.01). By contrast, there is some evidence of a fall in trust over time in 𝜌 =
0.50, although this effect is statistically weak (p-value = 0.064). The fair reference point 
is estimated to be slightly higher at around 1.5× the seller’s profit, although the confi-
dence intervals between BM-1 and BM-2 overlap. Seller rationality in this specification 
is not significantly below one. We prefer the full model based on all available statistical 
comparisons (𝜒 = 29.16, p-value < 0.001). 
The behavioural estimation implies that seller trust levels in our experiment 
were between 𝛼 = 0.3 and 0.4, and the perceived fair reference point 𝛾 at slightly above 
one. We benchmark our 𝛼 estimate against previous studies. Using a least absolute 
deviation approach, Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) estimate 𝛼 = 0.50 in the gift-exchange 
experiments of Fehr et al. (1993) and 𝛼 = 0.42 in the trust game experiments of Berg 
et al. (1995).24 The structure of our ex-post bilateral trade relationship is closer to the 
trust game and our 𝛼 estimate reflects this.  
Payoff equality is normatively appealing (Konow 2003) and commonly found at the 
firm level (Andreoni and Bernheim 2009). Given this observation, it is interesting to 
infer what the behavioural estimates imply for the optimal retainage level, as formulated 
in the equilibrium analysis. In Figure 2.7, we depict equilibrium outcomes in the (𝛼, 𝜌) 
space, given our estimate for the fair reference point 𝛾 ≈ 1. For 𝜌 = 0.50, we can infer 
from the figure that our upper bound estimate of 𝛼 = 0.4 lies on the threshold at which 
high quality is an implementable seller strategy. The equilibrium bid at this coordinate 
(59) is also very close to the average observed in the data (57.8). For 𝜌 = 0.75, the level 
of trust required to implement high quality is 0.55, greater than our estimate from the 
data. This suggests substantial heterogeneity in sellers’ beliefs in this treatment, which 
is not captured by our model but implied by the unravelling in certain cohorts of this 
treatment. It also suggests that some sellers were overly optimistic in their beliefs about 
others’ trustworthiness (for a related result, see Li et al. 2019).  
 
 
24 We obtain similar estimates for 𝛼 using a least absolute deviation approach on the observed 
profit data (details are contained in the appendix).  
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Figure 2.7. Implementable retainage levels supported by the behavioural model es-
timation. 
 
Notes: The figure displays equilibrium seller strategies in (𝛼, 𝜌) space for 𝛾 = 1. 
 
2.6. Discussion and Conclusion 
The managerial literature has devoted substantial attention to how auction institu-
tion design can improve procurement efficiency. In competitive procurement, standard 
principal-agent models show that high product quality equilibria do not exist due to 
moral hazard. Thus, we see preferences among procurers for repeat purchases from a 
smaller group of certified suppliers and the establishment of reputational mechanisms. 
The identification of alternative incentive mechanisms that can reap the benefits of price 
competition while sustaining cooperation is of considerable managerial value. 
In our experiments, we find that retainage significantly increases the probability of 
high quality project delivery relative to the benchmark zero retainage case. There is a 
trade-off between trade efficiency and transaction fairness, due to the difficulty in sus-
taining trustworthy buyer payment behaviour over time. When sellers are engaged in-
formally, with no payment guarantee to cover production costs, we observe a significant 
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unravelling in markets over time. This reduces overall procurement efficiency, despite 
the higher quality of transactions remaining in the market. We develop a model of fair 
payment norms and show that, by explicitly incorporating trust and trustworthiness 
into the analysis, we can improve our understanding of decision-making at the individ-
ual-level.  
The experimental results are consistent with the finding of Fugger, Katok and Wam-
bach (2019) that reverse auctions perform poorly from an efficiency perspective with 
rigid fixed-price contracts when there exists seller-side moral hazard. The benefits of 
mechanisms that permit buyers to incorporate aspects other than price in their procure-
ment decisions have been discussed in detail (see, e.g., Englebrecht-Wiggans et al. 2007). 
Here we demonstrate that attention should also be given to the flexibility of the con-
tractual price, even when price cannot be conditioned upon quality. 
The main message for procurement managers and construction industry practitioners 
is as follows. Retainage mechanisms, and deferred payments more generally, have a use-
ful role in incentivizing sellers to provide high quality. This recommendation comes with 
two caveats. First, procurement arrangements based on intent may have an anti-com-
petitive effect by discouraging suppliers from participating in the market. Second, if 
retainage monies are not properly administered, sellers are vulnerable to the payment 
malpractice of an untrustworthy buyer. This can undermine seller profits relative to 
fixed-price contracts and the deductibility of retainage throughout the supply chain 
would likely amplify these negative effects. Practitioners should remain cognizant of 
industry norms when designing contractual incentives. 
Our behavioural model offers further insights into how to design retainage incentives. 
If high trust levels have been built up over time in the industry, then engaging suppliers 
based partially on intent may be an effective strategy to keep projects on schedule. If 
trust levels are low, agreeing a formal contract with retainage provision before initiating 
works is preferable. Factors determining trust attitudes and behaviours should be con-
sidered here. Exogenous market uncertainty, for example in the buyer’s value, can affect 
beliefs about trustworthiness (Özer et al. 2011). Competition among buyers may reduce 
trustworthy behaviours (Spiliotopoulou et al. 2016). Özer and Zheng (2019) also 
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emphasise that the target and context of trust matter. Perceptions of trust in a specific 
managerial network may substitute for generalised trust in supply chain interactions 
(Choi et al. 2020). Trust and trustworthiness may be easier to facilitate in small pools 
of suppliers engaged in repeated interactions, in which case our estimates for the impact 
of retainage on transaction efficiency are conservative. Higher prevailing trust has been 
observed in collectivist societies (e.g., in China) when there is the prospect of long-term 
supply chain relationships, but it may be reduced in cross-border transactions if in-
group bias emerges (Özer et al. 2014). Investigating cross-cultural differences in trans-
action norms would be an interesting avenue for further work. 
An implication of the analysis is that, with retainage, the first-order efficiency prob-
lem becomes a second-order distributional problem. Future research might therefore also 
examine the effects of incorporating dispute resolution into the setup. A limitation of 
our setup is that sellers are endowed with no bargaining power after the auction and 
cannot dispute the buyer’s retainage return decision. This assumption is clearly restric-
tive. In a consumer setting, Andreoni (2018) observes that some legal enforcement is 
required to induce buyer trust when goods are sold with a “satisfaction guarantee”. 
Nevertheless, formal litigation is often costly and alternative dispute mechanisms under-
developed. Consideration could also be given to the buyer’s payment record in the pro-
curement process. Reputation has been observed to improve seller trustworthiness in 
reverse auctions with moral hazard (Brosig-Koch and Heinrich 2014). Sellers may trust 
more those buyers who have previously proved themselves to be trustworthy payers.  
The type of incentives examined in this study are a feature of performance bonuses 
in principal-agent relationships more generally.  Employment contracts often contain a 
fixed base payment, with the promise of discretionary rewards in the future (see also 
Fehr et al. 2007, Lee et al. 2018). In certain industries, such as finance or professional 
sports, these voluntary bonus payments may be the most lucrative part of the compen-
sation package. A similar mechanism is used in the rental housing market by landlords, 
who withhold deposits as a percentage of the total rental price – typically amounting to 
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one or two month’s rent – to incentivise tenants to take good care of their property.25 
When there is an excess supply of agents, the motivating effects of performance bonuses 
are not obvious (MacLeod and Malcomson 1998). We provide evidence from a compet-
itive bidding environment to suggest that implicit incentives can help mitigate the moral 
hazard problem, under such conditions of market imbalance. 
Finally, an open question is the extent to which models of fairness, originally devel-
oped to explain personal exchanges, apply to the impersonal setting of firm decision-
making. We find that deriving common thresholds as to the likelihood of a buyer or 
seller in the market acting in good faith is a useful one. We acknowledge, however, that 
in repeated interactions the reference point may be path-dependent. This possibility is 
not captured by our static equilibrium model and is a productive avenue for further 





25 Arrangements to pay “half now, half later” are also popular with criminal and gangster organ-
izations, at least as portrayed in the movies. 
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3 The Behavioural Consequences of Contingent Con-
tracting in Procurement Relationships 
“Doveryai, no proveryai; Trust, but verify”  
- A famous Russian proverb. 
3.1. Introduction 
As noted in the previous chapter, a characteristic feature of procurement relation-
ships is the supplier’s ability to influence the buyer’s valuation after allocation of the 
contract. Since it can be difficult to verify supplier non-performance, contracts are often 
incomplete and parties to the contract may understand their performance obligations 
differently, leading to liability risks and moral hazard issues. When these differences are 
important, disputes over supplier and buyer performance arise, particularly when sup-
pliers are incentivised to cut costs and reduce prices. 
Confronted with the administrative reality that complex contracts are incomplete 
(e.g., the bounded rationality argument of Simon 1947), contracts governing long-term 
procurement relationships often contain “hierarchical” elements, such as dispute resolu-
tion provisions, to mitigate ex-post opportunism.26 The theoretical underpinnings of 
hierarchy come from transaction cost economics (see Williamson 1985). Buyer and sup-
plier opportunism necessitates contractual safeguards, particularly under conditions of 
asset-specificity that typify the procurement of critical products, which may involve 
specific production equipment, knowledge, and qualifications. For example, a recent sur-
vey of procurement professionals found that 65% of procurement projects last more than 
three years and just 18% of buyers switch suppliers during a long-term procurement 
project (Gretschko and Pollrich 2021). The governance of contractual relations is 
“greatly complicated” by this kind of economic arrangement, in which parties are bilat-
erally dependent (Williamson 1988, p. 71).  
 
26 Other hierarchical elements are structures of authority, risk-sharing, operating procedures and 
change orders (Stinchcombe and Heimer 1985). These elements may not be mutually exclusive. 
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A high-profile case arose in 2016, when the German automaker Volkswagen an-
nounced a halt to production at several assembly plants due to a contractual dispute 
with two major component suppliers, ES-Automobil Guss GmbH and Car Trim GmbH 
(Smith 2016). The dispute stemmed from Volkswagen cancelling payments worth 500 
million euros, as it pressured critical suppliers to cut costs following the diesel emissions 
scandal that broke earlier in the year. These non-payment events came after the suppli-
ers had invested tens of millions of euros into building relations-specific capacity for the 
contracts. The result was a costly and inefficient disagreement in which both parties 
reneged on performance obligations.  
 Another common source of disputes are ex-post payment adjustments in construc-
tion projects which are not written into the initial contract. For example, the buyer may 
deduct liquidated damages in response to suspected seller negligence and/or a failure to 
meet specification standards. Alternatively, an unforeseen contingency may arise during 
trade and the parties will try to negotiate a variation order that alters the final payment 
amount. Price ranges are a common response to contractual indefiniteness, such as when 
parties write an initial agreement and leave specific terms up for renegotiation within 
pre-defined limits (Ben-Shahar 2004, p. 424). If agreement is not possible, parties may 
end up in arbitration or the courts, depending on the provisions in the contract. The 
value of construction disputes is often large: a global industry report estimated the 
average value in 2019 at US $30.7 million (Arcadis 2020). The shadow of potential 
dispute may lead contractors to “strategically manipulate their bids in anticipation of 
changes to the pay” (Bajari et al. 2014, p. 1292). 
In this chapter, we investigate how hierarchical contractual elements may exacerbate 
– rather than mitigate – hazards of opportunism and influence strategic buyer and sup-
plier behaviours in procurement relationships. To do so, we construct a stylised game-
theoretic procurement model and examine, relative to this normative benchmark, the 
behavioural consequences of two contract types. The contracts under study either pro-
vide, or do not provide, for the resolution of trade contingencies via costly dispute. 
 To fix ideas, consider the construction of the Channel Tunnel between Britain and 
mainland Europe, which opened in May 1994 (see Genus 1997, for a detailed account). 
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The Channel Tunnel was a complex large-scale construction project that required vari-
ous administrative provisions and contract flexibility to mitigate non-performance risks. 
A lump sum contract to design and build the tunnel was awarded to TransManche Link 
(TML) in 1986, and a Disputes Panel created to resolve disagreements between TML 
and the client, Eurotunnel. This project involved bilateral dependence, ex-post oppor-
tunism and an incomplete contract; clearly, fertile grounds for dispute. Perhaps it is 
unsurprising then that the lump sum contract became a major source of conflict during 
the relationship. Claims running to hundreds of millions of pounds were made by both 
parties for compensation due to non-performance of the other. As time went on, both 
parties became reliant on the hierarchical elements of the contract, in particular the use 
or arbitration to resolve disputes. This eroded trust in the TML-Eurotunnel relationship. 
The Channel Tunnel effectively became “a zero-sum 'game' where the parties compete 
antagonistically rather more than they seem to cooperate” (Genus 1997, p. 434).  
In our setting, a single buyer seeks to procure one unit of an indivisible good from a 
pool of pre-qualified suppliers. The contract is allocated via a first-price sealed-bid re-
verse auction (tender).27 Reverse auctions are less likely to be used for the procurement 
of complex private-sector construction projects, but they remain a requirement for most 
public-sector projects (Bajari et al. 2009, 2014). The contract contains a minimum pay-
ment obligation on the buyer. Additionally, the contract contains provision for a contin-
gent payment to be made from buyer to supplier in the event of dispute over performance 
(see Skrzypacz 2013 for a general characterisation of auctions with contingent pay-
ments). Contingent contracts reduce risk by sharing it between the trade parties (Ba-
zerman and Gillespie 1999). Thus, they can align incentives for responsible contractual 
behaviour when the contract price cannot be conditioned perfectly on all outcomes.28 
Supplier performance is defined here by the quality of works provided, e.g., the quality 
 
27 First-price auction formats are typically used in procurement (Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. 
2007). 
28 The importance of responsible contractual behaviour has gained renewed attention in the wake 
of the Covid-19 pandemic. Indeed, the UK government released specific guidance on this issue: 
“Responsible and fair behaviour in contracts now – in particular in dealing with potential dis-
putes – will result in better long-term outcomes for jobs and our economy” (Cabinet Office 2020). 
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of materials used or the ethicality of production practices. Buyer performance is defined 
by payment of monies requested in the initial contract. 
We model the contingent payment as an arbitrator, although it finds more general 
interpretation as the enforceability of deferred value. As alluded to above, arbitration 
clauses are common in construction and engineering projects as a means of dispute 
resolution.29 Standard building contracts in Britain are produced by the Joint Contracts 
Tribunal, which provides model rules for the resolution of payment disputes by arbitra-
tion. Until 2007, arbitration was the preferred dispute resolution method in standard 
United States construction contracts by default, while construction case filings at the 
American Arbitration Association continue to increase, up six percent in 2019, with 
complex new cases rising at twice this rate. 30  
The role of an arbitrator is “to remember who sunk costs in the past, and to ensure 
that future compensation is paid in a way that creates the correct incentives to make 
such investments” (Crawford 1985, p. 375).31 Traditionally, the economics literature ex-
amined the distributional implications of arbitration, given a fixed surplus to divide 
(Ashenfelter and Bloom 1984, Crawford 1981, Farber 1980, Farber and Katz 1979). 
Gabuthy and Muthoo (2019) drop the fixed surplus assumption and show that the mere 
presence of an arbitrator can improve incentives of bilateral trade parties to make mu-
tual relationship-specific investments.  
We consider the efficiency consequences of arbitration in a quite different environ-
ment. After conclusion of the tender process, the winning supplier (seller) receives the 
guaranteed payment component of the contract and takes costly action to determine the 
project quality, high or low. Thus, while the pre-qualified suppliers are homogeneous ex-
 
29 Unlike litigation, there is generally no public record of arbitration proceedings. 
30 Since 2007, US construction contracts require trade parties to check a box specifying the 
preferred dispute resolution method (e.g., Document A101-2017 at https://www.ai-
acontracts.org/). The US case filings statistic is obtained from American Arbitration Association 
Annual Report at https://www.adr.org/annual-reports. UK building contracts are obtained 
from: https://www.jctltd.co.uk/. 
31 Arbitration finds varied applications for resolving disputes. The most well-known is for the 
settlement of wage disputes in labour bargaining. Mandatory consumer arbitration clauses are 
also prevalent. For example, as of 2020, the eBay user agreement contains a requirement to 
submit dispute claims, e.g., due to an unpaid auction bid, to binding and final arbitration. 
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ante, the homogeneity assumption is not necessarily satisfied ex-post. After observing 
her value from trade, the buyer has discretion to propose a final price constrained by 
the bounds of the contract. This combination of buyer- and seller-side moral hazard and 
implicit non-homogeneity of suppliers after moving from competitive market to bilateral 
monopoly lays the foundations for an inefficient outcome if the contract is not designed 
carefully and may lead parties to end up in dispute (see Williamson 1973, p. 318). In 
such circumstances, an arbitrator is invoked to provide binding resolution. The arbitra-
tor must verify the claims and adjudicate on how to compensate the trade parties ac-
cording to some pre-defined reference point. Knowledge of the reference point may come 
from experience or be explicitly written into the contract.  No restriction is placed on 
what the arbitrator deems a fair settlement; but the arbitrator is not always able to 
intervene. Specifically, there is an exogenous probability with which the arbitrator can 
verify quality. This imperfection reflects the reality that quality verification is not feasi-
ble in every trading scenario. 
The contingent contract is defined by the combination of price flexibility and the 
probability of quality verification. For high quality to emerge as an equilibrium outcome, 
there is a “goldilocks region” in which the probability that quality can be verified is 
large enough to reward high quality, but not so large as to allow suppliers to reduce 
their bids too far during the tender process. The outcome is first-best in the absence of 
verification costs and benefits the buyer, but not seller, owing to the strong nature of 
ex-ante competition. 
In the second part of the chapter, we test the predictions of the model in a lab 
experiment. The lab has found long-standing use as a test-bed for more general arbitra-
tion mechanisms because it enables control over factors such as the arbitrator’s prefer-
ences, costs, and valuations.32 No prior experiment has tested the relative effectiveness 
of contingent versus non-contingent contracts in reverse auctions with moral hazard.33 
Behavioural considerations may distort the effectiveness of supply chain contracts (e.g., 
 
32 For a survey of this literature, see Kuhn (2009). 
33 Chen et al. (2009) conduct a theoretical analysis of contingent contracting in reverse auctions 
with adverse selection. 
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Ho and Zhang 2008, Loch and Wu 2008); it is therefore interesting to consider the effects 
of contingent contracting on actual decision-making. Hart and Moore (2008) argue that 
competitively determined contractual terms may serve as a reference point for later 
actions in relationships that influence the gains from trade.34 As a consequence, trade 
may be inefficient not as a result of allocation to the inefficient “type” ex-ante, but as a 
result of reneging on contractual performance ex-post. This contrasts with the tradi-
tional property rights approach (Hart and Moore 1990) in which trade parties can always 
renegotiate to an efficient outcome.   
Our experimental results suggest that with a contingent contract, bidding is more 
aggressive and high quality is the more profitable seller strategy. However, a contingent 
contract does not increase trade efficiency relative to the equivalent non-contingent con-
tract. Instead, we observe that the contingent contract crowds out the reciprocity of 
buyers, a significant fraction of whom exhibit reference-dependent fairness preferences. 
This crowding out effect erodes suppliers’ relation-specific trust, as inferred from their 
willingness to deliver high quality. The study thus relates to a literature in experimental 
economics recognising the potential for explicit incentives to be counterproductive.  
3.2. Model and Theory 
We first recap features of the environment that are shared with Chapter 2. A single 
buyer seeks to procure one unit of an indivisible good from a pool of 𝑛 ≥ 2 pre-qualified 
suppliers, indexed by 𝑖.  
At date 0, the pre-qualified suppliers compete on price (only) to deliver the unit. 
That is, pre-qualified suppliers are ex-ante symmetric in their delivery capability. Each 
supplier submits a sealed bid 𝑏  at a first-price reverse auction (tender), with a commit-
ment to procure at the lowest price. The selected supplier is the one submitting the 
lowest priced bid 𝑏 (henceforth, the seller). If two or more suppliers submit the same 
bid, the tie is broken randomly. A bilateral trade relationship forms between buyer and 
 
34 Related are experiments investigating whether renegotiable contracts can solve the hold-up 
problem (Bartling and Schmidt 2015, Brandts et al. 2015, Davis and Leider 2018, Fehr et al. 
2011, Fehr et al. 2015, Hoppe and Schmitz 2011). 
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seller. Any non-selected supplier is no longer considered in the interaction and earns 
zero payoff.   
At date 1, the seller determines the quality of the unit. We again discretise the quality 
space such that the seller either delivers a low-quality (𝑞 = 𝑞 ) or high-quality (𝑞 = 𝑞 ) 
unit. The seller’s quality choice maps directly to his own unit cost 𝑐 , and the buyer’s 
unit valuation 𝑣 . The cost and valuation schedules are common knowledge. We impose 
the same assumptions on these schedules as before. 
At date 2, the buyer observes her valuation for the unit and proposes total payment 
𝑦, which must at least fulfil her minimum obligation in the contract (to be defined).35  
The final payment 𝑝 from buyer to seller is then determined and payoffs from the 
interaction are realised. The payoffs of the buyer and seller are summarised as follows, 
𝜋 = 𝑣 − 𝑝. (3.1) 
𝜋 = 𝑝 − 𝑐 . (3.2) 
The focus of this chapter is on how the final payment 𝑝 is determined, how these 
payment incentives influence equilibrium buyer and seller behaviours and the associated 
efficiency consequences. Consider the following contract: 
𝑃 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑏 + 𝛽𝑍, (3.3) 
for some constants 𝛼, 𝛽 ∈ [0,1] and some (possibly non-linear) contingent payment func-
tion 𝑍. The standard auction theory setup with a fixed-price contract equal to the 
winning bid is captured by 𝛼 = 𝛽 = 0. More generally, (3.3) represents a cash bid plus 
fixed contract. For example, McAfee and McMillan (1986) replace 𝑍 with the seller’s 
exogenously assigned cost type, in which case 𝛼 = 𝛽 = 1 is a cost-plus contract, and 
𝛽 > 0 is a linear incentive contract for which the seller has a share in cost overruns.36  
 
35 The results in this section would be unchanged by switching the order of date 1 and 2 actions. 
36 McAfee and McMillan (1986) also include a fixed fee. A fixed fee has no influence on the 




We will interpret the first term in (3.3) as the buyer’s minimum payment obligation 
at date 2. Thus, 𝑦 ≥ (1 − 𝛼)𝑏. We limit attention to 0 < 𝛼 < 1 and so this parameter is 
the maximum bid discount; without loss, we set 𝛽 = 1. The function 𝑍 considered here 
captures a particular hierarchical element of contracts for large-scale procurement pro-
jects: dispute resolution. We assume that quality can only be imperfectly verified by 
third parties, such as an arbitrator. This is an incomplete contracting assumption (Hart 
2017). It is motivated by the observation that in non-commoditised procurement, the 
seller’s costly effort underlying the quality decision may be unobserved and so it is 
difficult to write a complete contract that ties payment to outcomes.  
We incorporate this uncertainty via an exogenous probability 𝜎 with which delivered 
quality can be verified. A specific interpretation of 𝜎 is the probability with which an 
arbitrator can ex-post adjudicate on a dispute (see e.g., Herweg and Schmidt 2020). 
Since we use this interpretation in the experiment, we will adopt it here. A more general 
interpretation of 𝜎 is as the enforceability of deferred value. 
The dispute resolution function is defined as follows:    
𝑍 ≔
𝑧(𝑏, 𝑞 ),         𝑤. 𝑝. 𝜎;        
0,                 𝑤. 𝑝. (1 − 𝜎).
 (3.4) 
Which specifies a deferred payment from buyer to seller, where 𝑧(𝑏, 𝑞 ) ∈ [0, 𝛼𝑏] is a 
function that maps the seller’s bidding strategy to a deferred payment in the non-nega-
tive quadrant, bounded by 𝛼𝑏. This preference may be inferred from the contract or be 
an unwritten but agreed upon trading norm. Either way, it represents what an (unbi-
ased) arbitrator would deem a fair distribution of profits after completion of the fact-
finding process.  
Award of the preferred deferred payment is contingent on the verifiability of quality 
and – similar to a debt or insurance security – caps total payment at the winning bid. 
Note that setting a higher cap to incorporate cost overruns would not change the model’s 
insights; by setting the cap equal to the seller’s bid, we interpret this action as the 
seller’s claim on the surplus.  
We make three assumptions on the dispute resolution function in (3.4) for any com-
bination of winning bid 𝑏 and quality level 𝑗: (i) 𝑧(𝑏, 𝑞 ) ≥ 𝑐 − (1 − 𝛼)𝑏; (ii) 𝑧(𝑏, 𝑞 ) ≥
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𝑧(𝑏, 𝑞 ); (iii) for any 𝑏 < 𝑏, 𝑧(𝑏′, 𝑞 ) ≥ 𝑧(𝑏, 𝑞 ) and 𝑏 − 𝑏 ≥ 𝑧(𝑏′, 𝑞 ) − 𝑧(𝑏, 𝑞 ). The first 
assumption ensures that (where feasible) a fair payment should cover the seller’s costs 
known ex-ante. The second assumption simply implies that the deferred payment re-
wards high over low quality. The third assumption requires that the deferred payment 
offsets (in part or in full) a reduction in the buyer’s minimum payment obligation. Thus, 
all else equal, a contract containing a lower minimum obligation is associated with a 
(weakly) higher deferred payment. 
It remains to define what constitutes a dispute in our model. 
Definition 3.1 (Dispute). A dispute is recorded if and only if 𝑦 < (1 − 𝛼)𝑏 + 𝑍. 
That is, a dispute is recorded if the buyer’s claim on the surplus at date 2 is strictly 
below the fair settlement and – by our assumptions on 𝑍 – below the seller’s claim on 
the surplus. If a dispute is recorded and quality can be verified, then the buyer pays a 
fixed verification cost 𝑘 > 0.37 This cost accrues outside the model, such as to a third-
party arbitrator. To avoid uninteresting cases, we assume that 𝑘 does not exceed the 
gains from trade. If no dispute is recorded or quality cannot be verified, then the seller 
receives the buyer’s proposed payment (i.e., 𝑝 = 𝑦). 
The game can be analysed as an extensive-form game of complete information. For-
mally, a pre-qualified supplier 𝑖’s strategy has two components: a bid 𝑏 ≥ 𝑐 , and a 
quality choice function 𝑞 (𝑏 ). Bids below marginal cost are never profitable for the seller. 
We place no restriction on the maximum permissible bid except that it be high enough 
to guarantee a seller minimum payment to cover his cost schedule (i.e., at least 
𝑐(𝑞 )/(1 − 𝛼)). A buyer’s strategy consists of a payment function 𝑦(𝑏, 𝑞 ) ≥ (1 − 𝛼)𝑏, 
i.e., a payment that satisfies the minimum contractual obligation.   
 
37 In practice, arbitration costs may be borne by the unsuccessful party or shared between the 
dispute parties. To simplify the exposition, we employ the former rule here, but the main insights 
of the model are unchanged by using a shared cost allocation. Common knowledge about the 
arbitration cost has real-world application. The German Arbitration Institute, for example, 




The solution concept is SPNE in pure strategies and we solve the game by using 
backward induction. As in standard Bertrand competition models with bounded de-
mand, complete information, fixed marginal costs and zero fixed costs, there is no mixed 
strategy equilibrium (see e.g., Baye and Morgan 1999). We are interested in whether 
there exists a procurement outcome in which high quality is implementable. A necessary 
condition for implementability is incentive compatibility, and so the definitions proceed 
in order. 
Definition 3.2 (Incentive compatibility). A quality level is incentive compatible if it is 
strictly preferred by the seller to the other quality level. 
Definition 3.3 (Implementability). A quality level is implementable if it is an incentive 
compatible component of an equilibrium seller strategy. 
3.2.1.  Non-contingent contract 
If quality cannot be verified (i.e., 𝜎 = 0), then we have a non-contingent contract. 
Proposition 3.1 . There is a unique SPNE in which 𝑏∗ =
( − )
 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑞∗ = 𝑞  and 𝑦∗ =
(1 − α)𝑏.  
Proof. See Proposition 2.1A. ∎  
Thus, with a non-contingent contract, high quality is not implementable. As we 
showed in the previous chapter, other-regarding preferences can sustain high quality in 
equilibrium with a non-contingent contract when there is flexibility in the price. This is 
the appropriate benchmark for assessing the relative effectiveness of a contingent con-
tract in the experiment. 
3.2.2.  Contingent contract 
If quality can be verified with some positive probability (i.e., 𝜎 > 0), then we have a 
contingent contract. There is now the possibility of dispute because 𝑍 ≥ 0. The dispute 
payoffs of buyer and seller are as follows, 
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     𝑑 = 𝑣 − (1 − σ)𝑦 − 𝜎[(1 − 𝛼)𝑏 + 𝑧(𝑏, 𝑞 ) + 𝑘]. (3.5) 
𝑑 = (1 − σ)𝑦 + 𝜎[(1 − 𝛼)𝑏 + 𝑧(𝑏, 𝑞 )] − 𝑐 .  (3.6) 
The results derived below are qualitatively unchanged by specifying a utility function 
with risk aversion so long as the dispute utilities remain monotonic over the price grid. 
In the appendix, we show that the model predictions still hold under risk aversion for 
the dispute resolution function used in our experiment. For the remainder of this section, 
we assume that the buyer and suppliers act as risk neutral profit-maximisers. 
At date 2, the buyer observes her valuation for the good and proposes to compensate 
the seller as follows for quality delivered, 
𝑦 =
(1 − α)𝑏,                                𝑖𝑓 
( − )
< 𝑧(𝑏, 𝑞 );
(1 − α)𝑏 + 𝑧(𝑏, 𝑞 ),                   𝑖𝑓 
( − )
> 𝑧(𝑏, 𝑞 ).
  (3.7) 
If the buyer’s expected cost of verification is less than her expected benefit from dispute, 
then the buyer fulfils her minimum payment obligation in the contract (only) and the 
two parties end up in dispute. If the expected cost of verification is greater than her 
expected benefit from dispute, then the buyer makes final payment in line with the 
arbitrator’s preference and no dispute is recorded. Since the buyer’s dispute payoff is 
non-increasing in 𝑦, it is not in her interest to propose an interior payment. 
At date 1, anticipating the buyer’s payment function in (3.7) and given his bid, the 
seller chooses the quality level. The seller’s incentive compatibility constraint for high 
quality is the union of the three cases below. The left-hand inequality defines the buyer’s 
expected cost of verification, and the right-hand inequality is the seller’s required mar-
ginal return to high quality. To economise on notation, we define 𝑐 = 𝑐 − 𝑐  and 
𝑧 = 𝑧(𝑏, 𝑞 ) − 𝑧(𝑏, 𝑞 ). 
𝑧(𝑏, 𝑞 ) ≤
( − )
: 𝑧 > 𝑐 .  (3.8a) 
𝑧(𝑏, 𝑞 ) <
( − )
< 𝑧(𝑏, 𝑞 ): 𝜎𝑧 − (1 − 𝜎)𝑧(𝑏, 𝑞 ) > 𝑐 . (3.8b) 
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𝑧(𝑏, 𝑞 ) ≥
( − )
: 𝜎𝑧 > 𝑐 . (3.8c) 
At high expected verification cost (3.8a), the seller knows his return to high quality 
with certainty and incentive compatibility depends on the deferred payment premium 
for high quality. As 𝜎 approaches one, the buyer prefers to make a fair payment and 
avoid dispute.  
Corollary 3.1 . At high expected verification cost, high quality is not implementable with 
a contingent contract. 
Proof. If cost case (3.8a) applies, then from (3.7) the payment is 𝑝 = (1 − α)𝑏 + 𝑧(𝑏, 𝑞 ) 
and no dispute is recorded. By our assumption on the cost schedule, 
𝜋 (𝑏 = 𝑐 , 𝑞 = 𝑞 ) < 𝜋 (𝑏 = 𝑐 , 𝑞 = 𝑞 ) = 0 and so low quality is incentive 
compatible for any supplier 𝑖 at a bid equal to 𝑐 . For any higher bid, each supplier has 
an incentive to undercut his competitor and deliver low quality due to the binding 
auction selection rule and the zero-payoff for a non-selected supplier. Any bid below 𝑐  
is not profitable. Thus, high quality cannot be part of an equilibrium seller strategy.  ∎ 
An interesting implication of Corollary 3.1 is that, as 𝜎 approaches one, the buyer’s 
claim on the surplus is irrelevant and high quality is not incentive compatible because 
potential suppliers compete away their rents at date 0. We obtain a second corollary. 
Corollary 3.2 . Perfect verification (i.e., 𝜎 = 1) cannot implement high quality. 
From now on, suppose that the expected verification cost 𝑘 < 𝑧(𝑏, 𝑞 ) and so the 
buyer reciprocates high quality with the minimum required payment. In these cases 
(3.8b, 3.8c), high quality is incentive compatible only if the probability of quality veri-
fication is high enough. Clearly, there is a trade-off on 𝜎 to simultaneously satisfying 
the buyer’s cost condition and the seller’s incentive compatibility constraint. Thus, for 
high quality to be implementable, there is a “goldilocks region” in which 𝜎 is large 
enough to reward high quality but not so large as to allow suppliers to reduce their bids 
too far in the date 0 auction. A third corollary follows directly from Definition 3.2. 
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Corollary 3.3 . High quality is implementable if and only if there exists at least one seller 
strategy for which 𝑑 (𝑏, 𝑞 ) < 0 ≤ 𝑑 (𝑏, 𝑞 ).  
Note that the inequality in Corollary 3.3 is never satisfied with a non-contingent 
contract because, if 𝜎 = 0, then 𝑑 (𝑏, 𝑞 ) = 𝜋 (𝑏, 𝑞 ) > 𝜋 (𝑏, 𝑞 ) = 𝑑 (𝑏, 𝑞 ) for all 𝑏. 
Given our assumptions on the dispute resolution function in (3.4), the seller’s dispute 
payoff in (3.6) is non-decreasing as the winning bid increases. Thus, there always exists 
at least one bid which in combination with low quality yields the seller an expected loss. 
For high quality to be implementable, at least one of these bids must also yield the seller 
a non-negative profit when combined with high quality. We will see now that when such 
a bid exists, high quality is the unique equilibrium outcome.  
Proposition 3.2 . There exists a contingent contract for which the unique SPNE outcome 
is 𝑏∗ = −
( − )
 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑞∗ = 𝑞  and 𝑦∗ = (1 − α)𝑏.  
Proof. By our earlier assumption on the expected verification cost, the buyer chooses 
the minimum payment at date 2 in exchange for high quality. A supplier’s breakeven 
bid associated with high quality, obtained by setting the dispute payoff in (3.6) equal to 
zero, is 𝑏 = (𝑐 − 𝜎𝑧(𝑏, 𝑞 )) (1 − α)⁄ . Suppose that there exists at least one seller 
strategy for which 𝑑 (𝑏, 𝑞 ) < 0 ≤ 𝑑 (𝑏, 𝑞 ). Owing to monotonicity of the dispute 
payoff function in the winning bid, 𝑏  must be the smallest bid associated with this 
strategy. At date 0, if two or more pre-qualified suppliers submit a bid equal to 𝑏  then 
every supplier earns zero profit in expectation. Any upward deviation would yield zero 
profit, due to the binding auction selection rule. Undercutting this bid would yield the 
seller a loss in expectation independent of the chosen quality level. Thus, this is the 
unique equilibrium outcome. ∎ 
From inspection of the equilibrium bids in Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 and the incentive 
compatibility constraint in (3.8), we infer a final corollary.38 
 
38 Corollary 3.4 requires 𝑐 < 𝜎𝑧(𝑏, 𝑞 ), which is true if high quality is incentive compatible. 
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Corollary 3.4 . Any contingent contract that implements high quality is associated with 
lower equilibrium bids than the equivalent contract with 𝜎 = 0. 
We will now put more structure on the dispute resolution function in (3.4) and specify 
a parametric form for the arbitrator’s preferences, which will then be used in the exper-
iment. 
3.2.3.  A specific functional form 
Consider the following mapping from actions to the arbitrator’s preferred payment 
gross of the minimum contractual obligation: 
𝑧(𝑏, 𝑞 ) + (1 − 𝛼)𝑏 = 𝜇𝑣 + (1 − 𝜇)𝑐  (3.9) 
Where 0 < 𝜇 < 1 is the arbitrator’s preference parameter and 𝑧(𝑏, 𝑞 ) ∈ [0, 𝛼𝑏]. This 
specifies a deferred payment from buyer to seller as a convex combination of the trade 
surplus, determined by the seller’s quality decision at date 1.  The payment is again 
constrained to lie in the interval between the buyer’s minimum payment obligation and 
the seller’s bid. It is straightforward to verify that (3.9) satisfies our earlier three as-
sumptions on the dispute resolution function. 
In Figure 3.1, we sketch the seller’s dispute payoff associated with (3.9) as a function 
of the bidding strategy. Without loss, we set 𝑘 = 0. The solid line in the figure 
corresponds to the payoff function with perfect quality verification (i.e., 𝜎 = 1), and the 
dashed line with no quality verification (i.e., 𝜎 = 0). The payoff function is quality-
specific and has two pivot points at the vertical dotted lines in the figure. Incentive 
compatibility corresponds to regions in which the seller dispute payoff to high quality is 
above the payoff to low quality. At bids below the lower pivot point, the arbitrator’s 
preference cannot be implemented and so the arbitrator awards the seller his bid in full 
(region A). As bids rise above the upper pivot point, the seller received more than his 
fair share of the surplus and so the arbitrator awards the minimum payment obligation 
(region C). At bids in-between, the arbitrator awards the preferred amount exactly 




Figure 3.1. Seller 𝑖's dispute payoff as a function of bid 𝑏  and quality level 𝑞 = 𝑞 . 
 
Notes: The solid line is seller 𝑖′s dispute payoff 𝑑  as a function of bid 𝑏  and quality 
level 𝑞 = 𝑞  with perfect quality verification (i.e., 𝜎 = 1). The dashed line is the 
corresponding payoff function with no quality verification (i.e., 𝜎 = 0). 
 
As the arbitrator’s preference 𝜇 increases, the pivot points are found over higher bids, 
the arbitrator is more favourable to the seller, and the payoff line in region B shifts up. 
As the maximum bid discount 𝛼 increases, the payoff function in Figure 3.1 shifts down 
because of the greater potential for seller losses when quality cannot be verified. 
Similarly, region B is found over a wider subset of bids owing to the greater contractual 
flexibility. As the probability of quality verification 𝜎 falls below one, the solid line payoff 
function in region A shifts down and the payoff function in region B pivots towards the 
dashed line. Thus, 𝜎 determines the slope of the payoff function in region B. When 𝜎 >
0, the payoff functions to high and low quality either never intersect, or they intersect 
at two points in the price grid. At the limit, 𝜎 = 0 and the two segments form a straight 
line as in standard Bertrand competition with homogenous goods; region B collapses to 
a single price and high quality is not incentive compatible.  
An example contingent contract for 0 < 𝜎 < 1 that implements high quality is 
presented in Figure 3.2. The equilibrium bid, marked on the figure by a diamond plus, 
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is at the point where the dispute payoff function to high quality crosses the zero-profit 
line. This bid is below (above) the corresponding equilibrium bid when 𝜎 = 0 (= 1). 
The first intersection between the payoffs to low and high quality occurs below the zero-
profit line. For zero verification cost, the first-best outcome is achieved. For any non-
zero verification cost, a Pareto improving second-best outcome can be implemented. We 
will now test the effectiveness of the contingent contract in the lab. 
 
Figure 3.2. An example contract that implements high quality. 
 
Notes: The solid (dashed) line is seller 𝑖′s dispute payoff to low (high) quality. The 
dotted line is the zero-profit line. The equilibrium bid is marked by a diamond plus. 
 
3.3. Experimental Setup 
3.3.1.  Treatments and parameters 
In the experimental setting, one buyer faces two potential sellers. The maximum bid 
discount 𝛼 is set at 0.75, which permits substantial flexibility in the contract and makes 
the payment trade-offs salient. There are three experimental conditions (Table 3.1), 
which vary according to the probability of quality verification – using a between-subjects 
design – and the arbitrator’s preference from (3.9) – using a within-subjects design. The 
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first condition simulates the non-contingent contract, and so the probability of quality 
verification 𝜎 = 0 (the “Voluntary” treatment). In this treatment, any payment to the 
seller above one-quarter of the winning bid is made by the buyer voluntarily. In the 
second and third conditions, we introduce a contingent contract, where the probability 
of quality verification 𝜎 = 0.5 (collectively, the “Arbitrator” treatment). This treatment 
is split into two sub-treatments, in which the arbitrator either prefers to award 𝜇 = 1/3 
or 2/3 of the trade surplus to the seller. By varying the arbitrator’s preference parameter 
within-subjects, we conduct a less restrictive test of the model and consider relationships 
in which the contingency favours the buyer and seller. We deliberately avoid invoking 
norms associated with an equal surplus split, which have been observed in prior bar-
gaining studies (Andreoni and Bernheim 2009).39 The fixed verification cost 𝑘 = 2 
throughout (more details below). 
 
Table 3.1 – Treatment matrix. 
Treatment Voluntary Arbitrator 
Sub-treatment  𝜇 = 1/3 𝜇 = 2/3 
Probability of quality verification 𝜎 = 0 𝜎 = 0.5 
Maximum bid discount 𝛼 = 0.75 
 
The cost and valuation schedules are common knowledge in the experiment (Table 
3.2). Low quality generates a trading surplus of 20 and high quality generates a surplus 
of 60. Low quality costs the seller 30 to deliver and is valued by the buyer at 50. High 
quality costs the seller 40 to deliver and is valued by the buyer at 100. Consistent with 
the investment game literature in experimental economics, the surplus multiplier is 
three. The bid increment is set at one, the minimum permissible bid at 30 and the 
maximum permissible bid at 200. The maximum bid is high enough to ensure that 
potential sellers can always submit a profitable bid associated with either low or high 
 
39 Aside from the normative appeal of the equal split, there is no immediate reason why subjects 
should behave differently for values of 𝜇 other than 1/3 or 2/3 (where Proposition 3.2 applies). 
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quality. It is also low enough to ensure that there is no bid at which a buyer could be 
forced into a purchase that might yield a loss.  
 
Table 3.2 – Cost and valuation schedules. 
Quality level 𝑞  𝑞 = 𝑞  𝑞 = 𝑞  
Buyer’s valuation: 𝑣  50 100 
Seller’s cost: 𝑐  30 40 
 
3.3.2.  Session protocol 
All subjects participated in a sequence of 30 trade interactions. Each interaction was 
divided into distinct phases. There were two phases of every interaction in the Voluntary 
treatment and three phases of every interaction in the Arbitrator treatment.  
The first two phases were the same in both treatments. In phase 1, the potential 
sellers in a group each submitted a sealed bid at a first-price reverse auction. At the 
same time as choosing a bid, each potential seller also chose a quality level, high or low, 
to be delivered conditional on winning the auction. This variant on the strategy method 
enabled twice as many quality observations to be collected, without changing the stra-
tegic nature of the game.40 The seller who submitted the lower bid in the first phase 
won the auction, with ties broken randomly. The winning and losing bids and the min-
imum payment obligation were then revealed within the group. This information was 
presented to subjects as a contract price range, with the lower bound price equal to one-
quarter of the winning bid and the upper bound price equal to the winning bid. The 
seller that submitted the losing bid in phase 1 earned zero profit for the interaction. 
In phase 2, the buyer observed the winning seller’s chosen quality level and proposed 
a payment from within the contract price range. In Voluntary, the buyer’s proposal was 
the final payment and the interaction ended there. In Arbitrator, there was a third (non-
 
40 Further benefits were that it helped to preserve anonymity of the winning seller and minimise 
wait times. A complete strategy method in Arbitrator would have required sellers to specify a 
quality choice for every possible bid, which is not practical. 
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decision) phase in which appeal to an arbitrator could be triggered if the buyer’s pro-
posal was less than a reference arbitrator price. The arbitrator’s price was the amount 
from between the buyer’s proposal and the seller’s bid that minimised the distance 
between the final payment and the mapping from arbitrator’s preferred surplus division 
to the gross deferred payment in (3.9). This mapping was common knowledge in the 
experiment (see implementation details below). If the buyer’s proposed price was below 
the arbitrator’s price, then an appeal to the arbitrator was triggered. The arbitrator was 
available to set a final price on one-half of appeals, determined at random at the onset 
of phase 3, in which case the buyer paid the verification cost.41 If no appeal was triggered, 
or the arbitrator unavailable, then the seller received the buyer’s proposed price.  
To illustrate, suppose the winning bid is 128 and the seller selects high quality. The 
contract price range is [32, 128]. The buyer proposes a price of 65. In Voluntary, this is 
the final payment; the buyer earns 35 and the seller earns 25. In Arbitrator, the arbi-
trator’s price would be 60 when 𝜇 = 1/3 or 80 when 𝜇 = 2/3. In the first situation, no 
appeal is triggered, and profits are the same as in Voluntary. In the second situation, 
an appeal to the arbitrator is triggered. If the arbitrator is available, then a two-point 
verification fee is levied on the buyer and the arbitrator’s price is used for payment; the 
buyer earns 18 and the seller earns 40.  If the arbitrator is unavailable, then profits are 
the same as in Voluntary. 
3.3.3.  Hypotheses 
Proposition 3.1 states that trade will be inefficient (i.e., low quality) in Voluntary. 
We chose the contract parameters in Arbitrator such that high quality is the unique 
implementable outcome for all levels of risk aversion and so Proposition 3.2 applies. In 
the appendix, we demonstrate the implementable quality levels for the full set of con-
tingent contracts.42 The cost of quality verification is low enough to ensure that the 
buyer should always propose her minimum payment obligation in the experiment, which 
 
41 This cost was not factored into calculation of the arbitrator’s price. 
42 The subset of contracts for which high quality is implementable is decreasing in the seller’s 
degree of risk aversion. 
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gives us scope to examine the behavioural effects of the hierarchical contract element. 
In Table 3.3, we present the point predictions for bid, quality, and profits in each treat-
ment. To within an increment, the equilibrium bid in Voluntary is 120, in Arbitrator 
with 𝜇 = 1/3 is 80, and with 𝜇 = 2/3 is 64. Due to the strong nature of supplier com-
petition, buyers are expected to appropriate the full surplus. 
 
Table 3.3 – Equilibrium predictions for bids, quality, and profits in the experiment. 
Treatment Voluntary Arbitrator 
Sub-treatment  𝜇 = 1/3 𝜇 = 2/3 
Measure    
𝑏  120 80 64 
𝑞 Low quality High quality High quality 
𝜋  20 60 60 
𝜋𝑆 0 0 0 
Notes: A potential seller’s bid is 𝑏 ; the quality level chosen by the auction winner is 𝑞; the buyer’s 
price proposal is 𝑦. The buyer’s expected profit is 𝜋𝐵 and the seller’s expected profit is 𝜋𝑆 . 
Numbers are to within one increment due to discreteness of the experimental price grid. 
 
The comparative hypotheses to be tested are summarised as follows: 
Hypothesis 3.1. Bidding. (i) Winning bids are lower in Arbitrator than in Voluntary; 
and (ii) winning bids are higher when 𝜇 = 1/3 than when 𝜇 = 2/3. 
Hypothesis 3.2. Efficiency. The probability of high quality is greater in Arbitrator than 
in Voluntary. 
Hypothesis 3.3. Reciprocity. There are no differences in the buyer’s payment behaviour 
between Arbitrator and Voluntary. 
Hypothesis 3.4. Profits. The buyer’s profit is higher in Arbitrator than in Voluntary; 
sellers’ profits are unchanged between Arbitrator and Voluntary. 
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3.3.4.  Implementation 
The total number of subjects recruited for the experiment was 108. Subjects were 
recruited using the web-based software hroot (Bock et al. 2014) and allocated at random 
to one of the two treatments, Voluntary or Arbitrator. Each treatment included six 
independent cohorts and no subject participated in more than one treatment. Every 
cohort had nine human subjects, three buyers and six sellers, who were matched into 
groups of one buyer and two sellers using a stranger matching protocol between inter-
actions. An algorithm ensured no subject played with the same two players in consecu-
tive interactions, and subjects were informed of this. In the procurement of critical 
products or long-term projects, firms typically compete for contracts within a fixed pool 
of potential sellers. While buyers and potential sellers vary between interactions, they 
often meet again at some future date. Thus, our matching protocol is arguably more 
appropriate than a perfect stranger matching protocol for the target setting. There were 
two cohorts (18 subjects) of the same treatment in every session.43 To minimise the 
possibility of tacit collusion, subjects were not informed about the cohort size.  
To facilitate understanding, the task was presented using a cover story. A shipping 
company sought to procure an engine for its cargo ship. The choice of a shipping com-
pany was deliberate. Subjects are less likely to have experience from daily life with a 
shipping company than, perhaps, an airline (see Alekseev et al. 2017 on the merits and 
pitfalls of using a meaningful instruction frame). One-third of subjects assumed the role 
of a shipping company (buyer); and two-thirds the role of a supplier.  
In Arbitrator, the sequence of trade interactions was broken into two blocks of 15 
interactions, which constituted the two sub-treatments. To control for order effects, the 
block sequence in this treatment followed a crossover design, with one-half of the sub-
jects in a session assigned to the sequence 𝜇 = {1/3, 2/3} and the other half assigned 
to 𝜇 = {2/3, 1/3}. The probabilistic nature of the arbitrator was explained using a die 
 
43 Data from one cohort of the Voluntary treatment was discarded after discovery of a compre-
hension issue. We subsequently conducted an additional session of this treatment, with nine 
(new) subjects, to fill the missing cohort. Summary statistics for the discarded cohort are avail-
able on request. 
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roll. Subjects were informed that if an appeal to the arbitrator was triggered, the com-
puter would roll a fair six-sided die. If the die came up one to three, the arbitrator would 
be unavailable, and the seller would receive the buyer’s proposed price as payment. If 
the die came up four to six, the arbitrator would be available, and the seller would 
receive the arbitrator’s price as payment.44 The mapping from arbitrator’s preference to 
price described in (3.9) was explained to subjects in terms of a two-to-one buyer (seller) 
to seller (buyer) profit ratio. Sellers were informed about the arbitrator’s price associated 
with each combination of bid and quality level. Buyers were informed about the arbi-
trator’s price associated with each proposal and whether an appeal would be triggered.  
At the end of each interaction, feedback was provided about the outcomes of a sub-
ject’s own interaction group (only) on bids, quality, payment, and profits. This feedback 
was provided to all groups simultaneously, to prevent subjects inferring the identities of 
others in their interaction group. Private feedback remained available in a history table 
to facilitate learning. The losing seller only observed the auction outcome.  
The experiments were computerised and programmed in oTree (Chen et al. 2016). 
To aid replicability and ensure common knowledge, video instructions were created and 
played at the start of an experimental session.45 Subjects had to answer a set of com-
prehension questions correctly before proceeding to two trial rounds, in which they were 
guided through the decision screens specific to their role. Roles were assigned randomly 
before the trial rounds and remained fixed. Each seller had their own auction in the trial 
rounds and these rounds were non-incentivised. The main experiment followed immedi-
ately. At the end of a session, subjects completed a survey to elicit demographic infor-
mation, risk and trust attitudes.46  
Subjects received money for their participation, which was paid in private and in 
cash at the end of a session. As is often the case in auction experiments, there was the 
 
44 The randomization was successful: the arbitrator was available on 49.3 percent of appeals in 
the experiment, which is not significantly different from 50 percent (p-value = 0.690, two-tailed 
binomial test).  
45 A compendium of instructions and links to the video recordings are included in the appendix. 
46 Since the predictions do not depend on risk preferences, we do not use an incentivized elicita-
tion. Summary statistics from the post-experiment survey are presented in the appendix. 
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possibility of losses. Subjects assigned a buyer (seller) role therefore began each interac-
tion with an endowment of five (ten) points.47 Any profit or loss was added to or sub-
tracted from the endowment. Sessions lasted sixty to seventy-five minutes. The total 
points from all rounds were multiplied by a pre-determined exchange rate of forty points 
per one British pound. Subjects were informed that the minimum amount they could 
leave the session with was £4.48 Average earnings for buyers were £28 and for sellers 
£10. Payoff inequality does not influence the theoretical predictions, because we assume 
standard preferences. Empirically, however, a concern for fairness may influence behav-
iour (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000). We return to this point 
when analysing the experimental results. 
3.4. Experimental Results 
This section presents findings of the lab experiment. First, we conduct an aggregate 
analysis. The cohort is the independent level of observation and is used for all statistical 
comparison tests in Section 3.4.1. Second, we analyse the individual bidding strategies 
pursued by sellers, in relation to the theory. Third, we estimate a mixture model and 
find that a significant fraction of buyers exhibit reference-dependent preferences. 
3.4.1.  Aggregate findings 
The main results of the experiment are summarised in Table 3.4. Cohort averages 
are provided for winning bids, the frequency of high quality, the buyer’s proposal for 
the seller’s share of the trade surplus (as inferred from the buyer’s proposed price), and 
profits. An efficiency measure is provided, which captures the realised percentage of 
trade surplus net of verification cost incurred by the buyer. The point predictions from 
Table 3.3 are included in square brackets. 
 
 
47 The relative endowment sizes compensate for the expectation that, on average, each seller 
participates in half as many transactions as the buyer. 
48 One subject encountered a limited liability problem. The results are qualitatively unchanged 
by inclusion or exclusion of the cohort in which this subject participated. For completeness, we 
include this cohort.  
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Table 3.4 – Aggregate summary statistics from the experiment. 
Treatment Voluntary Arbitrator 
Sub-treatment 
Measure 
  𝜇 = 1/3 𝜇 = 2/3 
Winning bid 105.64 [120] 65.29*** [80] 72.96*** [64] 
Quality 0.45 [0] 0.43 [1] 0.53 [1] 
Proposed seller share 0.13  -0.18***  -0.05**  
       Low quality 0.13  -0.23***  -0.13***  
        High quality 0.13  -0.11**  -0.05  
Buyer profit 33.85 [20] 33.8 [60] 32.32 [60] 
         Low quality 17.32  18.35  13.93  
         High quality 52.41  52.83  48.21  
Seller profit 4.79 [0] 3.35 [0] 8.01 [0] 
         Low quality 2.68  0.78  5.24  
         High quality 7.59  6.51  11.11  
Efficiency 63% [33%] 61% [96.7%] 67% [96.7%] 
Notes: The table summarises the main outcomes of the lab experiment. Values are median cohort 
averages, based on six independent cohorts per treatment. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. All 
statistical tests are based on two-tailed non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests versus the 
Voluntary treatment. The point prediction of the theory is provided in square brackets. Variable 
definitions: Winning bid is the lowest bid submitted by potential sellers in the auction phase; Quality is 
the relative frequency that high quality is chosen for delivery by the winning seller; Proposed seller share 
is the buyer’s proposal for the seller’s share of the trade surplus (as inferred from the proposed price); 
Buyer profit is the trade profit per round for the buyer; Seller profit is the trade profit per round for the 
winning seller; Efficiency is the realised percentage of attainable trade surplus net of any verification cost 
incurred. 
 
Bidding. The theory predicts that winning bids are lower in the Arbitrator treatment 
and that the equilibrium bid is a function of the arbitrator’s preference. The data 
strongly supports the first prediction, but not the second. 
Both bids and winning bids (the lower-order bidding statistic) differ between the two 
treatments. In Voluntary, the average bid submitted in the auction is 115.77 and in the 
pooled Arbitrator data, 78.55. The average winning bids are 105.64 and 69.24, respec-
tively. Both differences are statistically significant in the direction predicted by 
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Hypothesis 3.1 (p-value < 0.01 for both comparisons).49 Pairwise comparisons between 
the Voluntary treatment and the Arbitrator sub-treatments yield similar statistical dif-
ferences.50 The distribution of bids in Voluntary is stochastically larger than in Arbitra-
tor (p-value < 0.001, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, one-tailed). In Voluntary, bids are in 
line with the point prediction of 120 (p-value = 0.563). 
Result 3.1a. We find support for Hypothesis 3.1(i). A contingent contract results in 
significantly lower winning bids than a non-contingent contract. 
The theory is less successful at explaining bidding behaviour within-subjects in Ar-
bitrator. When the arbitrator favours the buyer (𝜇 = 1/3), rather than the seller (𝜇 =
2/3), we expect sellers to adjust their bids upwards to compensate for the lower expected 
price in the event of winning the auction and the arbitrator being available. This is not 
observed in the data.  
Average bids are 74.71 when 𝜇 = 1/3 and 81.06 when 𝜇 = 2/3. Winning bids are 
65.29 and 72.96, respectively. Neither pairwise difference is significant (p-value = 0.563 
and p-value = 0.313). The failure to adjust bids in response to a change in 𝜇 is not 
concealed by learning. If we restrict attention to experienced sellers only – periods 11 
to 15 and 26 to 30 – neither bids nor winning bids are significantly different (p-value = 
1.00 and p-value = 0.563). The null finding is also not a consequence of behavioural 
spillover effects. Spillover effects are possible in Arbitrator because 𝜇 is varied within 
subjects between the first and second half of the experiment (see Bednar et al. 2012, for 
a discussion of the importance of accounting for spillovers in economic experiments). 
The results in this section are qualitatively unchanged if we only consider data from 
periods one to fifteen and so only consider between-subjects variation.51 This suggests 
that any spillover effects, if present, did not significantly alter subjects’ behaviour. 
 
49 Unless otherwise stated, all p-values in this section are based on Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests 
for two-sample comparisons and Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests for one-sample comparisons. We 
report one-sided p-values if the theory predicts a direction, else two-sided.  
50 Voluntary vs. 𝜇 = 1/3, p-value < 0.01 for both; Voluntary vs. 𝜇 = 2/3, p-value = 0.021 and 
p-value < 0.01. 
51 Summary statistics for the spillover analyses are included in the appendix. 
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Result 3.1b. We reject Hypothesis 3.1(ii). Potential sellers fail to adjust their bids based 
on expected values in response to a change in the arbitrator’s preference. 
Efficiency. The theory predicts that high quality trading relationships are more likely 
to be observed with a contingent contract independently of the arbitrator’s preferences. 
There is no systematic evidence for this in the data. 
High quality trades are observed across the winning bid distributions in both treat-
ments (see Figure 3.3). The relative frequencies of high quality delivered by the winning 
seller in the Voluntary and Arbitrator treatments are forty-five and forty-eight percent, 
respectively. This difference is not significant (p-value = 0.350). There is also no signif-
icant difference in quality between the Arbitrator sub-treatments (p-value = 0.313).  
Consistent with the model, the relative frequency of dispute is high at close to eighty 
percent in both Arbitrator sub-treatments. After taking the verification cost into ac-
count, average trade efficiency is sixty-three percent in Voluntary and sixty-four percent 
in Arbitrator. This difference is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.531). There is 
no significant pairwise difference between Voluntary and either of the Arbitrator sub-
treatments (Voluntary vs. 𝜇 = 1/3, p-value = 0.803 and vs. 𝜇 = 2/3, p-value = 0.294). 
Result 3.2. We reject Hypothesis 3.2. A contingent contract does not significantly in-
crease trade efficiency relative to a non-contingent contract. 
Reciprocity . The model assumes standard preferences and so predicts that buyers 
satisfy their minimum payment obligation only. Given the vast literature in experimental 
economics documenting social preferences, it is unsurprising that this assumption is 
falsified behaviourally. More interesting is that buyer proposals (in profit-sharing terms)  




Figure 3.3. Distribution of winning bids and the relative frequency of high quality. 
 
 
In Voluntary, the buyer on average proposes a price equal to 37.6 percent of the 
winning bid. In Arbitrator, the average proposal is forty-two percent, but of a lower 
average price. Both rates are significantly above the minimum required one-quarter (p-
value = 0.016 for both comparisons) and this is consistent with the existence of social 
preferences among buyers.52 There is a sustained gap between lower bound contract price 
and the average buyer proposal in the experiment over time. The average final price in 
Arbitrator is 40.78, which coincides with the equilibrium prediction of compensation 
equal to the seller’s delivery cost of high quality. By contrast, in Voluntary the average 
final price is 38.93, significantly above the cost of low quality (p-value = 0.031). 
The seller surplus shares implied by these proposals differ markedly between treat-
ments and we interpret this as a measure of buyer reciprocity. Average price proposals 
in Voluntary imply a seller profit equal to 13.26 percent of the transaction surplus. The 
picture is very different in Arbitrator, where proposals imply a seller loss equal to 14.65 
 
52 Since proposals cannot be below one-quarter of the winning bid, we use a one-tailed test. 
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percent of the transaction surplus. The difference is highly significant (p-value < 0.01). 
The arbitration clause was triggered on four out of five transactions. Revealingly, while 
buyers in Voluntary offer the seller a similar surplus share independently of the quality 
level, buyers in Arbitrator offer significantly less in exchange for low quality than for 
high quality (p-value = 0.031). This is not driven by differences in bids accompanying 
the two quality levels (see next sub-section) and implies that buyers are less forgiving 
of a seller’s reluctance to deliver high quality with a contingent contract. 
Result 3.3. We reject Hypothesis 3.3. A contingent contract crowds out buyer reciproc-
ity and the arbitrator acts as a partial substitute for reciprocity in the determination of 
final prices. 
Profits. The standard theory predicts that sellers compete away their rents in the 
auction and so the buyer appropriates the full trade surplus, yielding higher profits in 
Arbitrator. This prediction is only partially borne out in the data. 
In both the Voluntary and Arbitrator treatments, buyers earn significantly higher 
profits than sellers (p-value = 0.016 for both comparisons). The gains from high quality 
trade are also apparent. Buyers and sellers each earn roughly three times as much from 
high quality trades as low quality trades, in line with the surplus multiplier. Yet buyers 
do not benefit from the presence of an arbitrator. In fact, buyer profits are remarkably 
stable across experimental conditions, at 33.85 in Voluntary, 33.80 in Arbitrator when 
𝜇 = 1/3 and 32.32 when 𝜇 = 2/3. Neither pairwise difference is significant.53 
The average seller profit is 4.79 in Voluntary and 6.42 in Arbitrator. This increase is 
not significant (p-value = 0.818). It does, however, mask some underlying differences 
between the Arbitrator sub-treatments. Seller profits are 3.35 when 𝜇 = 1/3 and 8.01 
when 𝜇 = 2/3. While profits in the 𝜇 = 2/3 sub-treatment of Arbitrator are not signif-
icantly different from the Voluntary treatment (p-value = 0.310), we cannot rule out 
that this is due to a lack of statistical power – see the robustness check below. More 
data is required to make concrete inferences on whether, and the conditions under which, 
 
53 Voluntary vs. 𝜇 = 1/3, p-value = 0.758 and vs. 𝜇 = 2/3, p-value = 0.758; 𝜇 = 1/3 vs. 2/3, p-
value = 1.00. 
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an arbitration mechanism can improve the seller’s position in competitive procurement 
interactions. 
Result 3.4. We find partial support for Hypothesis 3.4. Buyers earn significantly more 
than sellers, but neither trade party significantly benefits from a contingent contract. 
Robustness check: Since the number of independent observations per treatment is 
small, low statistical power might be a concern for any null result in the hypothesised 
direction. There is disaggregated data from 540 matching groups in each treatment, 
which yields greater statistical power to detect effects than the more conservative mean 
comparison tests used above. Results 3.1 to 3.4 are qualitatively unchanged if we conduct 
a regression analysis on the matching group level data, accounting for intra-cohort 
dependencies and small-sample considerations using the wild cluster bootstrap method 
(Cameron et al. 2008). The results of this exercise are contained in the appendix. 
3.4.2.  Seller bidding strategies 
In this sub-section, we analyse seller bidding strategies formulated during the auction 
phase of the experiment. There is data from 1,070 strategies submitted in Voluntary 
and 1,059 strategies submitted in Arbitrator.54 High quality is a component of forty-two 
percent of bidding strategies in Voluntary. In Arbitrator, this is true of forty-six (fifty-
five) percent of strategies when 𝜇 = 1/3 (𝜇 = 2/3), which is a weakly significant increase 
over Voluntary (p-value = 0.066). Thus, whereas a contingent contract does not signifi-
cantly improve the winning quality delivered, there is some evidence that it promotes 
higher quality among the pool of potential sellers. This implies a negative selection effect 
of the reverse auction. 
As a first step, it is instructive to examine average bids that accompany the respective 
quality levels at the cohort level. In Voluntary, the median bid for low quality strategies 
 
54 The difference is due to the use of a hard time-out protocol in the experimental sessions. In 
the event of time-out, the default bid was 200, the quality level was decided at random and the 
price proposal was set equal to the winning bid. The rate of data loss is less than one percent, 




is 118.35, very close to the equilibrium prediction [120]. The median bid for high quality 
strategies is significantly lower at 109.71 (p-value = 0.031). This suggests that, with a 
non-contingent contract, deviation to a lower bid may have been driven by a belief that 
high quality is a “gift” that buyers will reciprocate. By contrast, in Arbitrator the me-
dian bid for high quality strategies at 81.86 is significantly higher than for low quality 
strategies at 74.46 (p-value = 0.063). One explanation is that potential sellers anticipate 
lower proposed surplus shares with a contingent contract and adjust their bids to com-
pensate; i.e., sellers must insure themselves against relatively lower price offers. 
In Figure 3.4 we compare actual versus predicted seller profits per quality level, as a 
function of the winning bid. The SPNE bid in each experimental condition is marked 
with a red diamond plus. Consistent with the aggregate results, seller profit levels are 
stable across bids in Voluntary. On average, observed seller profits remain flat above the 
break-even level, independent of the bid and quality choice. In Arbitrator, however, 
seller profits are sensitive to the winning bid and more closely track the prediction based 
on the assumption that buyers act as strict profit maximisers. Note that at the median 
winning bid in each Arbitrator sub-treatment, high quality is incentive compatible based 
on actual profits. 
Table 3.5 presents the results of regression analyses to investigate the determinants 
of suppliers’ bidding strategies. First, to examine factors affecting bids, we use random 
effects regressions with three levels of dependencies and controlling for a range of co-
variates (models 1 to 4, adapted from Moffatt 2015, Chapter 4.7). The dependent vari-
able is the bid of subject 𝑖 in cohort 𝑗 in period 𝑡. To account for intra-session correlation, 
the variance is estimated at subject and cohort levels.55 We observe a positive depend-
ency of current bids on the once-lagged competitor’s bid, which captures the strategic 
complementarities of Bertrand competition. Bids trend downwards over time in both 
Voluntary and Arbitrator treatments. In models 2 and 4, we add the buyer’s proposed 
 
55 The specification is 𝑦 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑥 + 𝛽 𝑧 + 𝛽 𝑜 + 𝛽 𝑡 + 𝑢 + 𝜐 + 𝜀 , variances 𝑉 (𝑢 ) =
𝜎 , 𝑉 𝜐 = 𝜎  and 𝑉 𝜀 = 𝜎 . The three levels are 𝑖 = 1,… ,36 (sellers), 𝑗 = 1,… ,6 (cohorts), 
𝑡 = 1,… , 30 (periods). Independent variables are specific to the subject-cohort-period (𝑥 ), sub-
ject only (𝑧 ) or cohort only (𝑜 ). 
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bid discount from the previous period as a regressor to measure the influence of buyer 
reciprocity. This measure drives significantly higher bids in both treatments. The effect 
size is much larger in Voluntary, where a 10 percentage point increase in the most 
recently proposed bid discount leads suppliers to adjust their bid upward by nearly five 
points on average. In Arbitrator, the adjustment is just over one point. 
 
Figure 3.4. Seller profits as a function of the winning bid: Actual versus predicted. 
 
Notes: The lines are loess smoothers and the shaded regions for the observed data 





Table 3.5 – Determinants of bid strategies: the most recent bid discount drives 
higher bids and lower probability of high quality, but the effect weakens in Arbitrator. 
Dependent variable Bid Prob. High Quality 
Treatment Voluntary Arbitrator Voluntary Arbitrator 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Competitor’s bid t-1 0.222*** 0.218*** 0.075*** 0.061**   
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.024) (0.027)   
Bid (IV = Bid t-1)     0.011 -0.005 
     (0.010) (0.013) 
Proposed bid discount   0.471***  0.119*** -0.026*** -0.009*** 
(ppt) t-1  (0.048)  (0.034) (0.007) (0.003) 
       
Period -0.302*** -0.132* -0.510*** -0.679*** 0.005 -0.011 
 (0.063) (0.077) (0.077) (0.101) (0.011) (0.013) 
𝜇 = 2/3    1.44 2.225  0.096 
   (1.28) (1.643)  (0.182) 
OrderHL   8.37 11.791  0.313 
   (9.38) (8.911)  (0.529) 
Constant 87.62*** 61.375*** 85.38*** 53.062*** 0.453 -1.185 
 (13.58) (9.692) (19.95) (19.639) (1.266) (1.840) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Random effects  
(subject and cohort) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Cohort fixed effect No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 1,037 512 990 488 512 488 
Subjects 36 36 36 36 36 36 
Cohorts 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Wald 𝜒  149.8 266.9 85.08 82.46 56 29.98 
𝜒  p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 
𝜎   15.01 8.400 11.08 10.46   
𝜎   9.601 5.511 5.437 4.639   
𝜎   16.68 13.56 20.05 17.89   
Notes:  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The models in columns 1 to 4 are estimated using multilevel 
mixed effects linear regression and include two random effects intercepts that capture intra-session corre-
lation at the subject and cohort levels, respectively. Coefficient estimates are presented, with standard 
errors in parentheses. The models in columns 5 and 6 are estimated using instrumental variable (IV) probit 
regression and include cohort fixed effects. Coefficient estimates are on the z-score scale, with robust 
standard errors clustered at the subject level. Bid is the continuous endogenous regressor and the excluded 
instrument is the once-lagged bid. The IV first stage is reported in the appendix. Proposed bid discount 
(ppt) t-1 is one minus the ratio of the buyer’s proposed price to the winning bid in the previous period, 
expressed in percentage points. The following control variables (not shown) are included: dummy for being 
female; dummy for being an economics and finance major; two Likert scales for self-reported willingness 
to take risks in general and in financial matters; dummy for reporting trust in strangers; and a generalised 
trust index. OrderHL is a dummy variable to indicate that the cohort followed the sequence 𝜇 = {2/3, 
1/3} in the Arbitrator treatment. 
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To examine the factors affecting sellers’ quality choices, we estimate instrumental 
variable probit regressions in which quality is the dependent variable and bid is the 
endogenous regressor, which is instrumented for by the once-lagged bid (models 5 and 
6). The instrumental variable estimator is used to mitigate the issue of simultaneity 
between bids and quality choices inherent in the strategy method application. The in-
strument passes recognised strength tests – see the appendix for diagnostic statistics. 
Standard errors are adjusted using the Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance at 
the subject level. Cohort fixed effects are included in both regressions, based on a joint 
test of their significance (p-value < 0.001, two-tailed Wald test). 
In both treatments, the only significant predictor of the seller’s willingness to deliver 
high quality is the buyer’s most recently proposed bid discount.56 In Voluntary, a 10 
percentage point reduction in the most recent bid discount increases the probability of 
high quality by 9.4 percentage points. Again, the effect size is smaller in Arbitrator, 
where a 10 percentage point reduction in the most recent bid discount increases the 
probability of high quality by just 3.8 percentage points. The effect is robust to different 
values of the arbitrator’s preference. This suggests that seller reciprocity is also attenu-
ated with a contingent contract, which hampers the effectiveness of the contingent con-
tract for improving trade efficiency. This offers further support for Results 3.2 and 3.3 
above. 
3.4.3.  Reference-dependent buyers 
In this sub-section, we analyse buyer behaviour during the price proposal phase of 
the experiment. There are eighteen buyers in each treatment and every buyer is observed 
over thirty trading periods. We have data from 535 price proposal decisions in each 
treatment. In Voluntary, only 23.7 percent of buyer choices are of the lower bound price 
(i.e., the maximum bid discount). This varies by the seller’s chosen quality level, equal 
to 31.4 percent for low quality and less than 15 percent for high quality. There are 
 
56 Reassuringly, the order in which the values of 𝜇 are presented to sellers in Arbitrator has no 
significant effect on either bid or quality decisions. No significant order effects are found in de-
termining buyer proposals either (see the appendix for details). 
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masses at the salient fifty-fifty surplus split, but the most common allocations are found 
at three-to-one and five-to-one buyer to seller ratios. 
In Arbitrator, proposals of the lower bound price are observed more frequently: 46.8 
percent of choices when 𝜇 = 1/3, and 50.8 percent of choices when 𝜇 = 2/3. These fre-
quencies are stable across quality levels. Thus, a seller in this treatment could expect to 
encounter a strictly profit-maximising buyer on roughly one-half of transactions. Around 
one-in-five buyer choices in Arbitrator are “mimicking”. That is, the buyer proposes the 
reference arbitrator price, given the winning bid and quality level delivered. Note that 
the arbitrator’s price does not necessarily coincide with the final price even when the 
arbitrator is available, because of the constraint to award at least the buyer’s proposal. 
The frequency of mimicking choices is stable across quality levels. Most of the remaining 
proposals are in the region between the lower bound price and the reference arbitrator 
price. Less than four percent of proposals award the seller more than what the arbitrator 
deems fair.  
In both treatments, buyers tend towards strictly profit-maximising choices as the 
experiment progresses. Non-parametric bootstrap tests of a positive time trend in the 
number of lower bound proposals show strong significance across conditions.57 The 
standard theory cannot explain the persistence of mimicking choices in Arbitrator. 
When 𝜇 = 1/3, no time trend is observed in the average number of mimicking choices 
(p-value = 0.493); when 𝜇 = 2/3, there is a significant positive trend (p-value = 0.012). 
One explanation for the persistence of such choices is that some buyers have refer-
ence-dependent fairness preferences over outcomes. In the experiment, subjects are in-
formed in advance about the arbitrator’s preference and when this would change. Other-
regarding buyers may then have anchored their proposals on the arbitrator’s preference 
and perceived this as the fair reference point. If the reference point is determined by 
recently held expectations (e.g., Kőszegi and Rabin 2006), then we would expect the 
proportion of mimicking choices to be stable across the Arbitrator sub-treatments. The 
 
57 Based on 999 replications, Voluntary: Mean = 0.365, S.E. = 0.191, p-value = 0.025; Arbitrator, 
𝜇 = 1/3: Mean = 0.763, S.E. = 0.269, p-value < 0.001; Arbitrator, 𝜇 = 2/3: Mean = 0.553, S.E. 
= 0.270, p-value = 0.01. 
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plausibility of the reference-dependent argument is suggested by the raw choice data: 
22.3% (20.7%) of choices are mimicking when 𝜇 = 1/3 (= 2/3), respectively. 
To test the reference-dependent argument, we separate buyers in Arbitrator into one 
of two behavioural types: self-interested (Self) or fair (Fair). We then estimate the pa-
rameters underlying each type’s price proposal function using a finite mixture model. 
This structural approach will help us to identify the determinants of buyer behaviour in 
the experiment. The mixture model estimation procedure is adapted from Moffatt 
(2015) and full details are contained in the appendix. Self-interested buyers are associ-
ated with maximal bid discounts. For fair buyers, we specify a latent model in which 
price proposals anchor on the arbitrator’s preferred price with a normally distributed 
error term. An implicit assumption is that subjects do not switch between types.58 A 
two-limit tobit model is appropriate, where the limits correspond to the lower/upper 
bounds of the contract price range and are specific to each buyer and period. The type 
frequencies are given by the mixing fractions 𝛾  and 𝛾 .  
The maximum likelihood estimates from this procedure are summarised in Table 3.6. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are computed, with resampling clusters at the cohort 
level. The estimated fraction of self-interested (fair) buyers in Arbitrator is 0.611 (0.389) 
(p-value < 0.001). Consistent with the reference-dependent argument, the coefficient 
estimate on the arbitrator’s preferred price is not significantly different from one (p-
value = 0.853, two-sided Wald test). In Figure 3.5, panel (a), we display posterior type 
probabilities as a function of the number of lower bound price proposals. The posteriors 
separate buyers into one of the two types. A cluster of buyers in Arbitrator never choose 
the lower bound price. Self-interested types choose the lower bound price on more than 
ten transactions. Panel (b) of the figure presents the histogram of proposals by type, as 
a share of trade surplus. We exclude any proposal equal to the winning bid (35 obser-
vations) because these do not necessarily reflect a buyer’s true preference. For fair types, 
the largest densities can be found at 1/3 and 2/3 of the surplus. If we include proposals 
equal to the winning bid, the mass at 1/3 of the surplus increases further. 
 
58 Buyers appear to gravitate towards one strategy during the experiment, rather than mixing 




Table 3.6 – Maximum likelihood estimates from the finite mixture two-limit Tobit 
model of buyer behaviour in the Arbitrator treatment. 
Fair buyers  
Arbitrator’s preferred price 0.971 (0.158)*** 
Constant -3.64 (5.76) 
Error term sd. 8.51 (6.54) 
Mixing fractions  
𝛾   0.611 (0.084)*** 
𝛾   0.389 (0.084)*** 
Observations 535 
Wald 𝜒  37.97 
𝜒  p-value 0.000 
(Subjects, Periods) (18, 30) 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 
clustered at the cohort level, based on 999 bootstrap replications. 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Finite mixture model validation. 
 
(a) Posterior type probabilities.            (b) Histogram of buyer proposals.  
Notes: Panel (a) contains a jittered scatter plot of posterior type probabilities from 
the finite mixture two-limit Tobit model. Panel (b) contains a histogram of buyer 
price proposals as a share of the trade surplus, excluding upper censored price 
proposals and one outlying observation in which a buyer offered more than the full 




3.5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Hierarchical elements, such as dispute resolution provisions, are common elements of 
procurement contracts when there are moral hazard and liability issues. Contingent 
contracts are intended to avoid the prohibitive costs of lengthy court proceedings and 
align incentives to maximise gains from trade. We use a combination of theory and 
experiments to examine the behavioural consequences of contingent contracting in a 
procurement relationship characterised by two-sided moral hazard. The contingency is 
modelled as an arbitration clause; the seller is determined by a reverse auction; and the 
buyer has discretion to deduct monies from the seller in exchange for quality delivered. 
In theory, a non-contingent contract yields low quality trade, while a contingent contract 
can improve trade efficiency and generate more competitive bids.  
We observe in a lab experiment that, while the contingent contract is robust in the 
sense that it relies only on the regard of each party to their own interest, it also crowds 
out reciprocity. Buyers reward suppliers less (in profit-sharing terms) for quality deliv-
ered. Sellers are in turn less willing to deliver high quality and so the contingent contract 
does not significantly increase the efficiency of trade relative to a non-contingent con-
tract. This crowding out effect is consistent with evidence from labour market experi-
ments on the demotivating effects of explicit incentives (Fehr and Gächter 2000, Fehr et 
al. 2007), and with principal-agent literature on the hidden costs of incentive devices 
(Falk and Kosfeld 2006).  
The model developed here can rationalise why powerful corporations may favour the 
use of arbitration agreements, from simple profit-maximizing behaviour. In theory, the 
buyer appropriates the increased surplus from trading with a contingent contract. More 
data is required to inform on whether a contingent contract improves the seller’s position 
empirically. An interesting implication of the analysis arises from the prediction that 
uncertainty is a necessary condition for the contingent contract to be successful. That 
is, when sellers compete on price, guaranteeing quality verification may be inefficient. 
Since the total verification cost increases in the relative frequency with which an arbi-
trator is employed, any industry scheme guaranteeing the availability of an arbitrator 
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during trade may incur an unnecessary and counter-productive expense. Potential sellers 
may use such information to lower their bids and increase their probability of winning 
the contract. This observation is consistent with anecdotal evidence that sellers lower 
their bids in expectation of later recovering costs through a dispute mechanism.59 
From a trade efficiency perspective, both flexible price contract types tested here 
perform favourably when compared to the allocation of a rigid, fixed-price contract in 
reverse auctions with moral hazard (Brosig-Koch and Heinrich 2014, Fugger, Katok and 
Wambach 2019). There are, of course, alternative mechanisms to mitigate the seller-side 
moral hazard problem, such as buyer-determined auctions and systems of reputation. 
And since there is a cost involved in organising an arbitration scheme, these mechanisms 
may well be complementary and/or preferable in certain settings. That said, mechanisms 
that can preserve price competition have transparency benefits beyond those captured 
in the model. For this reason, moving away from a commitment to procure at the lowest 
price is not always palatable for the regulator.  
There are several limitations of the model that might be addressed in future work. 
First, an optimal dispute resolution mechanism was employed in the experiment, as 
implemented by a computer program. Whether or not trade parties make optimal use 
of dispute resolution is an interesting question for future work. An alternative design 
would be to assess how payment norms emerge endogenously if a human arbitrator(s) 
were introduced into the experiment. Third-party punishment behaviours have been 
observed to serve a useful function in enforcing distributional norms (Fehr and Fisch-
bacher 2004). 
Second, the implementation of the arbitrator’s preference is a known and determin-
istic function of the transaction price and quality. In practice, the final deferred value is 
likely to involve noise, especially when actions are difficult to verify. This caveat should 
be kept in mind if drawing policy implications from the analytical results, which may 
 
59 For example, see the following extract taken from a survey of industry practitioners: “Some 
interviewees noted that they had observed project participants bidding a lower price upon the 
expectation of recovering sums through variation orders which, if disputed, could be arbitrated” 
(Pinsent Masons 2019, p 7). 
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overstate the effects of a contingent contract in real-world dispute resolution. One avenue 
for further research would be to add a stochastic component into the preference set. 
Third, the nature of supplier competition considered here is strong. Small supplier 
profit margins are characteristic of many procurement settings. For example, publicly 
traded highway construction firms in the sample of Bajari et al. (2014) report profit 
margins of less than three percent. However, strong supplier competition is not repre-
sentative of all procurement settings and it would be useful to extend the analysis to a 
balanced market environment, a market in which the seller holds the balance of power, 
and/or alternative auction selection rules.  
Finally, the assumption that buyers are endowed with full bargaining power is often 
used in the contract-theoretic literature to create the most severe hold-up problem (Hart 
and Moore 1999, Hoppe and Schmitz 2011). The model here could be generalised to 
allow for an investigation of a seller’s relative bargaining power in determining the final 
trading price. Future work might also consider the effects of contingent contracting in 
procurement with multi-sourcing of suppliers. As Volkswagen found to its detriment in 




4 The Horizontal Effects of Late Payments 
“Imagine walking into a shop, taking what you want up to the counter, and then, 
when the time comes to pay, saying ‘thanks – but I think I’ll just take these now 
and pay later’, and casually walking out with your items. You obviously wouldn’t 
dream of it – so why is this kind of behaviour acceptable when it comes to paying 
small business suppliers?”  
- Stephen P. Kelly, CEO, Sage (2017).60 
4.1. Introduction 
Existing models of price competition assume that suppliers receive payment on de-
mand. Yet often, suppliers must account for the possibility of late payment when for-
mulating their bidding strategies. As a consequence, they may value prospective revenue 
below the posted price. A multi-national industry report uncovered that more than one 
in ten invoices issued by small and medium-sized enterprises are paid with delay, ranging 
from 8% in Brazil, to 12.5% in the US, and 18% in the UK and Singapore. This trans-
lates to over 1 trillion US dollars in payments made outside of the agreed term globally 
(Miller and Wongsaroj 2017). Late payments on large invoices are equally as likely as 
those on small invoices, and so from a managerial perspective pose a significant business 
risk. Research released by the British Federation of Small Businesses revealed that the 
failure of clients to pay on-time was perceived as the single greatest risk faced by sup-
pliers (FSB 2018).61 A separate representative survey of UK businesses from 2020 found 
that 89% of respondents pay their suppliers late (Bottomline 2020).  
Payment delays have a negative effect on supplier cash flows. There is a dispropor-
tionate impact on smaller companies, which are typically more liquidity constrained. 
 
60 https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/lets-call-time-late-payments-stephen-kelly/. 
61 In the FSB survey, more than 80% of businesses reported experience of receiving payments 
beyond the due date. This practice spanned multiple business sectors, from construction to retail, 
with one in five suppliers to the public sector also affected. As of January 2021, £23.4 billion 




Indeed, a culture of poor payment practice extends beyond missed invoice dates. For 
example, Carillion - the collapsed facilities management and construction services group 
– were “notorious late payers” and even requested a discount from suppliers in exchange 
for use of an early repayment facility. Evidence submitted to a parliamentary select 
committee in 2018 suggests that Carillion had doubled its payment term and used sup-
pliers as a line of credit. Such practices are made possible by the power imbalance 
between smaller contractors and their larger clients.62 
The aggregate impact of these payment practices is stark. Late payments were esti-
mated to be responsible for the closure of 50,000 companies in the UK during a single 
year, undermining investment and hiring (FSB 2016). Market commentators routinely 
claim that they inflate consumer prices.63 In EU member states, a significant statistical 
relationship has been documented between the timeliness of business-to-business pay-
ments and firm survival rates (Connell 2014, Conti et al. 2020). Late payments have 
also been identified with a withholding of supplies and a counter-productive increase in 
procurement costs for buyers (Howorth and Reber 2003). An obvious challenge in infer-
ring causality from empirical data on the impact of late payments is endogeneity. Mar-
kets in which late payments abound may be characterised by financially weak firms, 
who are more likely to mark up their prices to achieve positive profits or otherwise exit 
the market. Therefore it is extremely difficult to separate the horizontal effects of late 
payments from broader financial constraints which are themselves inherent in field data.  
In this chapter, we use theory and experiments to circumvent the endogeneity prob-
lem and isolate the channel through which payment delays influence supplier bidding 
strategies and competition. The analytical results build from earlier models of Bertrand 
competition in the industrial organization literature. We assume simultaneous entry and 
pricing with non-zero entry costs. The number and identity of rival entrants is unob-
served before bidding and the Nash equilibrium is characterised in symmetric mixed 
strategies (Lang and Rosenthal 1991, Levin and Smith 1994). To focus on the role of 
 
62 See “Committees publish correspondence” (2018).  
63 The following quote is indicative of this type of reasoning, “the additional financing costs that 
suppliers incur because they aren’t being paid promptly work their way back into higher prices 
for consumers” (Strom 2015). 
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late payments in entry and pricing decisions, we assume away other factors, such as 
repeated interactions and renegotiation, which might confound the underlying channel 
of interest. While we acknowledge that this may be restrictive from a practical perspec-
tive, we consider the absence of these factors a strength of the experimental methodology 
in enabling us to address the research question of interest, that is, to identify the specific 
horizontal (rather than vertical) effects of late payments. 
We also consider aspects of the regulatory environment that might influence a buyer’s 
choice of payment strategy. Specifically, we analyse the impact of an exogenous penalty 
(e.g., a regulatory fine) imposed on the buyer for reneging on an intention to pay within 
the standard payment term. This type of penalty is an active area of policy debate. In 
the UK, legislation enacted in 2016 established the Office of the Small Business Com-
missioner with the remit to crack down on the endemic culture of late payment. New 
powers proposed by the government include the ability to levy fines on firms that fail 
to meet their payment obligations (Small Business Commissioner 2021). The EU di-
rective 2011/7/EU on combating late payment in commercial transactions (2011) sets 
minimum rules specifying that public and private companies must pay their invoices 
within 30 and 60 days, respectively, or else incur a financial penalty. 
One strategy used by buyers to avoid paying beyond the due date is to extend long 
payment terms. Absent deterrent penalties and/or in situations where buyers are en-
dowed with high bargaining power, extending long payment terms makes commercial 
sense to maximise capital usage.64  Even where deterrent regulation exists, such as 
2011/7/EU, there are exceptions for trade parties who “expressly agree” to longer pay-
ment periods (p. L 48/2).65 There is growing empirical evidence that many large com-
panies agree long payment terms with their suppliers (IACCM 2015). That is, it is not 
only financially weak buyers who pay late. The following extract from The New York 
Times (NYT) is a case in point: “Exhibit A is Cisco Systems, one of the largest 
 
64 And has even propagated a new business model. See: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2019-08-16/how-late-payments-to-vendors-spawned-a-new-business-quicktake. 
65 Moreover, where exceptions should not apply, enforcement of prompt payment terms is varia-




technology companies in the world, which announced last year that it would wait a full 
60 days to pay its small-business suppliers - mostly because it had found that that was 
what other big companies were doing” (Seligson 2011). Another NYT commentary 
pointed to the popularity of this tactic among the world’s largest food processing com-
panies: “Diageo, the European spirits company, now asks for 90 days to pay its bills. 
Mondelez, Mars and Kellogg seek 120 days. The list of companies doing the same reads 
like a grocery store version of Who’s Who” (Strom 2015).   
Given the observed payment strategies, we model the interaction as a signalling game. 
In our setting, firms possess a discount factor by which they mark down late payments 
relative to the nominal payment value. We interpret this discount factor as a firm’s type. 
For ease of analysis, we confine our theoretical environment to two types of buyer: Strong 
and Weak. Weak buyers place greater value on late payment than Strong buyers. The 
timeline of events in our model is as follows. First, the buyer observes her type and 
signals an ex-ante payment term. We consider two payment terms: standard (e.g., 30 
days) or extended (e.g., 60 to 120 days). Second, potential suppliers observe the buyer’s 
signal, but not her underlying type. They must then decide whether or not to incur a 
fixed entry cost and enter into price competition. The supplier that submits the lowest 
bid wins the right to contract with the buyer. Third, the buyer observes the winning 
bid and selects the final payment date ex-post. The buyer is free to pay within or beyond 
the signalled payment term but a penalty is imposed on the buyer for reneging on a 
standard term. The contribution of the signalling structure is to enable us to understand 
how the institutional environment (i.e., exogenous penalty) interacts with the buyer’s 
financial capacity (i.e., discount factor) and the regulatory implications for setting an 
optimal penalty.   
We show theoretically that payment delays feed into higher consumer prices and 
reduced supplier entry. Consistent with the anecdotal evidence described above, when 
the penalty imposed on buyers for paying suppliers late is low, even Strong buyers – 
who may benefit from large cash reserves, plentiful access to credit and by implication 
high discount factors – signal an extended payment term in equilibrium. Within deter-
rent institutional environments, whether buyers fulfil a standard payment term depends 
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on the relative financial strength of buyers in the population. Financial strength per se, 
however, does not preclude the emergence of late payments in equilibrium. Our analysis 
can rationalise a late payment event if the cost of reneging on a standard payment term 
is not set optimally and there exist price spillover effects in the market. Moreover, we 
demonstrate that increasing the size of a penalty for late payment may not necessarily 
result in a welfare gain. 
In the second part of the chapter, we design a lab experiment to test the predictions 
of the model. Experimentation has served as a useful tool for testing predictions of the 
classic Bertrand-Nash oligopoly model with constant and symmetric marginal costs of 
production and exogenous market size (Dufwenberg and Gneezy 2000, 2002, Dufwenberg 
et al. 2007, Fouraker and Siegel 1963). A private correspondence with Martin Dufwen-
berg in July 2019 confirmed that non-zero entry costs were not tested in the original set 
of Bertrand competition experiments, neither published nor unpublished. Several exper-
iments have been conducted in the related Bertrand-Edgeworth environment, with ca-
pacity constraints (Fonseca and Normann 2008, 2013, Grether et al. 1988, Heymann et 
al. 2014, Kruse et al. 1994) and/or convex cost functions (Abbink and Brandts 2008, 
Argenton and Müller 2012). Recent lab studies have integrated asymmetric marginal 
costs into the Bertrand environment (Boone et al. 2012, Dugar and Mitra 2016). This 
line of inquiry complements theoretical work attempting to explain price dispersion, a 
real-world phenomenon at odds with marginal cost pricing and that supports the Ber-
trand paradox.66 We employ a strategy method design to control for the potential con-
found of excessive seller entry observed in previous auction experiments with an endog-
enous number of bidders (e.g., Palfrey and Pevnitskaya 2008). This simplifies the game 
 
66 The Bertrand paradox disappears theoretically if we change assumptions underlying the model, 
including capacity constraints (Edgeworth 1925), convex costs (Dastidar 1995), product differ-
entiation (Singh and Vives 1984), ex-ante demand commitments (Kreps and Scheinkman 1983), 
cost uncertainty (Wambach 1999), a probabilistic number of competitors (Janssen and Rasmusen 
2002) or the introduction of unbounded monopoly profits (Baye and Morgan 1999). Behavioural 
explanations for price dispersion cover bounded rationality (Baye and Morgan 2004), step-level 
thinking (Gneezy 2005), or cognitive limitations due to perceived coarseness of the pricing grid 
(Fatas et al. 2014). 
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and permits us to focus on the horizontal effects of late payments for prices, which is 
not feasible with field data.  
The experimental results largely support the model’s predictions. The anticipation 
of late payments has anti-competitive effects among suppliers and results in higher 
transaction prices. When the penalty imposed for a late payment is low, the majority of 
buyers recognise that extending standard terms is not preferred and often signal ex-
tended payment terms up front. Nevertheless, within such an environment and in con-
trast to the theory, a significant minority of buyers - in particular Strong buyers - still 
offer standard payment terms in an attempt to induce greater supplier competition. We 
also observe that the propensity of Strong buyers to pay late is decreasing in the size of 
the penalty. Weak buyers are only deterred if the penalty is above a certain threshold; 
below this threshold, these buyers prefer to free ride on the price spillover effects gener-
ated by other firms in the market and a welfare loss arises. We also describe the results 
of a follow-up experiment that we conducted in which sellers can determine their own 
entry decisions. 
4.2. Model and Theory 
Consider a one-shot interaction in which a single buyer seeks to procure one unit of 
an indivisible good from a group of 𝑛 pre-qualified suppliers, indexed by 𝑖. A first-price 
sealed-bid reverse auction determines selection of the winning supplier (henceforth the 
seller) and the contract price. Auction participation is voluntary for suppliers, and the 
buyer can choose to not purchase after observing the contract price.67 The seller can 
produce either a high- or low-quality unit, but the setting prohibits quality contingent 
contracts. 
4.2.1.  Signalling game 
We build from a one-shot Bertrand model with simultaneous entry and pricing. Sup-
pose that there are two ex-ante homogenous potential suppliers, indexed by 𝑖. Each 
 
67 Discretion clauses are common in construction tenders. 
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supplier has the opportunity to submit a bid 𝑏  to deliver a contract to a single buyer 
at date 0.68 Conditional on at least one supplier entering into competition, the supplier 
that submits the lowest price bid wins the contract at a price 𝑝 equal to the winning 
bid, with ties broken at random. Henceforth, we will denote the winning supplier as the 
seller. Bids can be any number in the interval [0,𝑅], where 𝑅 is large and constitutes 
the reserve price at auction.  
Before submitting a bid, each supplier must decide whether or not to incur a non-
refundable entry cost 𝐸 > 0. This is the cost of preparing a bid for tender, which is not 
imposed if a firm chooses not to enter into competition. Whether the rival supplier has 
entered is unobserved until after the entry and pricing decision is made. Production 
costs are normalised to zero. If no bid is submitted, the contract is not completed. In 
that case, all parties earn zero. Specifying that entry and pricing be simultaneous, rather 
than sequential, is a modelling decision. Sequential entry and pricing generate counter-
intuitive predictions when potential suppliers are asymmetric, due to the nature of 
mixed strategy equilibrium (Elberfeld and Wolfstetter 1999). 
We now embed the Bertrand entry and pricing model into a signalling game struc-
ture. 
Stage 1. The buyer sends the potential suppliers a message, 𝑚 ∈ {0, 1}, announcing 
her ex-ante intended payment term, where 𝑚 = 0 is an offer of a standard payment term 
(e.g., 30 days) and 𝑚 = 1 is an offer of an extended payment term (e.g., 60 to 120 days). 
This message is non-discriminatory, i.e., it does not depend on the identity of the seller.  
Stage 2. The potential suppliers observe the buyer’s message 𝑚 and make their entry 
and bidding decisions. Conditional on at least one entering supplier, the seller and price 
are determined as described above. 
Stage 3. The buyer observes the potential suppliers’ entry and pricing decisions and 
selects the ex-post payment date 𝜏 ∈ {0,1} to pay the seller, where 𝜏 = 0 denotes 
 
68 Restricting entry and price competition to just two suppliers is without loss of generality. See 
Lang and Rosenthal (1991) for the general case of 𝑀  potential suppliers. 
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payment on or before the due date associated with a standard payment term (hence-
forth, “on-time”), and 𝜏 = 1 denotes a payment made after this date (henceforth, 
“late”).69 
Just like how individuals prefer current income to delayed income of a similar mag-
nitude, firms value a late payment ex-post at less than its nominal value. This insight 
is captured in the model by a discount function 𝐷(𝜏) = 𝛿 , with 𝐷(1) < 𝐷(0) = 1. The 
corresponding discount factor is given by 𝛿 ∈ (0, 1), which is firm-specific and might be 
determined by cash reserves, access to secured credit and/or the prevailing interest rate. 
We endow the buyer with private information about her discount factor, which we refer 
to as her type. This type is assigned by nature. We assume the existence of two buyer 
types, either Weak (𝛿 ) or Strong (𝛿 ), where 𝛿 < 𝛿 . The types are independently 
drawn from the same commonly known distribution. Potential suppliers hold the same 
prior belief concerning the buyer’s type, described by a single number 𝑥 ∈ (0, 1). With 
probability 𝑥, the buyer is Strong; with probability 1 − 𝑥, she is Weak. There is but one 
seller type 𝛿 , which is common knowledge. 
We incorporate a fixed penalty 𝑐 ≥ 0 to reneging on standard payment terms. We do 
not specify who accrues this cost, which remains outside the model. Potential suppliers 
find themselves at one of two information sets in Stage 2, each containing two nodes. 
After receiving the buyer’s message, they update their belief about the buyer’s type 
using Bayes’ Rule. If the suppliers observe an offer of standard payment terms at Stage 
1, then their posterior belief that the buyer is Strong is 𝑦 ∈ [0,1]. If the potential sup-
pliers observe an offer of extended payment terms, then they attach probability (1 − 𝑧) 
to the event that the buyer is Weak. In Figure 4.1, we illustrate the extensive form game 
of incomplete information.70  
 
 
69 In this regard, we consider “Late” in a relative sense, i.e., relative to the reference date that 
would be implied by a standard payment term, which may be longer for a private entity than a 
public entity. 
70 Space constraints preclude proper representation of the entry and pricing continuation games. 
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Figure 4.1. Extensive-form representation of the model. 
 
Notes: The first row in the payoff vectors corresponds to the buyer’s profit, the 
second row corresponds to the seller’s profit and the third row corresponds to the 
other supplier’s profit. The buyer’s valuation and reserve price at auction is 𝑅 and 
the potential suppliers’ entry cost is 𝐸. The buyer’s discount factor is 𝛿 ∈
{𝛿 , 𝛿 } and the seller’s discount factor is 𝛿 . The buyer’s ex-ante intended pay-
ment term is 𝑚 ∈ {0,1} and ex-post payment date is 𝜏 ∈ {0,1}. 
 
In the equilibrium analysis that follows, firms are risk-neutral and act to maximise 
expected profits. We discuss the qualitative implications of risk preferences when for-
mulating the experimental hypotheses. Information about the distribution of types is 
common knowledge. The buyer’s profit is 𝜋 = 𝑅 − 𝛿 𝑝 − 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {𝜏 − 𝑚, 0} ∙ 𝑐 and the 
seller’s profit is 𝜋 = 𝛿 𝑝 − 𝐸. 
4.2.2.  Equilibrium analysis  
The model can be analysed as an extensive-form game of incomplete information. 
The solution concept is weak PBE. Let 𝑞 be the potential suppliers’ belief at Stage 2 
that payment is received late ex-post. If 𝑞 = 0, potential suppliers expect to receive 
payment at date 0 with probability one; if 𝑞 = 1, potential suppliers expect to receive 
payment at date 1 with probability one. We will find that there is a direct relationship 
between the beliefs about receipt of a late payment and the beliefs about a buyer’s type. 
All proofs are relegated to the appendix. 
A PBE of the signalling game is defined on the buyer’s ex-ante intended payment 
term from Stage 1. If the two buyer types send the same message 𝑚, we have a pooling 
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equilibrium on 𝑚 (independent of the final ex-post payment date). If the two buyer 
types each send a different message 𝑚, we have a separating equilibrium. The probability 
𝑞 is equal to 0 or 1 in any equilibrium where the two buyer types choose the same ex-
post payment date. There is an interior probability 𝑞 in any pooling equilibrium where 
the two types choose different ex-post payment dates. We will find that no pooling 
equilibrium exists in which the Strong buyer pays late, and the Weak buyer on-time. 
Thus, the only interior probability of interest is 𝑞 = (1 − 𝑥). 
To gain insight, we first examine the second stage as a standalone entry and pricing 
game. No Nash equilibrium exists in pure strategies at parameter values of interest. To 
understand this, note that for all 𝑝 less than or equal to 𝑅, there exists an incentive for 
each supplier to undercut his competitor on price to increase own profit. Yet once the 
(discounted) price falls below the entry cost, each potential supplier would prefer not to 
bid for the contract. A unique symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies does exist, 
however, consisting of an independent randomization by both players over their entry 
and bid decision for which there is no profitable unilateral deviation. This equilibrium 
is outlined in Lemma 4.1. The lemma uses Theorems 1 and 2 in Lang and Rosenthal 
(1991). 
Lemma 4.1. Suppose that the two potential suppliers have symmetric discount factors, 
with 𝛿 𝑅 > 𝐸. There exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the entry and 
pricing stage characterised as follows: each supplier enters with probability 𝜇(𝑞) and 
submits a bid according to the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) 𝐹(𝑝, 𝑞), where 
 𝜇(𝑞) = 1 −
( − + )
 ,         
 𝐹(𝑝, 𝑞) =
−( − + )
−( − + )
   for   𝑝 ∈ 𝑝, 𝑅 , 𝑝 =
− +
 .    
The conditional price c.d.f. is  
 𝐺(𝑝, 𝑞) = ( ) ; 
Expected welfare is 
101 
 
 𝑊(𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑚, 𝜏) = 𝛽 𝜋 ;   
Where  𝛼 (𝑝) = 1 −
( − + )
and  𝛽 = 1 −
( − + )
.    
Lemma 4.1 states that in equilibrium, potential suppliers randomise second stage 
entry with the same fixed probability 𝜇(𝑞) and submit a bid according to the c.d.f. 
𝐹(𝑝, 𝑞). Since equilibrium expected profits of potential suppliers net of the entry cost 𝐸 
are zero, expected total welfare 𝑊(𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑚, 𝜏) is determined by expected buyer surplus, 
given at least one entrant. The potential suppliers’ symmetric equilibrium strategy de-
pends on their expectation 𝑞 about the buyer’s ex-post payment date. Entry is decreas-
ing in 𝑞. The c.d.f. of the winning bid conditional on at least one bid being submitted 
is 𝐺(𝑝, 𝑞), with density function 𝑔(𝑝, 𝑞). We define the expected price as 𝑝 =
∫ 𝑝𝑔(𝑝, 𝑞)𝑑𝑝,  which is increasing in 𝑞.71 
We obtain the following corollary directly from Lemma 4.1. 
Corollary 4.1. Late payments are associated with higher prices and lower welfare. 
In an appendix, we generalise Lemma 4.1 to the asymmetric case in which potential 
suppliers possess different discount factors. The results are intuitive: the supplier with 
the highest discount factor (in absolute value terms) is most likely to enter into compe-
tition and earns economic rents in equilibrium. Since the comparative statics of entry 
and pricing are unchanged, we can restrict attention to the case of symmetric potential 
suppliers. 
Now we consider the entry and pricing game at Stage 2 in context of the wider 
signalling structure. Each strategy profile of the three-stage game is an ordered list, 
([𝐴,𝐵], [𝐶, 𝐷]; [𝐸, 𝐹 ], [𝐺,𝐻]; 𝑦, 𝑧), where 𝐴 and 𝐵 are the buyer’s message and payment 
date if Strong, 𝐶 and 𝐷 are the buyer’s message and payment date if Weak, 𝐸 and 𝐹  
are the potential suppliers’ entry and bidding decisions if 𝑚 = 0 is observed, 𝐺 and 𝐻 
are the potential suppliers’ entry and bidding decisions if 𝑚 = 1 is observed, and 𝑦 and 
 
71 The conditional c.d.f. is typically the observed distribution in naturally occurring markets. 
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𝑧 are the potential suppliers’ posterior belief that the buyer is of Strong type at each 
information set. 
In the continuation game associated with 𝑚 = 1 (i.e., an extended payment term), 
the buyer has a dominant strategy to pay late in the final subgame and so 𝜏 = 1. In the 
continuation game associated with 𝑚 = 0 (i.e., a standard payment term), the buyer 
pays on-time in the final subgame if the cost from reneging on her intended payment 
term exceeds the benefit from a discounted late payment, that is if 𝑐 ≥ (1 − 𝛿 )𝑝 . In 
that case, 𝜏 = 0. We define the penalty at which this inequality binds in expectation for 
a Strong buyer by 𝑐 (𝑝 ), which is an increasing function of the price. The threshold 
penalty required for a Weak buyer to pay on-time is 𝑐 (𝑝 ), which is everywhere greater 
than for a Strong buyer.  
To fully characterise equilibria in our institutional environment, we impose a Suffi-
cient Difference restriction on the distribution of types (see the appendix for details). 
This restriction is without loss of generality. The propositions that we derive below 
pertain to three distinct penalty intervals, in relation to the buyer’s type (Figure 4.2). 
The buyer’s type determines which payment term she prefers to offer in Stage 1.  
 
Figure 4.2. Penalty intervals and corresponding propositions. 
 
Low Cost Proposition.  
A. For all 𝑐 < 𝑐 (𝑝 ), there exists a unique pooling PBE, independent of the type dis-
tribution, characterised as: ([1,1], [1,1]; [𝜇(1), 𝐹(𝑝, 1)], [𝜇(1), 𝐹(𝑝, 1)]; 𝑦, 𝑥).  
Expected welfare is 𝑊 = 𝛽 ∙ (𝑅 − (𝑥𝛿 + (1 − 𝑥)𝛿 )𝑝 ). 
B. For all 𝑐 ∈ [𝑐 (𝑝 ), 𝑐 (𝑝 − )): 
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i. If 𝛿 > − ( − ), then in addition to A. there exists a separating PBE char-
acterized as: ([0,0], [1,1]; [𝜇(0), 𝐹(𝑝, 0)], [𝜇(1), 𝐹(𝑝, 1)]; 1,0).  
Expected welfare is 𝑊 = 𝑥 ∙ 𝛽 ∙ (𝑅 − 𝑝 ) + (1 − 𝑥) ∙ 𝛽 ∙ (𝑅 − 𝛿 𝑝 ). 
ii. If 𝛿 < − ( − ), then we return to the unique pooling equilibrium in A. 
The Low Cost Proposition  (A.) is intuitive: a buyer prefers to offer and pay within 
an extended payment term independent of her discount factor if the penalty is too low 
to (at least) deter the Strong type from reneging on an offer of a standard payment term 
at the lowest expected equilibrium price. No buyer type prefers to honour a standard 
payment term at any equilibrium price defined by 𝑞. Buyers therefore pool on extended 
payment terms in the first stage. At higher penalties, up to the threshold required to 
deter the Strong type from reneging on a standard payment term at an expected price 
of 𝑝 −  (the expected price if only the Strong buyer pays on-time in the continuation 
game associated with a standard payment term), the equilibrium outcome depends on 
the distribution of types.  
If the threshold condition on the Strong type in (B.i.) holds, then a separating equi-
librium exists in which the Strong buyer offers and pays within a standard term and the 
Weak buyer offers and pays within an extended term. This case does not rule out the 
existence of a pooling equilibrium on an extended payment term for certain off-the-path 
posterior beliefs. For example, if we specify 𝑦 ∈ [0, 𝑥). Such a specification is objection-
able, however, because it implies that a Weak buyer is more likely to deviate to a stand-
ard payment term than a Strong buyer despite having less to gain. In weaker buyer 
populations, the separating equilibrium cannot be reached at any cost below 𝑐 (𝑝 ) 
and we return to the unique pooling equilibrium in case A. Note that if the Strong 
buyer’s expected benefit from paying late exceeds her expected gain from increased 
competition, then extended payment terms are optimal. 
Corollary 4.2.  𝑊 > 𝑊  if and only if 𝛿 > − ( − ). 
We now consider the opposing end of the institutional spectrum. 
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High Cost Proposition. For all 𝑐 ≥ 𝑐 (𝑝 − ): 
i. If 𝛿 > − ( − ), then there exists a pooling PBE characterised as: 
([0,0], [0,0]; [𝜇(0), 𝐹(𝑝, 0)], [𝜇(1), 𝐹(𝑝, 1)]; 𝑥, 𝑧). This is unique if 𝑐 ≥ 𝑐 (𝑝 ). 
Expected welfare is 𝑊 = 𝛽 ∙ (𝑅 − 𝑝 ). 
ii. If 𝛿 < − ( − ) < 𝛿 , then there exists a separating PBE characterised as: 
([0,0], [1,1]; [𝜇(0), 𝐹(𝑝, 0)], [𝜇(1), 𝐹(𝑝, 1)]; 1,0). This is unique if 𝑐 ≥ 𝑐 (𝑝 ). 
Expected welfare is 𝑊 . 
iii. If 𝛿 < − ( − ), then there exists a unique pooling PBE characterised as: 
([1,1], [1,1]; [𝜇(1), 𝐹(𝑝, 1)], [𝜇(1), 𝐹(𝑝, 1)]; 𝑦, 𝑥). 
Expected total welfare is 𝑊 . 
The High Cost Proposition  (i.) implies that, if the distribution of buyer types is 
strong enough, the imposition of a penalty that can deter the Weak type from reneging 
on a standard payment term at an expected price of 𝑝 −  is sufficient to fully deter late 
payments. In this situation, both types pay on-time and 𝑊  is the first-best outcome. 
There is maximal equilibrium entry and price competition, without the welfare-damag-
ing cost of reneging on a standard payment term being imposed. If the buyer types fall 
either side of the threshold discount factor in (ii.), a high penalty can only induce ad-
herence to payment on-time by the Strong type. In that case, the separating equilibrium 
associated with 𝑊  re-emerges, with an additional condition on the Weak type due to 
the deterrent effect of the higher penalty in this interval. This condition was redundant 
before. Even with a very high penalty, extended payment terms will obtain if the buyer 
population is weak enough (iii.). 
Corollary 4.3.  𝑊 > 𝑊  if and only if 𝛿 > − ( − ).  
In each equilibrium outcome considered so far, the ex-post payment date is consistent 
with the buyer’s ex-ante payment term. Moreover, the buyer must be weak enough to 
prefer to make late payment at the associated (higher) equilibrium price. Our final 
proposition considers the intermediate penalty interval, 𝑐 ∈ [𝑐 (𝑝 − ), 𝑐 (𝑝 − )). This 
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proposition can help us to understand why, in the real-world, we observe financially 
strong companies making a late payment despite offering a standard payment term. 
Free-rider Proposition. For all 𝑐 ∈ [𝑐 (𝑝 − ), 𝑐 (𝑝 − )): 
If 𝛿 > − − − ( − − ), then there exists a pooling PBE characterized as: 
([0,0], [0,1]; [𝜇(1 − 𝑥), 𝐹(𝑝, 1 − 𝑥)], [𝜇(1), 𝐹(𝑝, 1)]; 𝑥, 𝑧). 
Expected welfare is 𝑊 = 𝛽 − ∙ (𝑅 − (𝑥 + (1 − 𝑥)𝛿 )𝑝 − − (1 − 𝑥)𝑐). 
The Free-rider Proposition  states that, if the expected competition benefit from 
offering a standard payment term is large enough and the buyer population strong 
enough, then the Weak(er) type can free ride on the timely payment of the Strong(er) 
type and profitably renege on her own payment term, incurring the penalty in equilib-
rium. In such situations, financial strength per se does not preclude late payments. 
Instead, even those buyers who do not place a high value on making a late payment 
may exploit the competition externalities from other timely payers in the market. Note 
that as 𝑥 approaches zero, the threshold condition for 𝛿  goes to one because there are 
fewer Strong buyers for the Weak type to free-ride on. If 𝑐 ≥ 𝑐 (𝑝 ) and there is equi-
librium potential for the Weak type to gain with maximal entry and price competition 
relative to an extended payment term, then a second pooling equilibrium exists on 𝑚 =
0 associated with payment on-time by both types. In weaker buyer populations, High 
Cost Proposition  (ii. and iii.) apply. For all 𝑐 < 𝑐 (𝑝 ), if we admit objectionable be-
liefs, then the caveat on multiplicity discussed with regard to the Low Cost proposition  
(i.) applies to the Free-rider proposition  and to High Cost Proposition  (ii. and iii.). 
Corollary 4.4. Welfare loss: 
i. 𝑊 ≤ 𝑊  if and only if 𝑐 ≥ − −( +( − ) ) − − ( − )
− ( − )
; 
ii. 𝑊 ≤ 𝑊  if and only if 𝑐 ≥ − −( − + ) − − ( − )−( − ) −
− ( − )
; 
iii. 𝑊 ≤ 𝑊  if and only if 𝑐 ≥ − −( +( − ) ) − − −( +( − ) )
− ( − )
. 
There is a welfare loss associated with 𝑊  if the cost of reneging on a standard 
payment term is set too high. This loss can occur relative to the first-best pooling 
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equilibrium in which both types offer a standard payment term and pay on-time, that 
is the outcome associated with 𝑊 , the separating equilibrium associated with 𝑊 , 
and/or the pooling equilibrium on an extended payment term associated with 𝑊 . The 
conditions in Corollary 4.4 are ordered, i.e., the condition on the penalty in (iii) is 
sufficient for (ii) and (i) to hold, while the condition in (ii) is sufficient for (i) to hold. 
A welfare loss is more likely to arise if Weak buyers are relatively more frequent in the 
population (i.e., as 𝑥 falls).72 This corollary suggests that uniformly increasing the size 
of a fine imposed on buyers for a late payment may not necessarily lead to a welfare 
gain. Thus, care should be taken in setting the level of any such fine. 
4.3. Experimental Design 
The experimental environment considers the case of two potential suppliers and aug-
ments earlier Bertrand competition experiments with costless entry (e.g., Dufwenberg 
and Gneezy 2000). Subjects make decisions in either a buyer or seller role, which is 
determined randomly at the beginning of the experiment and remains fixed throughout. 
Then, subjects are matched into groups of 1 buyer and 2 sellers. In our experiment, 
seller eligibility to customise the unit substitutes for entry. The buyer may purchase a 
single unit of a customised good from one of the two sellers. The buyer’s valuation for 
the unit is 100. The unit is to be sold at an auction. One or both of the sellers may not 
be eligible to customise the unit. Thus, a transaction is not guaranteed. If a transaction 
takes place, the auction determines which seller delivers the unit and the transaction 
price. 
Subjects with a seller role are assigned the common discount factor 𝛿 = 0.50 for the 
entire experiment. Subjects with a buyer role are each randomly assigned a discount 
factor with equal probability from the set 𝛿 ∈ {0.75, 0.95}. The two elements in this 
set correspond to the Weak and Strong buyer types, respectively. We denote these as 
types 1 and 2 in the experiment. The buyer’s type remains private information and is 
drawn anew at the beginning of each period. We specify a discount factor for the Strong 
 
72 For example, with our experiment parameters, 𝑊 ≤ 𝑊  for all 𝑥; 𝑊 < 𝑊  for any 𝑥 ≤ 0.70; 
and 𝑊 < 𝑊  for any 𝑥 ≤ 0.10. 
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type strictly below one to ensure that the buyer has strict preference in the final payment 
decision. The sellers’ discount factor and the distribution of buyer discount factors is 
common knowledge. Thus, the sellers’ prior belief that their matched Buyer is of Strong 
type is one-half.73 Each period of the experiment consists of three stages: a Pre-Auction 
stage, an Auction stage, and a Post-Auction stage.  
In the Pre-Auction stage, the buyer learns her type for the period and sends a mes-
sage to the two sellers in her group. This message signals her intended payment method 
for the unit, either “upon delivery”, or “after delivery”. These payment methods substi-
tute for an offer of payment terms (either standard or extended). When describing the 
experiment, we use the language of the laboratory. 
In the Auction stage, the sellers observe the buyer’s message. Each seller submits a 
bid for which they would be willing to deliver the unit. This bid can be any integer from 
25 to 100 (the reserve price). To give the theory its best shot, we control for possible 
seller over-entry by using a variant on the strategy method. Subjects do not choose 
whether to enter the auction. Instead, the computer determines whether each seller is 
eligible to customise the unit, according to a pre-determined probability. This probabil-
ity is set equal to the equilibrium mixed strategy entry randomization, given correct 
beliefs (more on this later). Sellers are informed about their eligibility probability at the 
time of submitting a bid. Sellers are not informed about their own nor their competitor’s 
eligibility realization until after submitting a bid.  
Any seller that is determined by the computer not to be eligible can return his non-
customised unit to the experimenter in exchange for 25 points (the entry cost). After 
both bids in a group have been submitted, the eligibility randomization is performed by 
the computer, independently for each seller. If the computer determines that both sellers 
are eligible, then the buyer purchases the unit from the seller that submitted the lower 
bid in the auction. Ties are broken at random. If the computer determines that only 
one seller is eligible, then the buyer purchases the unit from the eligible seller. The 
transaction price is the selected seller’s bid.  
 
73 Sufficient Difference is satisfied: 𝛿 ≥ 0.4 + 0.6𝛿 . 
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In the Post-Auction stage, the buyer observes the price (but not the identity) of the 
selected seller and selects a final payment method for the unit. If final payment is made 
upon delivery, then both the buyer and seller value payment at the full transaction price. 
If final payment is made after delivery, then the seller values payment at half of the 
transaction price; a Weak buyer at 75% of the transaction price; and a Strong buyer at 
95% of the transaction price.74 If the buyer reneges on an intention to make payment 
upon delivery, then a penalty is levied on the buyer. Subjects are informed that the 
penalty accrues to an independent third party outside of the experiment.  
Based on our model, we design three treatments which vary the size of this penalty 
using a between-subjects design. In the first treatment, which we call Low-Cost (𝐿𝐶), 
the penalty is set equal to 1. The penalty in this treatment is insufficient to deter either 
buyer type from reneging on an intention to make payment upon delivery and so the 
theory predicts a pooling equilibrium on intended payment after delivery followed by 
final payment after delivery by both types.  
In the second treatment, which we call High-Cost (𝐻𝐶), the penalty is set equal to 
16. Given the distribution of types, the penalty in this treatment is sufficient to fully 
deter reneging on an intention to pay upon delivery among buyers and so the theory 
predicts a pooling equilibrium on intended payment upon delivery followed by final 
payment upon delivery by both types.  
In the third treatment, which we call Free-Rider (𝐹𝑅), the penalty is set equal to 8. 
This penalty is sufficient to deter only a Strong buyer from reneging on an intention to 
pay upon delivery and so the theory predicts the existence of a pooling equilibrium on 
intended payment upon delivery associated with divergence in payment methods during 
the final stage, with the Weak type free-riding on the Strong type. 
We implement the strategy method entry randomization for our experiment param-
eters both on and off the equilibrium path (cf. Lemma 4.1). In LC, if the buyer signals 
 
74 To avoid any negative connotations, we do not refer to payment as “late” in the experiment. 
We make clear in the instructions that a buyer’s intended payment method may not correspond 
with her final payment method: “The final payment method selected can differ from the buyer’s 




an intention to make payment upon delivery, then the computer is programmed to ran-
domise seller eligibility with probability one-half. In HC, if the buyer signals an intention 
to make payment upon delivery, then the computer is programmed to randomise seller 
eligibility with probability three-quarters. In FR, if the buyer signals an intention to 
make payment upon delivery, then the computer is programmed to randomise seller 
eligibility with probability two-thirds. In all three treatments, if the buyer signals an 
intention to make payment after delivery, then the computer is programmed to random-
ise seller eligibility with probability one-half. 
If a transaction occurs, then the buyer earns 100 minus her payment value and minus 
the penalty if applicable; the seller earns a profit equal to her payment value. Any seller 
who is determined by the computer not to be eligible earns a profit of 25. An eligible 
seller who submits the higher bid earns zero profit for that period. If neither seller is 
determined by the computer to be eligible, the buyer does not purchase a unit and so 
earns zero profit for the period. 
4.3.1.  Hypotheses 
The preceding theory and design offer several testable hypotheses, which we summa-
rise below. The point predictions are presented in Table 4.1. 
Hypothesis 4.1 . (i) Buyers will signal an intention to pay after delivery more often in 
LC than in HC or FR; and (ii) There will be no difference in intended payment decisions 
between Weak and Strong buyers in any treatment. 
The first part of Hypothesis 4.1 reflects that the buyer’s cost of reneging on a stand-
ard payment term is too low in the LC treatment and so this signal is not credible. It 
is possible, however, that buyers will attempt to convince sellers of a (false) intention to 
pay upon delivery. The second part of Hypothesis 4.1 captures the nature of the pre-





Table 4.1 – Theoretical predictions by treatment. 
Treatment LC HC FR 
Intended payment (AD, AD) (UD, UD) 
Final payment (AD, AD) (UD, UD) (UD, AD) 
Minimum bid 50 25 33.33 
Average price 66.67 40 50 
Buyer profit (27.5, 37.5) (56.25, 56.25) (44.44, 48.44) 
Seller profit 25 
Notes: The first two rows indicate the buyer’s intended and final payment decision for each type (Strong, 
Weak), where UD = Upon Delivery and AD = After Delivery. The third row indicates the minimum 
bid in the sellers’ equilibrium support. The fourth row indicates the expected transaction price 
conditional on at least one seller being eligible to customise the unit. The fifth row indicates the expected 
buyer profit for each type. The final row indicates the expected seller profit gross of the entry cost. 
 
Hypothesis 4.2 . (i) Buyers will make final payment after delivery more often in LC than 
in HC; and (ii) Weak buyers will make final payment after delivery more often than 
Strong buyers in FR. 
The first part of Hypothesis 4.2 states that, at low penalties for reneging on a stand-
ard payment term, the benefit of paying late dominates the associated cost for both 
buyer types, and vice-versa at high penalties. Of course, different behavioural norms 
could emerge. Prior studies suggest that certain individuals prefer to tell the truth (e.g., 
Charness and Dufwenberg 2006), which might manifest itself in buyers keeping to a 
standard payment term even when it is not in their self-interest. The second part of 
Hypothesis 4.2 states that if the penalty for reneging on a standard payment term is 
not set carefully, then Weak buyers will have an incentive to free ride on their Strong 
counterparts. 
Hypothesis 4.3 . (i) Bids will be independent of the buyer’s signal in LC, but higher 
after receiving an intention to pay after delivery in FR and HC;  (ii) Transaction prices 
will be rank ordered such that 𝑝 > 𝑝 > 𝑝 ; (iii) Buyer profit will be rank ordered 




This last hypothesis captures the negative indirect effect of late payments on con-
sumer prices and welfare (i.e., expected buyer profit). In LC, the bid support is [50, 100] 
and the expected price is 66.67. Strong buyers earn 27.5 and Weak buyers earn 37.5. In 
HC, the bid support is [25, 100], sellers adjust their bids upwards in response to an offer 
of an extended payment term and the expected price is 40. Both buyer types earn 56.25. 
In FR, the bid support is [33, 100], sellers adjust their bids upwards in response to an 
offer of an extended payment term and the expected price is 50. Strong buyers earn 
44.44 and Weak buyers earn 48.44. In all treatments, the expected seller profit gross of 
the entry cost is 25.  
4.3.2.  Procedure 
The experiments were conducted online in the fall of 2020, using oTree and Zoom 
(Chen et al. 2016, Zhao et al. 2020). Unlike in a usual online experiment – and just as 
in a typical lab experiment – subjects attended sessions at a pre-specified date and time. 
All subjects were recruited from a lab database of predominantly graduate and under-
graduate students at a large public university in the Southwestern United States and 
were randomly assigned to one of the three treatments. We recruited four independent 
cohorts per treatment. In each treatment, two cohorts repeated the interaction for 20 
periods and the other two cohorts for 30 periods; in each cohort, we assigned 3 subjects 
to the role of a buyer and 6 subjects to the role of a seller.75 Within a cohort, subjects 
were randomly matched into new groups each period. There were two cohorts of the 
same treatment in a session and the cohort size was not revealed to subjects. This 
protocol mitigated the possibility of tacit collusion (see Katok 2011).76   
Between periods, feedback was provided on the buyer’s pre-auction message, eligible 
bids, the buyer’s final payment method and any penalty levied. All subjects also saw 
 
75 The experimental sessions with 20 rounds were conducted first; after confirming that these 
finished within an acceptable time in the online format, we extended the second sessions to 30 
rounds. Two cohorts of HC had only 2 buyers and 4 sellers due to a lower than expected show-
up rate on the day.  
76 A compendium of experimental instructions, together with a discussion of the challenges con-
fronted in the online implementation and how we dealt with these, is contained in the appendix. 
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their own profit for the period. To minimise possible wealth effects, cumulative earnings 
were not displayed during the session. The profits of other players in a trio were also 
not displayed, to avoid making fairness concerns salient. Feedback was about a subject’s 
own matching group in the period and not the wider cohort. This design further mini-
mised the possibility of tacit collusion (see also Bruttel 2009, Dufwenberg and Gneezy 
2002). As the game progressed, a summary of this information remained available to 
each subject privately in an on-screen history table, to reinforce the game-theoretic 
assumption of “perfect recall”. Earnings from the experiment were converted to US Dol-
lars at an exchange rate of 80 (50) points per dollar in sessions of 30 (20) periods and 
were paid in addition to a show-up fee of $5. Sessions lasted approximately 75 minutes. 
Average earnings were $20.15 for buyers and $15.17 for sellers. 
Additionally, before moving the experiment online due to the Covid-19 shutdown, we 
collected data for two further cohorts of each treatment in a physical lab at a public 
university in the North East of England. To avoid mixing subject pools and experiment 
environments, we only present data collected from the online experiments below. A 
statistical analysis of the pooled data with six independent observations per treatment 
is contained in the appendix. Behaviour in the lab and online is statistically similar and 
the results reported below are qualitatively unchanged between the two samples.77 
  
 
77 For the pooled data, non-parametric tests support the theory in 22 out of 25 comparisons. 
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4.4. Experimental Results 
In this section, we begin by examining summary statistics for the three experimental 
treatments. Since there is no interaction between subjects playing in different cohorts, 
each cohort is considered a statistically independent observation in the construction of 
treatment averages and standard deviations. We then conduct a formal test of our hy-
potheses using regression analysis.78 
4.4.1.  Summary Statistics 
Table 4.2 contains aggregate data on observed payment decisions in the experiment 
and the relative frequencies with which the penalty for reneging on an intention to pay 
upon delivery was imposed on the buyer. We disaggregate this data by the buyer’s type 
to examine how varying her value for making payment late influenced behaviour.  
 
Table 4.2 – Payment decisions in the experiment (0 = UD; 1 = AD). 
Treatment LC HC FR  




Intended payment 0.62 (0.15) 0.39 (0.11) 0.32 (0.12)  





𝑯𝟒. 𝟏(𝒊𝒊)       Strong Buyer 0.52 (0.24) 0.30 (0.13) 0.26 (0.06) 
                                                             
𝑯𝟒.𝟐(𝒊)
   
Final payment 0.89 (0.17) 0.36 (0.10) 0.50 (0.16)  






      Strong Buyer 0.88 (0.12) 0.26 (0.14) 0.22 (0.07) 
       
Notes: Mean (SD) values based on 4 independent cohorts per treatment. Horizontal braces 
correspond to the two-sample comparisons of interest and associated hypotheses. Vertical braces 
correspond to the one-sample comparisons of interest and associated hypotheses. The results of 
non-parametric hypothesis tests for the pooled online and lab samples are contained in the 
appendix. UD = Upon Delivery, AD = After Delivery. 
 
78 All regression results reported in this section are robust to including the full set of demographic 
control variables elicited in the post-experiment questionnaire (see the appendix for details). The 




The theory predicts that both types signal an intention to pay after delivery in the 
LC treatment and upon delivery in the HC and FR treatments. In the experiment, the 
probability that a buyer signals an intention to pay after delivery is higher in LC (62%) 
than in HC (39%) or FR (32%), which supports Hypothesis 4.1(i). These differences are 
observed for both Weak and Strong buyers, which supports Hypothesis 4.1(ii). Never-
theless, we do observe a substantial fraction of buyers signalling an intention to pay 
upon delivery in LC. As a consequence, the number of eligible sellers is lower than 
expected in HC (actual 1.34 vs. expected 1.50) and FR (actual 1.21 vs. 1.33). We will 
discuss this in more detail below. 
The aggregate data also offers qualitative support for Hypothesis 4.2. Buyers in LC 
are the most likely to make final payment after delivery (89%) and this does not vary 
with the buyer’s type. Only 36% of buyers in HC and 50% of buyers in FR make final 
payment after delivery. Note that the latter probability would be expected across all 
buyers in FR if Weak buyers always free ride on their Strong counterparts. While this 
masks some variation between types, Weak buyers (74%) clearly pay after delivery more 
often than Strong buyers (22%). This is reflected in the penalty data: in FR, a penalty 
is imposed on 3% of transactions involving a Strong buyer and 42% of those involving 
a Weak buyer. The imposition of penalties is negligible in HC; 28% of transactions incur 
a penalty in LC.  
In Table 4.3, we present aggregate data on bids, transaction prices and buyer and 
seller profits. To examine whether sellers anticipated that the signal would influence the 
buyer’s final payment decision, bids are split by the buyer’s intended payment decision. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 4.3(i), sellers appear only to respond to a credible signal. 
Whereas in LC sellers do not adjust their bids conditional on the intended payment 
decision, bids are higher in both FR and HC when the buyer signals an intention to pay 
after delivery. The symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium implies that bids will be ran-
domised over a higher support in LC than in FR, and in FR than in HC, respectively. 
Similar qualitative differences are predicted for average transaction prices. We observe 
average bids of 67.54 in LC, 60.83 in FR and 54.94 in HC. The transaction prices 
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conditional on entry are slightly lower (63.38, 50.19 and 56.83) but the ranking predicted 
by Hypothesis 4.3(ii) remains intact. Nevertheless, whereas in LC transaction prices are 
close to the point prediction, in both HC and FR they are higher than expected.  
 
Table 4.3 – Bidding, prices and profits in the experiment. 
Treatment LC HC FR  
Bid        





𝑯𝟒. 𝟑(𝒊)      Intention AD 67.82 (10.68) 61.42 (9.24) 68.23 (7.03) 
                                                                                         
𝑯𝟒.𝟑(𝒊𝒊)
 
Price 63.38 (13.12) 50.19 (6.17) 56.83 (8.69)  




Buyer profit 34.70 (5.92) 47.52 (5.83) 39.30 (4.72)  
      Weak Buyer 39.27 (6.20) 49.64 (6.96) 42.66 (6.39)  
      Strong Buyer 28.78 (7.26) 45.55 (4.85) 36.08 (5.37)  
Seller profit 25.30 (2.12) 26.04 (2.73) 27.28 (2.83)  
Notes: Mean (SD) values based on 4 independent cohorts per treatment. Horizontal braces correspond 
to the two-sample comparisons of interest and associated hypotheses. Vertical braces correspond to the 
one-sample comparisons of interest and associated hypotheses. The results of non-parametric hypothesis 
tests for the pooled online and lab samples are contained in the appendix. UD = Upon Delivery, AD = 
After Delivery. 
 
There is qualitative support for the ranking in buyer profits from Hypothesis 4.3(iii). 
On average, buyers earn the most in HC (47.52), the second-most in FR (39.30) and the 
least in LC (32.50). Seller profits are close to the entry cost of 25 in all three treatments. 
In HC, both buyer types pay on-time in equilibrium and so we expect no difference in 
profits. Weak buyers, however, earn a premium in this treatment of around four points 
(49.64 versus 45.55). Weak buyers also earn more than Strong buyers in FR (42.66 
versus 36.08) which is similar to the differential predicted by the theory, albeit at a 
slightly lower absolute profit level. Weak buyers are predicted to earn 10 more points 
than Strong buyers in LC and this is broadly in line with the data (39.27 versus 28.78). 
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In the remainder of this section, we will conduct a formal test of our hypotheses using 
regression analysis and consider the observed buyer and seller strategies in more detail. 
Unless otherwise stated, reported p-values are based on two-sided Wald tests. 
4.4.2.  Buyer payment decisions 
In Table 4.4, we examine determinants of the buyer’s intended and final payment 
decisions in the experiment (0 = Upon Delivery, 1 = After Delivery). We also consider 
a specification in which the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the penalty was 
imposed in the transaction. The regressions are estimated using Logistic regression and 
include treatment dummies as regressors (the reference treatment is LC) and – in the 
second and third columns – their interaction with the buyer’s type. We include cohort 
fixed effects and a linear time trend. Marginal effects are presented next to the coefficient 
estimate, with robust standard errors based on clustering at the subject level. 
Result 4.1. Buyers are most likely to signal an intention to pay after delivery in LC. 
Weak buyers are more likely to signal an intention to pay after delivery than Strong 
buyers in all treatments. 
Support for the first part of Result 4.1 is provided in column 1 of Table 4.4. Buyers 
in FR and HC are, respectively, 30% and 22% less likely to signal an intention to pay 
after delivery than buyers in LC (p-values = 0.014 and 0.071).79 There is no significant 
difference in signals between buyers in HC and FR (p-value = 0.307). The second part 
of Result 4.1 applies to all treatments and is evident from the positive coefficient esti-
mate effect on the Weak type dummy in specification 1.80 Specifically, Weak buyers are 
16% more likely to signal payment after delivery in the Pre-Auction stage than Strong 
buyers (p-value = 0.041). In summary, our data is in line with Hypothesis 4.1(i), but 
we reject Hypothesis 4.1(ii) in favour of an alternative hypothesis in which Weak buyers 
are more likely to signal extended payment terms up front. 
 
79 The effect versus HC is not robust to including individual-level control variables (see appendix). 
80 In an unreported regression, we find no significant effect on the buyer’s intended payment 
decision of the interaction between Weak and HC (p-value = 0.933) or between Weak and FR 




Table 4.4 – Logit regression analysis of payment decisions (0 = UD; 1 = AD). 
Dependent variable Intended payment Final payment Penalty = 1 
 𝛽 ̂ 𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑥⁄  𝛽 ̂ 𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑥⁄  𝛽 ̂ 𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑥⁄  
 (1) (2) (3) 
HC -0.93* -0.22* -3.25*** -0.67*** -4.48*** -0.28*** 
 (0.52) (0.12) (0.95) (0.13) (1.07) (0.08) 
FR -1.29** -0.30** -3.38*** -0.69*** -2.97*** -0.20*** 
 (0.53) (0.12) (0.89) (0.12) (1.08) (0.07) 
Weak 0.68** 0.16** 0.52 0.12 -0.52 -0.04 
 (0.33) (0.08) (0.63) (0.14) (0.47) (0.04) 
HC * Weak   0.50 0.11 1.89 0.26 
   (1.04) (0.22) (1.21) (0.24) 
FR * Weak   1.94** 0.35** 3.93*** 0.65*** 
   (0.87) (0.14) (1.24) (0.21) 
Period -0.02 -0.004 0.003 0.001 0.02 0.002 
 (0.02) (0.004) (0.02) (0.004) (0.01) (0.001) 
Constant 0.17  2.31***  -0.28  
 (0.71)  (0.75)  (0.89)  
Observations 850 700 700 
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -533.40 -336.68 -251.27 
Wald test statistic 98.29*** 274.96*** 189.63*** 
Notes:  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Coefficient estimates on the logit scale (𝛽) and 
average marginal effects (𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑥⁄ ), with robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the 
subject level. The omitted experimental treatment is LC. The models are estimated using Logistic 
regression. The Wald test statistic is based on a Chi-squared test of joint regression significance. 
UD = Upon Delivery, AD = After Delivery. 
 
Result 4.2. Buyers are less likely to pay after delivery in HC than in LC regardless of 
the buyer’s type. Weak buyers are more likely to pay after delivery in FR than Strong 
buyers and to incur the penalty for reneging on an intention to pay upon delivery. 
Evidence to support Result 4.2 is contained in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.4. The 
probability of a late payment is 67% lower in HC than in LC (p-value < 0.01) and, as 
predicted by the theory, there is no significant effect of the buyer’s type in this treatment 
on the final payment decision (whether main or interaction effect). By contrast in FR, 
Weak buyers are significantly more likely to pay late (p-value = 0.026) and incur the 
penalty (p-value < 0.01). Similar inferences are made for Weak buyers in FR versus HC 
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(p-values = 0.020 and < 0.01). Together, these findings are consistent with Hypothesis 
4.2. There is no evidence to suggest the existence of a time trend in payment behaviours 
and the results are qualitatively unchanged if we split the regressions between the first 
and second halves of the experiment (see estimates in the appendix).  
In Figure 4.3, we plot the relative frequency of final payments after delivery in FR 
over time and according to the buyer’s type. The figure provides strong interocular 
support for the hypothesised free-riding by Weak buyers on price spillover effects in the 
market: there is a clear separation between Strong types who predominantly pay upon 
delivery and Weak types who predominantly pay after delivery. This separation persists 
over time. Given that both types more often signal an intention to pay upon delivery, 
this trend is associated with Weak types reneging on a significant fraction of their pay-
ment terms offered. 
Results 1 and 2 are robust to issues of learning that might arise because the buyer’s 
type is redrawn in each period (in the appendix, we analyse payment decisions for the 
first and second halves of the experiment separately). A robust behavioural deviation 
from the theory, however, is that buyers are more likely to incur the penalty in LC than 
in HC or FR (p-value < 0.01 for both comparisons). This observation applies in partic-
ular to Strong buyers, 48% of whom signal payment after delivery and 36% of whom 
incur the penalty in LC. To investigate off-equilibrium buyer strategies, in Table 4.5 we 
present relative frequencies for the vector of payment decisions observed in each treat-
ment.81 Frequencies for the Weak type are in square brackets and the equilibrium strat-
egy for each type is in boldface. We include the percentage of markets that failed to 
produce at least one eligible seller, which we denote as an “unravel”. As expected, the 
rate of unravelling decreases as the size of the penalty increases.82 
 
 
81 The off-equilibrium payment behaviours discussed here are not simply a facet of learning: the 
qualitative insights are unchanged if we restrict data to the last 15 periods only. 
82 In LC, the type randomization produced a slight imbalance between Weak and Strong types. 
Nevertheless, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the probability of observing each type in 
our sample is 50% (p-value = 0.181, two-sided binomial test). For LC, “unravel” is a check of 
our eligibility randomization (expected 25%); for the other treatments, it depends on the mix of 





Figure 4.3. Free-riding behaviour in the FR treatment. 
 
Notes: UD = Upon Delivery, AD = After Delivery. The solid (dashed) line is the 
frequency of final payments after delivery in the FR treatment among Strong 






Table 4.5 – Contingency table of buyer payment strategies for Strong [Weak] types 
by treatment. Equilibrium prediction in bold. 
Treatment 
Strategy 
LC HC FR 
(𝑈𝐷,𝑈𝐷) 11 [10] 90 [55] 89 [30] 
(𝑈𝐷,𝐴𝐷) 37 [36] 1 [3] 3 [57] 
(𝐴𝐷,𝑈𝐷) 0 [0] 0 [0] 2 [1] 
(𝐴𝐷, 𝐴𝐷) 49 [85] 29 [45] 23 [44] 
Unravel 24% 10.8% 17% 
Notes: The first (second) entry in the strategy indicates the intended (final) payment date. UD 
= Upon Delivery, AD = After Delivery; Unravel is the percentage of markets that failed to 
produce at least one eligible seller. 
 
The equilibrium strategy is the modal strategy for each type in every treatment. In 
LC, the alternative strategy (𝑈𝐷, 𝐴𝐷) is also popular among both Weak and in partic-
ular Strong types, suggesting that buyers recognised the possibility of influencing seller 
prices via their choice of payment terms ex-ante before the auction (recall that in this 
treatment, the buyer’s choice of signal has no effect on the sellers’ eligibility probability). 
The draw of circumventing a larger penalty in FR and HC via the signal is also evident: 
the second-most popular strategy for both types in these treatments is (𝐴𝐷,𝐴𝐷). The 
third-most popular strategy for Weak types in FR is (𝑈𝐷,𝑈𝐷). Conditional on the 
price, this strategy could be an act of self-interest or indicate a preference for truth-
telling among certain subjects. We find some evidence to suggest the latter: 45 out of 
52 instances in which buyers deviated from self-interest in their final payment decision 
were to honour an intention to pay on-time, which would be consistent with a notion of 
guilt aversion (e.g., Charness and Dufwenberg 2006). 
A natural question is the extent to which the payment strategy of a buyer is con-
sistent during the experiment, or whether there is evidence of mixing between strategies. 
In the appendix, we present within-buyer relative choice frequencies observed across 
periods, conditional on the assigned type. We also provide a weighted scatterplot of the 
strategy coordinates for each individual buyer in our experiment. These plots show 
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largest concentrations at the equilibrium coordinates, but with some buyers displaying 
off-equilibrium behaviours in line with observations of the previous paragraph. 
4.4.3.  Seller bids, transaction prices and profits 
We next analyse sellers’ bidding behaviour in the Auction stage of the experiment. 
In Table 4.6 (columns 1 and 2), we regress seller bids and transaction prices on the 
treatment dummies (the reference treatment is LC) and their interaction with the 
buyer’s intended payment decision (recall that the buyer’s underlying type is unobserved 
by sellers). We again incorporate a linear time trend and cohort fixed effects. All regres-
sions are estimated using OLS, with robust standard errors calculated based on cluster-
ing at the subject level.83 
Result 4.3a. Sellers mark up their bids in response to extended payment terms when a 
deterrent penalty is in place. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 4.3(i), sellers in HC and FR submit significantly higher 
bids after observing an intention to pay after than upon delivery (p-value < 0.01 for 
both interaction terms) and the intended payment decision has no significant impact on 
bids in LC. Thus, buyers’ attempts in the LC treatment to influence bids through the 
signal are (on average) unsuccessful. This result provides empirical evidence that the 
use of extended payment terms may inflate consumer prices even when the prevailing 
institutional environment penalises buyers for reneging on a standard payment term. 
Result 4.3b. Bids and transaction prices are lower when the penalty for reneging on a 
standard payment term is higher. 
This result is line with Hypothesis 4.3(ii) and validates our conjecture that the an-
ticipation of a late payment – due to the absence of deterrent regulation – feeds into 
higher consumer prices. Conditional on the equilibrium signal, we fail to reject our hy-
pothesis that the average transaction price equals 40 in HC, 50 in FR and 66.67 in LC 
(p-values = 0.647, 0.828 and 0.132). Bids and transaction prices are significantly lower 
 
83 The results are robust to using a random effects panel estimator (see appendix). 
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in HC and in FR than in LC (p-value < 0.01 for all four comparisons). These measures 
are also significantly lower in HC than in FR (p-values = 0.039 and 0.032). There is a 
significant trend upwards in bids and prices over time in all three treatments. This is 
not captured by the static equilibrium theory and suggests some learning by sellers early 
on. Nevertheless, the comparative statics remain unchanged if we split the regressions 
between the first and second halves of the experiment (details in the appendix). 
 
Table 4.6 – OLS regression analysis of bids, transaction prices and profits. 
Dependent variable Bid Price Buyer profit Seller profit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HC -17.85*** -20.15*** 20.42*** 1.35 
 (3.69) (4.21) (3.38) (1.61) 
FR -10.42*** -12.41*** 10.88*** 3.13* 
 (3.34) (3.91) (2.43) (1.90) 
Intention AD -0.35 -2.18 -1.64 -3.92*** 
 (1.93) (3.27) (3.39) (1.21) 
HC * Intention AD 11.95*** 14.68*** -13.37*** 0.78 
 (4.06) (4.55) (4.04) (2.16) 
FR * Intention AD 11.99*** 17.71*** -14.19*** 3.27* 
 (4.25) (4.19) (3.58) (1.68) 
Weak   9.40*** 0.51 
   (2.48) (1.12) 
HC * Weak   1.35 -3.74** 
   (1.79) (1.82) 
FR * Weak   -2.54 -6.81*** 
   (3.82) (2.18) 
Period 0.68*** 0.57*** -0.35*** 0.07 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.05) 
Constant 62.81*** 61.54*** 30.61*** 26.81*** 
 (2.80) (3.41) (2.36) (1.38) 
Observations 1,650 682 850 1650 
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.22 0.27 0.13 0.03 
Wald test statistic 50.02*** 27.24*** 10.86*** 4.03*** 
Notes:  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Coefficient estimates are presented, with robust 
standard errors in parentheses clustered at the subject level. The omitted experimental treatment 
is LC. The models are estimated using OLS regression. The Wald test statistic is based on an F-





To assess the predictive power of the unique symmetric equilibrium in mixed strate-
gies of the Auction stage, in Figure 4.4 we compare the observed bid c.d.f. with the 
predicted c.d.f. for each treatment and conditioned on the buyer’s signal. Each row in 
the figure corresponds to one of the three experimental treatments; the left-hand panels 
correspond to a signal of payment upon delivery, and the right-hand panels to a signal 
of payment after delivery. All tests for equality of probability distributions are based on 
two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of the empirical bid c.d.f. versus that expected 
from Lemma 4.1.84 We find the evidence in support of the mixed strategy equilibrium 
to be (itself) mixed. 
In LC (top row), observed bids are spread more evenly over the feasible bid range 
than predicted and a non-negligible fraction of bids are submitted below the lower bound 
of the equilibrium support. Bids in this treatment are similar regardless of the signal 
but we reject the theoretical distribution at each information set (p-value < 0.01 for 
both). In HC (middle row), we fail to reject the null of equality of bid distributions on-
the-path (p-value = 0.152), although the empirical c.d.f. appears to lie to the right of 
the theoretical distribution at bids below 50; off-the-path, the distribution of bids is 
significantly lower than expected (p-value < 0.01) although, consistent with the theo-
retical bid support, sellers do not submit the lowest prices. In FR (bottom row), the 
observed distribution of bids is remarkably close to that predicted on-the-path (p-value 
= 0.904); off-the-path, the bid distribution diverges (p-value < 0.01). 
Finally, we analyse the determinants of buyer and seller profits observed in the ex-
periment (columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.6). 
Result 4.3c. The imposition of a deterrent penalty for reneging on a standard payment 
term increases consumer surplus. 
 
 
84 All statistical inferences are unchanged by using the more powerful Epps and Singleton (1986) 
two-sample omnibus test, except that in HC we reject the null of equality of distributions on-
the-path (p-value < 0.01). 
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Figure 4.4. Bid c.d.f. observed () versus theory (○), conditioned on the signal (UD 
= Upon Delivery, AD = After Delivery). 
 
Buyers also earn significantly more in HC than in FR (p-value < 0.01), suggesting 
that the welfare-enhancing potential of a fully deterrent regulatory intervention is real. 
In its absence (i.e., in LC), Weak buyers end up significantly better off than Strong 
buyers (p-value < 0.01). The results in Table 4.3 reinforce the profitability of signalling 
a standard payment term in HC and FR relative to an alternative strategy of circum-
venting the penalty by signalling an extended payment term up front (p-value < 0.01 
for both interaction terms). 
In line with the nature of mixed strategy equilibrium, there is no statistical evidence 
that sellers’ profits differ among treatments when interacting with a Strong buyer (p-
value = 0.265). Sellers are worse off when confronted with a Weak buyer in HC (p-value 
= 0.040) and particularly in FR (p-value < 0.01), due to the propensity of these types 
to pay late. This finding underscores the potential for late payments to damage sellers’ 
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earnings in competitive market settings. Conditional on the equilibrium signal, sellers’ 
profits are significantly above the expected level of 25 in HC and FR when interacting 
with a Strong buyer (p-value = 0.037 and p-value < 0.01), but not in LC (p-value = 
0.142). We fail to reject the hypothesis that sellers break even on average when inter-
acting with a Weak buyer in any treatment. 
4.5. Endogenous Entry 
A common finding in entry game experiments is over-entry (Camerer and Lovallo 
1999, Fischbacher and Thöni 2008, Goeree and Holt 2005). When the Nash equilibrium 
entry probabilities are less than 0.5, this can be explained theoretically by quantal re-
sponse equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995). In all three of our treatments, the 
Nash equilibrium probabilities are weakly above 0.5 and so over-entry would not be 
consistent with quantal response equilibrium. Previous auction experiments with endog-
enous entry, however, observe over-entry even at high equilibrium probabilities (Ay-
cinena et al. 2018, Palfrey and Pevnitskaya 2008). This might be attributed to risk 
preferences, an additional utility from winning or relative payoff considerations. Alter-
natively, it may be an artefact of activity bias (Lei et al. 2001).  
Since equilibrium payment strategies in our signalling model depend crucially on 
correct expectations about sellers’ entry probabilities, we deliberately set these proba-
bilities as exogenous in our experiment. This design increased experimental control and 
mitigated the potential confound of over-entry in the auction. To investigate whether 
over-entry would arise in our environment, we conducted an additional experiment which 
permitted sellers in the HC treatment to make both an entry and pricing decision at 
the Auction stage. We call this variant High-Cost-Entry (HC-E). The design and proce-
dures for this variant were identical to the original HC treatment, with the following 
differences. At the Pre-Auction stage, buyers no longer knew the probability of a seller 
being eligible to customise the unit conditional on the signal. At the Auction stage, each 
seller had the option to return his or her non-customised unit to the experimenter with-
out submitting a bid, i.e., entry was no longer randomised by the computer. We recruited 
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four independent cohorts of 9 subjects for the HC-E treatment across two sessions.85 On 
average, buyers earned more per round in HC-E than in HC, and vice versa for sellers 
(Buyers: 56.97 versus 46.60, p-value = 0.013; Sellers: 20.55 versus 26.36, p-value < 0.01; 
two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests).86 This is consistent with an over-entry story.  
The novelty of HC-E is in the Auction stage and so we first examine entry and price 
statistics. In Table 4.7, we compare the new cohort frequencies of entry and conditional-
on-entry winning bids, by the received signal, to those predicted in the symmetric mixed 
strategy equilibrium. We observe two diverging behavioural patterns among cohorts.  
 
Table 4.7 – Aggregate entry, price and payment statistics for the HC-E cohorts. 
Cohort 1 2 3 4 
Intention UD n = 136 n = 136 n = 18 n = 16 
Entry [0.75] 0.79 (0.41) 0.75 (0.43) 0.78 (0.43) 0.81 (0.40)  
Price 34.53 (15.22) 38.19 (12.45) 37.78 (9.05) 56.12 (11.03) 
Final payment AD 0.04 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Intention AD n = 44 n = 44 n = 162 n = 104 
Entry [0.50] 0.66 (0.48) 0.57 (0.50) 0.80 (0.40) 0.77 (0.42) 
Price 55.47 (20.03) 61.65 (14.08) 42.1 (18.08) 56.88 (16) 
Final payment AD 1 (0.00) 1 (0.00) 1 (0.00) 1 (0.00) 
Notes: Displayed are mean (SD) values at the subject level in each cohort; n = number of signals at a 
given information set (cohorts 1 to 3 had six sellers and so 180 auctions; cohort 4 had four sellers and 
so 120 auctions in total). The Nash equilibrium entry prediction is in square brackets. UD = Upon 
Delivery, AD = After Delivery. 
 
In cohorts 1 and 2, approximately three in four signals indicate payment upon deliv-
ery and in response, sellers enter into 75 to 79% of auctions. This is close to the expected 
equilibrium entry frequency of 75%. On receipt of an intention to pay after delivery, 
sellers in these cohorts enter into 57 to 66% of auctions versus an expected frequency of 
50%. A very different outcome is observed in cohorts 3 and 4: despite approximately 
 
85 One cohort had only 2 buyers and 4 sellers due to a lower-than-expected show-up rate. 
86 Unless otherwise stated, statistical tests in this section are based on linear regressions that 
control for cohort fixed effects and a linear time trend, with standard errors clustered at the 
subject level. The corresponding regression estimates are reported in the appendix. The entry 
results are qualitatively unchanged if we model the probability of entry as a logistic function. 
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nine in ten signals indicating payment after delivery, sellers enter into 80% of auctions. 
Thus, we find strong evidence of over-entry in HC-E off-the-path (p-value = 0.013). 
Entry is lower in HC-E after receiving an intention to pay after delivery versus upon 
delivery (p-value = 0.052). We find no statistical evidence of a time trend in entry 
decisions. To test the mixed strategy equilibrium at the individual level, we follow 
Moffatt (2015, 16.2) and examine entry sequences for each subject separately (Table 
4.8). Conditional on the received signal, we reject the Nash entry point prediction for 
13 out of 22 sellers (p-value < 0.05, two-sided Binomial tests); we also reject randomness 
of the entry sequence for 11 subjects (p-value < 0.05, two-sided runs tests). There is no 
significant relationship between entry and self-reported risk preferences. 
 
Table 4.8 – Seller entry frequencies in the HC-E treatment: binomial and runs tests. 
Cohort 
Seller 
1 2 3 4 
1 1**++ 0.55** 1**++ 0.44++ 
2 1**++ 0.84++ 0.61 0.85** 
3 1**++ 0.65 0.46 0.78** 
4 0.63 0.83 0.73** 1**++ 
5 0.92 1**++ 1**++  
6 0.26**++ 0.58 0.96**++  
Notes: Displayed are the relative entry frequencies for each seller in each cohort, conditional on 
the modal signal received; for cohorts 1 and 2, the modal signal is Upon Delivery; for cohorts 3 
and 4, the modal signal is After Delivery. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, based on two-sided binomial 
test versus expected frequency (= 0.75 for cohorts 1 and 2, = 0.5 for cohorts 3 and 4). ++ p < 
0.01, + p < 0.05, based on two-sided runs test. 
 
We also observe lower-than-expected transaction prices in HC-E, which together with 
over-entry suggests more intense bidding competition when entry is endogenous. In co-
horts 1 and 2, average prices are 34.53 and 38.19, below the equilibrium prediction of 
40; in cohorts 3 and 4, prices are 42.1 and 56.88, below the off-equilibrium prediction of 
66.67. They are also significantly below those observed in HC (p-value < 0.01). In Figure 
4.5, we plot the time-series of bids in the HC and HC-E treatments, conditioned on the 
signal. Bids are markedly lower with endogenous entry and there is a significant positive 
time trend in both treatments off-the-path, which suggests a certain degree of learning 
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at this information set. As a consequence, buyers earn significantly more and sellers 
significantly less than their counterparts in HC (both p-values < 0.01). Sellers earn a 
gross profit below the entry cost of 25 in all four cohorts, suggesting that they would 
have been better off staying out of the market.87  
 
Figure 4.5. Time-series of bids in the HC and HC-E treatments (including trend 
line and 95% confidence intervals, UD = Upon Delivery, AD = After Delivery). 
 
 
The associated bid distributions observed in HC-E are presented in Figure 4.6. The 
top (bottom) panel displays the bid c.d.f. conditional on an intention to pay upon (after) 
delivery. Both distributions lie to the left of the distribution associated with the mixed 
strategy equilibrium. On-the-path, bids track the theory and we fail to reject the null 
of equality of distributions (p-value = 0.104, two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test); the 
main difference with HC is the larger fraction of bids below 50. Off-the-path, we reject 
equality with the theoretical c.d.f. (p-value < 0.01, two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). 
 
 
87 Risk aversion would require a premium and net seller profit in equilibrium. We observe no 
significant relationship between risk preferences and seller profits; neither is there a significant 
gender effect.  
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Figure 4.6. Bid c.d.f.s observed () versus theory (○) in the HC-E treatment condi-
tioned on the signal (UD = Upon Delivery, AD = After Delivery). 
 
Finally, we have seen that buyers in HC-E cohorts 1 and 2 followed largely different 
payment strategies in the Pre-Auction stage relative to buyers in cohorts 3 and 4.88 To 
see this more clearly, in Figure 4.7 we present the intended and final payment decisions 
for each cohort and buyer type over the course of the experiment. Both types in cohorts 
1 and 2 converge on the equilibrium payment strategy (𝑈𝐷,𝑈𝐷), whereas convergence 
in cohorts 3 and 4 is on the alternate strategy (𝐴𝐷, 𝐴𝐷). These patterns emerge early 
on and there is no significant time trend in buyer behaviour (see formal regression anal-
ysis in the appendix). We conjecture that the differential payment paths observed are a 
direct result of over-entry. Unlike in HC and in cohorts 1 and 2 of HC-E, sellers in 
cohorts 3 and 4 did not punish buyers for offering extended payment terms: there is 
little difference in entry rates and bids in these cohorts conditional on the signal. More-
over, entry was significantly higher and bids lower than the theory would predict. In 
turn, buyers were able to create a “micro culture” in which late payments were expected 
and realized as a best-response to bidding behaviour. 
 
 




Figure 4.7. Intended and final payment decisions for the HC-E cohorts by type. 
 
Notes: UD = Upon Delivery, AD = After Delivery. The solid (dashed) lines are the 
relative frequencies of intended and final payments after delivery in the FR treat-





4.6. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this chapter, we harness the methodology of experimental economics to provide 
causal evidence that late payments feed into higher market prices and lower expected 
consumer surplus. Late payments, and their strategic counterpart extended payment 
terms, are a real liquidity risk in trading relationships and characterise a wide range of 
industries. Yet identifying the impact of such payment practices in the field confronts 
an endogeneity problem embodied in payment data. For example, in the wake of the 
Covid-19 pandemic, firms faced unprecedented revenue shocks (Joseph et al. 2020). In 
the UK, more than half of sellers reported having unpaid invoices due as a result of the 
crisis (Office for National Statistics 2020). The extent to which outstanding payments 
contribute to sellers increasing their prices or leaving the market is difficult to disentan-
gle from the wider financing constraints and demand shortfalls of the time. 
Existing models in the industrial organisation literature do not consider the horizon-
tal effects of late payment risk on suppliers’ bidding strategies. We show theoretically 
that the expectation of a late payment induces sellers to enter into competition less 
frequently and to inflate their bids conditional on entry. As a consequence, buyers end 
up worse off relative to a scenario in which they offer a standard payment term and 
make payment on-time. Our analysis suggests that introducing a regulatory penalty on 
those buyers who renege on a standard payment term can generate a Pareto improve-
ment: as sellers become more confident in the payment terms received, they bid for 
contracts more often and compete more aggressively, leaving end consumers to benefit 
from lower prices.  
We provide experimental evidence to back up our theoretical predictions and demon-
strate that care should be taken in setting the level of any regulatory fine. If this fine is 
not set high enough, those firms who benefit most from paying late may free ride on the 
positive competition spillover effects generated by other firms who pay on-time. The 
experiments also inform on why certain sectors may become stuck in an inefficient equi-
librium characterised by extended payment terms and prolonged unpaid invoices: if 
sellers are unwilling to adjust their bids in response to an offer of a standard payment 
132 
 
term for fear of the buyer reneging (as we observed in our LC treatment), it is not in 
the buyer’s interest to change their payment practices. To that end, an empirically test-
able prediction of the model is that the relationship between the average payment term 
and the level of consumer prices will be more evident in regions and/or sectors where a 
late payment is penalised than where it is not. 
An implication of our analysis is that a regulatory penalty may be ineffective in times 
of economic stress and when the buyer is likely to place higher value on a late payment. 
An alternative would be to reward firms for prompt payment. It is not obvious, however, 
that this would be palatable for a regulator to implement – presumably, it would require 
some form of subsidy. Discounts are often offered by sellers to consumers in voluntary 
trade credit agreements, as a reward for early payment.89 Late payment is, by its very 
nature, an involuntary arrangement. It is also important to recognise that implementing 
a penalty may not be feasible in all market settings, particularly if the cost of verifying 
payment performance is high. Our results suggest that buyers might be more likely to 
cooperate with such a regulatory scheme if they understand the horizontal price benefits 
from establishing a culture of prompt – rather than late – payments.  
In future work, we plan to additionally consider the impact of a penalty absorbed by 
the creditor. For example, the EU directive 2011/7/EU on combating late payment in 
commercial transactions (2011) states that in the event of a late payment, statutory 
interest and compensation for fixed recovery costs are due to the supplier. Thus, incen-
tives to renege on a standard payment term may also depend on the payment size. 
Intuitively, buyers will be less willing to incur a penalty for a small rather than a large 
inventory item. This could be addressed analytically by moving from a fixed-sum to 
proportional penalty.  
A further restrictive assumption in our approach is that renegotiation to a different 
final payment date is always inefficient. In practice, granting an extension to the pay-
ment term may be welfare-improving if liquidity constrained buyers are reprieved from 
going bankrupt, and/or if flexibility in the invoice due date can mitigate a short-term 
 
89 See, e.g., “2/10 Net 30”, in which a company extends a 30 day invoice term to customers who 
pay on credit and a 2% discount on the purchase price if payment is made within 10 days. 
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negative shock. Note that incorporating uncertainty on the buyer-side is unlikely to 
change the horizontal impact of a late payment on suppliers’ bidding strategies (so long 
as sellers still discount a late payment). It may, however, alter the buyer’s equilibrium 
incentives and so welfare comparisons. On the seller-side, it would be worthwhile to 
consider the implications for entry and pricing of conditional bids, i.e., offers that can 
be conditioned on the final payment date. 
We acknowledge that the concept of welfare considered here (expected buyer surplus) 
is narrow. This enabled us to focus specifically on the horizontal effects of a late payment 
on entry and pricing, at the cost of abstracting from broader welfare implications that 
might arise in more complex market structures. For instance, one could examine the 
effects of late payment on sub-contractors in a multi-tier supply chain. Once the conse-
quences of funding risk for downstream supplier competition are considered, the benefit 
of introducing a deterrent penalty for reneging on a standard payment term may be 
even larger. How payment terms and financial capacity interact between upstream and 
downstream suppliers is a possible avenue for future work. Relatedly, we limit attention 
to a symmetric-information (among sellers) first-price, sealed-bid auction in which pre-
paring a bid is costly. While this is reasonable for projects in which a cost estimate can 
be arrived at precisely (after some effort), in other situations these assumptions are 
restrictive. It would be interesting to examine the influence of the auction format on 
buyer-side and seller-side payment strategies. 
Finally, a limitation of our approach is that we consider only a one-shot interaction. 
In repeated interactions, reputational information may influence bidding strategies, 
change a buyer’s incentive to pay late (e.g., due to loss of trust and with it future 
business), and lead to separating equilibria not captured by our model. Note that in 
one-shot interactions, reputational information may still be relevant if firms are required 
to report on prior payment practices in the public domain.90 Note too that the conse-
quences of repeated interactions for the propensity of late payments are far from 
straightforward. Small firms, for example, may be reluctant to claim against their larger 
 
90 For an example of payment reporting requirements in the UK, see the Department for Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy (2016).  
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clients for fear of losing repeat business. The true welfare consequences of late payments 
will depend also on relative bargaining powers. Our static model predicts (intuitively) 
that Weak buyers benefit most from making a late payment. In a dynamic model, the 
buyers that benefit most are likely to be Weak buyers who possess significant bargaining 
power. Such buyers may be able to reap the benefits of holding onto cash without fear 
of repercussions from their suppliers. This was exactly the strategy of Carillion (cited 
in the Introduction) before it collapsed.91 Incorporating such imperfections would be 
another useful extension to the model. 
  
 
91 According to Rachel Reeves MP: “It's clear that Carillion were notorious late-payers, ruthlessly 
exploiting their position to bully their contractors in a desperate bid to prop up their precarious 
business model” (“Committees publish correspondence”, 2018). 
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A Appendix for Chapter 2 
A.1. Supplementary analyses of the experimental data 
Figure A. 1. Remaining cohort outcomes over time (𝜌 = 0). 
 
Notes: Panels display procurement outcomes over time in the specified treatment – 
cohort. Each observation corresponds to the outcome of a randomly matched inter-
action group in the period, with 1 buyer and 2 sellers. An open triangle is an 
instance of market unraveling, in which neither seller submitted a bid. A cross is a 
transaction failure, in which a buyer rejected the winning bid. A solid circle is an 
accepted winning bid at which the seller delivered low quality. A solid square is an 
accepted winning bid at which the seller delivered high quality. 
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Figure A. 2. Remaining cohort outcomes over time (𝜌 = 0.50). 
 
Notes: Panels display procurement outcomes over time in the specified treatment – 
cohort. Each observation corresponds to the outcome of a randomly matched inter-
action group in the period, with 1 buyer and 2 sellers. An open triangle is an 
instance of market unraveling, in which neither seller submitted a bid. A cross is a 
transaction failure, in which a buyer rejected the winning bid. A solid circle is an 
accepted winning bid at which the seller delivered low quality. A solid square is an 
accepted winning bid at which the seller delivered high quality. An open circle and 
an open square are the corresponding total payments in instances where these differ 






Figure A. 3. Remaining cohort outcomes over time (𝜌 = 0.75). 
 
Notes: Panels display procurement outcomes over time in the specified treatment – 
cohort. Each observation corresponds to the outcome of a randomly matched inter-
action group in the period, with 1 buyer and 2 sellers. An open triangle is an 
instance of market unraveling, in which neither seller submitted a bid. A cross is a 
transaction failure, in which a buyer rejected the winning bid. A solid circle is an 
accepted winning bid at which the seller delivered low quality. A solid square is an 
accepted winning bid at which the seller delivered high quality. An open circle and 
an open square are the corresponding total payments in instances where these differ 





Table A. 1 – Statistical learning analysis (I). 
 Periods 1-10 Periods 11-20 Periods 21-30 
 𝜌 = 0 
Bid 42.49 40.69 38.24 
 (4.64) (4.69) (4.20) 
Seller participation 0.98 0.99 0.99 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Buyer acceptance 0.56 0.53 0.73 
 (0.20) (0.24) (0.22) 
High quality 0.15* 0.03 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) 
 𝜌 = 0.50 
Bid 57.61** 63.46 64.75 
 (5.66) (6.47) (5.72) 
Seller participation 0.99 0.99 0.95 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) 
Buyer acceptance 0.94 0.90 0.89 
 (0.03) (0.08) (0.15) 
High quality 0.31 0.35 0.24 
 (0.08) (0.23) (0.33) 
Retainage return (low) 0.10* 0.05 0.03 
 (0.10) (0.08) (0.05) 
Retainage return (high) 0.40 0.27 0.33 
 (0.25) (0.17) (0.09) 
 𝜌 = 0.75 
Bid 55.22* 64.47 62.35 
 (4.43) (9.51) (16.21) 
Seller participation 0.83* 0.59 0.50 
 (0.16) (0.31) (0.37) 
Buyer acceptance 0.96+ 0.99 1.00 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) 
High quality 0.37 0.53 0.55 
 (0.15) (0.25) (0.37) 
Retainage return (low) 0.19 0.12 0.09 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) 
Retainage return (high) 0.39 0.36 0.35 
 (0.18) (0.24) (0.20) 
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Table A. 2 – Statistical learning analysis (II). 
 Periods 1-10 Periods 11-20 Periods 21-30 
 𝜌 = 0 
Buyer profit 4.16 0.97 2.93 
 (4.31) (1.99) (1.37) 
Seller profit 5.95 5.17 2.89 
 (3.19) (2.27) (0.75) 
 𝜌 = 0.50 
Buyer profit 17.99 16.77 12.06 
 (2.09) (9.58) (13.13) 
Seller profit -2.30 0.40 1.41 
 (2.14) (2.45) (2.20) 
 𝜌 = 0.75 
Buyer profit 29.38 30.11 33.16 
 (4.40) (4.69) (8.31) 
Seller profit -11.34 -6.72 -8.90 
 (3.06) (7.56) (9.13) 
Notes: Displayed in this table and the previous table are mean (SD) values based on cohort 
averages. Matched pairs t-test (two-sided) comparing averages between adjacent blocks, * indi-





A.2. Least absolute deviation (LAD) estimation of the behavioural 
model 
In this part of the appendix, we employ a tractable LAD approach to estimating the 
parameters of our behavioural model on the profit data from all 30 periods of our ex-
periment. Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) use an analogous procedure to apply their 𝛼 
model to behaviour in gift-exchange and trust game experiments. For comparability 
with Bolton and Ockenfels, we assume that trustworthy buyer types reward both low 
and high quality according to the fairness norm 𝛾.    
First, we define a procurement “bucket” 𝑔 (𝜌, 𝑝, 𝑞) as a group of procurement inter-
actions that share the same retainage provision and price-quality outcome. In terms of 
the strategic interaction, 𝜌 determines the specification of the extensive form game, 
(𝑝, 𝑞) specifies a penultimate information set and 𝑔  identifies the subset of observations 
reaching this information set. Observations within this subset vary by the buyer’s ulti-
mate action. For each bucket, we compute the average actual buyer and seller profits 
observed in the experiment.92 We assign each bucket a weight according to its relative 
empirical frequency, i.e., the number of transactions in the bucket divided by the total 
number of transactions across all buckets (= 907).  For each bucket, we then calculate 
the buyer and seller profits predicted by the model of fair payment norms at all (𝛼, 𝛾) 
pairs in the unit square. This enables us to compute, for each bucket and pair, the 
absolute deviation between actual and predicted buyer and seller profits. Finally, we 
take the weighted sum of these absolute deviations across all buckets and for each (𝛼, 𝛾) 
pair. The following objective function described this calculation: 
#𝑔
907
(|𝜋̅ (𝑔 ) − 𝜋̅ (𝑔 , 𝛼, 𝛾)| + |𝜋̅ (𝑔 ) − 𝜋̅ (𝑔 , 𝛼, 𝛾)|)  (A.1) 
 
92 Taking averages reduces noise at the cost of losing information from higher moments. The 
results of the LAD estimation are qualitatively unchanged if we instead conduct the exercise at 
the transaction level. The least deviation estimate is the same at 𝛼 = 0.40. The estimate of 𝛾 




Results of the estimation are presented in Figure A. 4. The subset of joint parameter 
estimates yielding the minimum LAD are identified by the darkest shaded colour in the 
figure. This subset is centred around best estimates of 𝛼 = 0.40 and 𝛾 = 0.50. Our es-
timate of 𝛾 predicts zero retainage payment for all interim seller surplus shares greater 
than one half. We observed this outcome in 137 out of 139 possible cases. 
 
Figure A. 4. LAD estimates of the behavioural model parameters. 
 
Notes: The heatmap presents the set of feasible joint parameter estimates of 𝛼 and 
𝛾, imputed from the experiment data. The colour scale indicates the least absolute 
deviation (LAD) between average actual profits and those predicted by the model 
of fair payment norms (the unit is ECU). The darkest shaded region corresponds 
to joint parameter estimates that yield the minimum LAD between model’s predic-





A.3. Experimental instructions 
This is an experiment in decision making. If you read these instructions carefully and 
make good decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money. The amount of 
money you earn will depend on both your decisions and the decisions of other partici-
pants. The currency unit in this experiment is called Experimental Currency Unit, or 
ECU for short. At the end of the session, you will be asked to complete a short ques-
tionnaire. Upon completion, your total earnings from the experiment will be displayed 
on the screen, including your participation fee of $5, and be paid to you in private and 
in cash. 
How you earn money  
For today’s session, one-third of you will be randomly assigned a Buyer role, and two-
thirds of you assigned a Seller role. You will see your role at the start of the session and 
this role will not change for the duration of the session. This experiment will include 30 
rounds. In each round a Buyer is matched with two Sellers. The Buyer can purchase a 
product from one of the two Sellers. The value of the product to the Buyer, and the 
cost that the Seller incurs to provide the product, depends on the Seller choice to deliver 
a High or Low Quality product, as follows:  
 Low Quality High Quality 
Buyer Value 35 80 
Seller Cost 30 40 
Each player will start each round with 7 ECU. Therefore, when there is a transaction 
between a Buyer and a Seller, 
 The Buyer earns:  7 + Profit, where Profit = Buyer Value – Payment to the 
Seller 




How a potential Seller is determined  
An auction is used to select which of the two Sellers will have the opportunity to transact 
with the Buyer. At the start of each round, each Seller privately submits a bid for a 
price at which they would be willing to deliver the product or elects not to participate 
in the current round’s auction. The Seller submitting the lower bid wins the opportunity 
to potentially trade with the Buyer. In the event of a tie, the computer will choose the 
winner at random. Bids can be integers from 30 to 80.  
Example:  
Seller A bids 35 and Seller B bids 62 = A is winner.  
Sellers A and B both bid 40 = A and B each have 50% probability of winning. 
A Seller who does not win or elects not to participate in the auction earns 7 ECU for 
the round (Profit = 0). After the auction, the Buyer is presented the winning bid. The 
Buyer chooses whether or not to proceed with the transaction. If the Buyer does not 
proceed the round ends and all three parties earn 7 ECU for the round (Profit = 0). 
How the payment to the Seller is determined 
Participants in the 𝜌 = 0 treatment received the following instructions:  
If the Buyer chooses to proceed, the Winning Seller receives payment equal to his or 
her bid amount. Then the Winning Seller must decide to deliver either a Low or High 
Quality product. 
Examples: 
 Suppose the winning bid is 50 and the Seller delivers Low Quality. The round 
profits for the Buyer and Winning Seller are as follows: 
Buyer Profit = 35 – 50 = –15* 
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Seller Profit = 50 – 30 = 20 
 Now suppose the Seller delivers High Quality. The respective profits are: 
Buyer Profit = 80 – 50 = 30 
Seller Profit = 50 – 40 = 10 
*Note that it is possible to lose money in a round. Make your decisions carefully. 
Participants in the 𝜌 = 0.50 treatment received the following instructions:  
If the Buyer chooses to proceed, the Winning Seller receives 50% of his or her bid 
amount. This is called the initial payment . Then the Winning Seller must decide to 
deliver either a Low or High Quality product. The Buyer learns the quality level of the 
product and then chooses how much of the remaining 50% of the winning auction bid 
is paid to the Seller. This amount is called the deferred payment . The Buyer keeps any 
portion of the remaining 50% of the bid not paid to the seller. 
Examples: 
 Suppose the winning bid is 50, the Seller delivers Low Quality, and the Buyer 
sets the deferred payment at 6. The round profits for the Buyer and Winning 
Seller are as follows: 
Buyer Profit = 35 – 25 – 6 = 4 
Seller Profit = 25 – 30 + 6 = 1 
 Now suppose the Seller delivers High Quality and the Buyer still sets the deferred 
payment at 6. The respective profits are: 
Buyer Profit = 80 – 25 – 6 = 49 
Seller Profit = 25 – 40 + 6 = –9* 
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 Now Suppose the winning bid is 70, the Seller delivers High Quality and the 
Buyer sets the deferred payment at 30. The respective profits are: 
Buyer Profit = 80 – 35 – 30 = 15 
Seller Profit = 35 – 40 + 30 = 25 
*Note that it is possible to lose money in a round. Make your decisions carefully. 
Participants in the 𝜌 = 0.75 treatment received the following instructions:  
If the Buyer chooses to proceed, the Winning Seller receives 25% of his or her bid 
amount. This is called the initial payment . Then the Winning Seller must decide to 
deliver either a Low or High Quality product. The Buyer learns the quality level of the 
product and then chooses how much of the remaining 75% of the winning auction bid 
is paid to the Seller. This amount is called the deferred payment . The Buyer keeps any 
portion of the remaining 75% of the bid not paid to the seller. 
Examples: 
 Suppose the winning bid is 60, the Seller delivers Low Quality, and the Buyer 
sets the deferred payment at 16. The round profits for the Buyer and Winning 
Seller are as follows: 
Buyer Profit = 35 – 15 – 16 = 4 
Seller Profit = 15 – 30 + 16 = 1 
 Now suppose the Seller delivers High Quality and the Buyer still sets the deferred 
payment at 16. The respective profits are: 
Buyer Profit = 80 – 15 – 16 = 49 
Seller Profit = 15 – 40 + 16 = –9* 
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 Now Suppose the winning bid is 72, the Seller delivers High Quality and the 
Buyer sets the deferred payment at 44. The respective profits are: 
Buyer Profit = 80 – 18 – 44 = 18 
Seller Profit = 18 – 40 + 44 = 22 
*Note that it is possible to lose money in a round. Make your decisions carefully. 
How you will be paid 
At the end of the session the earnings from all rounds of the session will be converted 
to US dollars at the rate of 20 ECU for $1. These earnings will be added to your $5 













Note: In the 𝜌 = 0.50 and 𝜌 = 0.75 treatments, a slider with random initial value was 
used to avoid anchoring bias. A calculator displayed buyer/seller profits for the different 




A.4. Post-experiment questionnaire and subject characteristics 
Age: Interval variable.  
Years. 
Mean 23.89, Median 24, Standard deviation 4.74, Minimum 18, Maximum 60 
 
Gender: Dummy variable for female. 
Male 49.38%; Female 50.62%. 
 
Field of studies: Dummy variable for economics or business major. 
Arts and Education 1.24%; Economics and Finance 6.21%; Business and Management 
65.22%; Law and Social Sciences 1.86%; Medicine and Health Sciences 4.35%; Engineer-
ing and Natural Sciences 20.50%; Not a Student 0.62%. 
 
Nationality: Categorical variable: 
Central and Eastern Asia 23.90%; Central and Western Africa 0%; Central, South Amer-
ica and the Caribbean 0.63%; Europe (excl. UK) 1.89%; Middle East and North Africa 
0%; North America 11.95%; Oceania 0%; South and Eastern Africa 0.63%; South-East 
Asia 22.64%; Southern Asia 38.36%; UK 0%. 
 
Income: Categorical variable.  
When you were 16 years of age, what was the income of your parents in comparison to 
other families in your country? 
Far below average 3.11%; Below average 9.32%; Average 50.93%; Above average 33.54%; 
Far above average 3.11%. 
 
Risk Index: Average of six behavioural risk categories, general attitude and specific 
domains. 
Based on the questions in Dohmen et al. (2011). Likert scale from 1 “Completely un-




1) Are you generally a person who is fully willing to take risks or do you try to avoid 
taking risks? 
Mean 6.53, Median 7, Standard deviation 2.26. 
2) How would you rate your willingness to take risks while driving a car? 
Mean 4.07, Median 3, Standard deviation 2.63. 
3) How would you rate your willingness to take risks in financial matters? 
Mean 5.55, Median 6, Standard deviation 2.26. 
4) How would you rate your willingness to take risks during sports and leisure? 
Mean 7.10, Median 8, Standard deviation 2.27. 
5) How would you rate your willingness to take risks in job matters? 
Mean 5.82, Median 6, Standard deviation 2.38. 
6) How would you rate your willingness to take risks in health matters? 
Mean 3.70, Median 3, Standard deviation 2.44. 
 
Trust Index: Average of three variables. 
Questions taken from the “General Social Survey” consistent with the approach of Glae-
ser et al. (2000). 
 
1) Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t 
be too careful in dealing with people?  
“Most people can be trusted” 26.71% or “Can’t be too careful” 73.29%. 
2) Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, 
or would they try to be fair? 
 “Would try to be fair” 26.71% or “Would take advantage of you” 73.29%. 
3) Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are 
mostly just looking out for themselves? 
“Try to be helpful” 36.02% or “Just look out for themselves” 63.98%.  
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B Appendix for Chapter 3 
B.1. Additional figures and tables 
Figure B. 1. Implementable quality level by contract for Constant Relative Risk 
Aversion (CRRA) utility function. 
 
Notes: The figure assumes that potential sellers formulate their bidding strategies 
based on the following CRRA utility function, 𝑢 = 𝜋 ( − )/(1 − 𝑟)  for 𝜋 ≥ 0 
and 𝑢 = −(−𝜋 )( − )/(1 − 𝑟) for 𝜋 < 0, where 𝑟 measures the degree of relative 
risk aversion. A contract is defined by the probability of quality verification 𝜎 and 
the bid discount 𝛼. The empty regions correspond to contracts for which no profit-




Figure B. 2. Expected seller utilities (CRRA case) conditional on submitting the 
winning bid in the Arbitrator treatment. 
 
Notes: The figure assumes that potential sellers formulate their bidding strategies 
based on the following CRRA utility function, 𝑢 = 𝜋 ( − )/(1 − 𝑟)  for 𝜋 ≥ 0 
and 𝑢 = −(−𝜋 )( − )/(1 − 𝑟) for 𝜋 < 0, where 𝑟 measures the degree of relative 
risk aversion. The red diamond plus is the equilibrium bid level. Inset in each panel 










Figure B. 4. Winning bids and trade efficiency over time. 
 
Notes: The vertical dashed line in the Arbitrator treatment panels represents the 
change in the arbitrator’s preference parameter 𝜇 after period fifteen. Arbitrator-
LH corresponds to those cohorts assigned to the sequence 𝜇 = {1/3, 2/3} and Ar-




Figure B. 5. Contract prices and proposals over time in the experiment. 
 
Notes: The vertical dashed line in the Arbitrator treatment panels represents the 
change in the arbitrator’s preference parameter 𝜇 after period fifteen. Arbitrator-
LH corresponds to those cohorts assigned to the sequence 𝜇 = {1/3, 2/3} and Ar-




Figure B. 6. Seller profits as a function of the winning bid observed in the Arbitra-
tor treatment: High quality is incentive compatible on average. 
 
Notes: The vertical dot-dash line is the median winning bid observed in the respec-





Figure B. 7. Buyer surplus allocations in the Voluntary treatment. 
 
 
Notes: Based on individual buyer decisions over the course of the experiment. The 





Figure B. 8. Individual buyer strategy counts in the Arbitrator treatment. 
 
Notes: Based on individual buyer decisions over the course of the experiment. The 
size of the open circles is weighted by the number of buyers at the coordinate. 
Minimal strategies are defined as buyer choices to propose the lower bound contract 
price. Mimicking strategies are defined as buyer choices to propose the arbitrator’s 
preferred price +/- 2. We permit a tolerance of two points either side of this price 
to reflect the granularity of the buyer’s price proposal slider. The slider was set at 
increments of 0.25 points, which did not always permit the arbitrator’s preferred 
price to be selected exactly. The missing categories are price proposals between 
minimal and mimicking, and price proposals above mimicking. 
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Table B. 1 – Summary of experiment outcomes from periods one to fifteen only in 




(𝜇 = 1/3) 
Arbitrator-HL 
(𝜇 = 2/3) 
Winning bid 71.16 75.00 
Quality 0.42 0.56 
Proposed seller share -0.16 0.01 
       Low quality -0.19 0.04 
        High quality -0.12 -0.04 
Buyer profit 31.80 23.19 
         Low quality 14.50 12.09 
         High quality 55.04 38.56 
Seller profit 4.78 16.01 
         Low quality 4.86 7.24 
         High quality 4.12 20.35 
Efficiency 60% 69% 
Notes: The table summarises the main outcomes of the Arbitrator treatment based on data from periods 
one to fifteen only. Arbitrator-LH corresponds to those cohorts assigned to the sequence 𝜇 = {1/3, 2/3} 
and Arbitrator-HL to those cohorts assigned to the sequence 𝜇 = {2/3, 1/3}. This precludes the 
possibility of behavioural spillover effects between the first and second half of the experiment. Values 
are median cohort averages, based on three independent cohorts per treatment. Variable definitions: 
Winning bid is the lowest bid submitted by potential sellers in the auction phase; Quality is the relative 
frequency that high quality is chosen for delivery by the winning seller; Proposed seller share is the 
buyer’s proposal for the seller’s share of the trade surplus (as inferred from the proposed price); Buyer 
profit is the trade profit per round for the buyer; Seller profit is the trade profit per round for the 





Table B. 2 – Average seller bids by quality level in the experiment. 
Treatment Voluntary Arbitrator 
Sub-treatment  𝜇 = 1/3 𝜇 = 2/3 
Low quality strategies 118.35 73.29 78.95 
High quality strategies 109.71 78.66 85.38 
Notes: The table presents seller bids from the strategy method data, by the quality level 
selected. Values are median cohort averages, based on six independent cohorts per 
treatment. 
 
Table B. 3 – Frequencies of buyer choices in the Arbitrator treatment. 
Sub-treatment 𝜇 = 1/3 𝜇 = 2/3 
Minimal 0.468 0.508 
Low quality 0.471 0.496 
High quality 0.465 0.518 
Mimicking 0.223 0.207 
Low quality 0.232 0.216 
High quality 0.211 0.199 
Notes: The table displays relative frequencies of buyer choices to propose the lower bound 
contract price (minimal) and the arbitrator’s preferred price  +/- 2 (mimicking). We permit 
a tolerance of two points either side of this price to reflect the granularity of the buyer’s 
price proposal slider. The slider was set at increments of 0.25 points, which did not always 
permit the arbitrator’s preferred price to be selected exactly. The missing categories are 







Table B. 4 – IV first stage estimates: Determinants of quality level in seller bidding 
strategies (relates to Section 3.4.2). 
Dependent variable Bid 
Treatment Voluntary Arbitrator 
Model (5) (6) 
Bid t-1 0.626*** 0.476*** 
 (0.094) (0.092) 
Proposed bid discount (ppt) t-1 0.286*** 0.106*** 
 (0.073) (0.030) 
Period -0.248*** -0.432*** 
 (0.071) (0.124) 
𝜇 = 2/3   -0.079 
  (1.848) 
OrderHL  -5.627** 
  (2.73) 
Constant 29.232*** 47.442*** 
 (7.630) (10.813) 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 512 488 
Subjects 36 36 
Cohorts 6 6 
F test of excluded instruments 43.50*** 43.43*** 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 238.779 181.72 
Notes:  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Coefficient estimates, with robust standard 
errors clustered at the subject level. Cohort fixed effects are included. Proposed bid discount 
(ppt) t-1 is one minus the ratio of the buyer’s proposed price to the winning bid in the 
previous period, expressed in percentage points. The following control variables (not shown) 
are included: dummy for being female; dummy for being an economics and finance major; 
two Likert scales for self-reported willingness to take risks in general and in financial matters; 
dummy for reporting trust in strangers; and a generalised trust index. OrderHL is a dummy 






Table B. 5 – Determinants of buyer price proposals. 
Dependent variable Price proposal 
Treatment Voluntary Arbitrator 
(1 − 𝛼)* Winning bid 0.493*** 1.347*** 
 (0.077) (0.168) 
High quality 13.168*** 9.389*** 
 (0.649) (0.988) 
Period -0.037 -0.263*** 
 (0.036) (0.062) 
𝜇 = 2/3   1.428 
  (0.978) 
OrderHL  8.940 
  (6.475) 
Constant 45.201*** -62.141** 
 (17.029) (25.577) 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Random effects 
(subject and cohort) 
Yes Yes 
Observations 535 535 
Subjects 18 18 
Cohorts 6 6 
Wald 𝜒  454.6 287.7 
𝜒  p-value 0.000 0.000 
𝜎   0.000 0.000 
𝜎   6.881 9.549 
𝜎   7.118 11.09 
Notes:  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The models are estimated using mixed effects 
linear regression and include two random effects intercepts that capture intra-session corre-
lation at the subject and cohort levels, respectively. Coefficient estimates are presented, with 
standard errors in parentheses. The following control variables (not shown) are included: 
dummy for being female; dummy for being an economics and finance major; two Likert scales 
for self-reported willingness to take risks in general and in financial matters; dummy for 
reporting trust in strangers; and a generalised trust index. OrderHL is a dummy variable to 





B.2. Robustness check of aggregate experimental findings 
In this section of the appendix, we validate Results 3.1 to 3.4 of Chapter 3. using an 
OLS regression procedure based on disaggregated data at the matching group level. 
There are 540 matching groups in each treatment. Data from all periods are included 
and we incorporate a time trend. There are dummies for each of the Arbitrator sub-
treatments. The Voluntary treatment is omitted. Robust standard errors are clustered 
at the cohort level to control for intra-cohort dependencies – matching groups are ran-
domly reconstituted each round within a cohort. Since the number of clusters is small 
(six), standard asymptotic inference is liable to over-reject (Cameron et al. 2008). Thus, 
we also present p-values using wild cluster bootstrap tests of linear hypotheses (Rood-
man et al. 2019) and these are reported in the text below. The results are contained in 
Table B. 6. 
Column 1 of the table supports Results 3.1(a) and 3.1(b). On average, winning auc-
tion bids are 34 to 38 points lower in the respective Arbitrator sub-treatments than in 
the Voluntary treatment (both p-values < 0.01). There is weak evidence of a decreasing 
trend in bids over time (p-value = 0.098). There is no significant difference in winning 
bids between the Arbitrator sub-treatments.  
Result 3.2 states that there is no significant difference in trade efficiency between the 
contingent and the non-contingent contract. Since this insight is based on a null finding, 
it is important to check whether the null result still obtains in the matching group data. 
This is of particular interest for the comparison between Voluntary and Arbitrator when 
𝜇 = 2/3. A power calculation suggests that this pairwise comparison at the cohort-level 
has only around 13 percent power to detect an effect size of the magnitude observed in 
the data.1  Column 2 of the table supports Result 3.2. There is no significant increase 
in trade efficiency with a contingent contract than without (𝜇 = 1/3, p-value = 0.399; 
𝜇 = 2/3, p-value = 0.699). This does not change significantly over time in the 
 
1 Mean (sd) in Voluntary of 0.639 (0.096) and in Arbitrator 𝜇 = 2/3 of 0.674 (0.098). All power 
calculations are based on 1000 replications and assume a normal distribution. 
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experiment (p-value = 0.518). We fail to reject a linear hypothesis test for equality of 
the estimates on the Arbitrator sub-treatment dummies (p-value = 0.404).  
Column 3 of the table supports Result 3.3. Buyer price proposals as a proportion of 
trade surplus are significantly lower with a contingent contract, both when 𝜇 = 1/3 (p-
value < 0.01) and when 𝜇 = 2/3 (p-value = 0.011). This is consistent with a crowding 
out of buyer reciprocity. The period indicator in column 3 is also negative and significant 
(p-value < 0.01), which indicates decreasing levels of buyer reciprocity over time. 
 













Validation of Result 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.4 
𝐴𝑟𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 (𝜇 = 1/3) -37.63*** -0.151 -0.308*** -0.431 -1.70 
 (7.56) (0.162) (0.039) (2.32) (1.05) 
 [0.009] [0.399] [0.006] [0.870] [0.153] 
𝐴𝑟𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 (𝜇 = 2/3) -33.52*** 0.157 -0.215*** -1.84 3.96 
 (8.28) (0.335) (0.039) (3.33) (2.53) 
 [0.013] [0.699] [0.011] [0.597] [0.230] 
Period -0.46 0.008 -0.008*** 0.373** -0.258** 
 (0.28) (0.103) (0.001) (0.108) (0.097) 
 [0.081] [0.518] [0.005] [0.007] [0.077] 
Constant 111.26*** 0.440*** 0.262*** 27.48*** 9.050*** 
 (3.51) (0.085) (0.050) (1.58) (1.89) 
Observations 1,080 1,070 1,070 1,070 1,070 
Wald test statistic 41.61*** 26.97*** 51.76*** 9.40** 4.50* 
Notes:  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Coefficient estimates are presented, with robust standard 
errors in parentheses clustered at the cohort level to correct for intra-cohort correlation. The omitted 
experimental condition is the Voluntary treatment. In square brackets are wild cluster bootstrap p-
values after imposing the zero null on the bootstrap data generating process, with 999 bootstrap sam-
ples drawing from the six-point Webb distribution – which is preferred to alternative distributions 
when the number of clusters is less than ten – obtained using the boottest command in Stata (Roodman 
et al. 2019). The models in columns 1, 3, 4 and 5 are estimated using OLS regression. The model in 
column 2 was estimated using fractional logistic regression and coefficient estimates are on the logit 
scale. The Wald test statistic is based on a test of joint regression significance (F-statistics except for 
column 2, which is a chi-squared statistic). The number of observations is higher in the first column 
because we have auction data from all matching groups, whereas trade data from 10 matching groups 
was lost due to a hard time-out protocol. 
 
Columns 4 and 5 of the table are in line with Result 3.4. Buyer profits do not differ 
significantly with a contingent contract than without and there is no significant 
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difference between the Arbitrator sub-treatments (p-value = 0.625). Of more interest is 
the comparison in seller profits between Voluntary and Arbitrator when 𝜇 = 2/3. There 
is little statistical evidence at the aggregate level to suggest that the contingent contract 
increases seller profits under these conditions, but this test only has around 23 percent 
power to detect an effect size of the magnitude observed.2 At the matching group level, 
the evidence for a positive effect is stronger but still not significant at conventional 
thresholds (p-value = 0.230). We also fail to reject a linear hypothesis test that the 
coefficient estimates on the dummy variables for the Arbitrator sub-treatments are equal 
in column 5 (p-value = 0.163). The buyer-seller profit differential widens over the course 
of the experiment, with a significant positive time trend in the specification for buyer 
profits (p-value < 0.01) and a weak significant negative time trend in the specification 
for seller profits (p-value = 0.077). 
B.3. Mixture model estimation procedure 
The finite mixture model estimation procedure used here is adapted from Moffatt 
(2015). There are 18 buyers in the Arbitrator treatment, each of whom is observed over 
30 trading periods. Buyer 𝑖′s price proposal in period 𝑡 is given by 𝑦 . The variable 𝑦  
is constrained by the contract price range, [𝑝 , 𝑝 ], which is determined in the auction 
phase of the period and is observed before the buyer makes her decision. The corre-
sponding arbitrator’s preferred price is: 
𝑝 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑝 , 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {𝑝 ,  𝜇 𝑣(𝑞 ) + (1 −  𝜇 )𝑐(𝑞 )} . (B.1) 
This price is determined by the seller’s product quality choice 𝑞  and the arbitrator’s 
exogeneous preference parameter 𝜇 , which varies during the experiment. 
The buyer’s latent preferred price is 𝑦∗ , which depends on her type. We assume that 
there are two buyer types: self-interested (self) and fair (fair). The model precludes 
subjects from switching between types. Self-interested buyers propose the lower bound 
 
2 Mean (sd) in Voluntary of 5.09 (3.85) and in Arbitrator 𝜇 = 2/3 of 9.06 (9.27). 
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price 𝑝  (i.e., the maximum bid discount). Fair buyers exhibit reference-dependent pref-
erences. For this type, we specify the following model:3 
𝑦∗ = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑝 + 𝜀  (B.2) 
𝑖 = 1,… ,18, 𝑡 = 1,… ,30, 𝜀 ~𝑁(0, 𝑠 ). 
Where the arbitrator’s interim preferred price is the fair reference point in a trading 
period. We expect the parameter 𝛽  to be close to one for fair buyers. The error term 
is assumed to be normally distributed, with variance 𝑠 . 
A two-limit tobit model (Nelson 1976) is appropriate, where the limits correspond to 
the lower and upper bounds of the contract price range and are specific to each buyer 
and period. The relationship between the buyer’s preferred price proposal and actual 
price proposal is determined by the following censoring rules: 
For self-interested buyers:  
𝑦 = 𝑝   ∀𝑡 (B.3a) 




⎧𝑝      𝑖𝑓 𝑦
∗ ≤ 𝑝        
𝑦∗      𝑖𝑓 𝑝 < 𝑦∗ < 𝑝
𝑝     𝑖𝑓 𝑦∗ ≥ 𝑝        
 (B.3b) 
We consider the possibility that buyers deviate on occasion from their preferred 
price by incorporating a tremble parameter 𝜔. In any given period, with probability 𝜔 
a buyer may lose concentration and choose a price proposal at random. The price pro-
posal increment in the experiment is set at 0.25 points and so the cardinality of the set 
of possible price proposals is |𝑌 | = 1 + (𝑝 − 𝑝 )/0.25. The importance of this 
 
3 We found no significant time trend and so a period indicator was dropped from the model. 
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parameter is likely decreasing during the experiment as subjects gain experience in the 
decision-making environment and so we employ the following specification: 
𝜔 = 𝜔 exp [𝜔 (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑)] (B.4) 
Where 𝜔  is the initial tremble probability and 𝜔  is the rate of decline. The tremble 
parameter estimates are not statistically different from zero and so we do not report on 
them further here. The likelihood contributions for a single price decision are as follows, 
where Φ(. ) and 𝜙(. ) are the standard normal cumulative distribution and probability 
density functions respectively: 
𝒚 = 𝒑:  
𝑃 𝑦 = 𝑝 𝑖 = 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 = 1 −
| |
   
(B.5a) 
𝑃 𝑦 = 𝑝 𝑖 = 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑟 = (1 − 𝜔 )Φ − + +
| |
   
𝒑 < 𝒚 < 𝒑:  




𝑓(𝑦 |𝑖 = 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑟) = (1 − 𝜔 ) 𝜙 − − +
| |
  
𝒚 = 𝒑:  
𝑃 𝑦 = 𝑝 𝑖 = 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 =
| |
   
(B.5c) 






The two buyer types are represented in the model by the mixing fractions 𝛾  and 
𝛾 . The likelihood contribution for a buyer 𝑖 is: 
𝐿 = 𝛾 ∏ 𝑃 𝑦 = 𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 =
=
𝑓(𝑦 |𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓) < < 𝑃 𝑦 = 𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 =     
(B.6) 
+ 𝛾 ∏ 𝑃 𝑦 = 𝑝 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑟 =
=
𝑓(𝑦 |𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑟) < < 𝑃 𝑦 = 𝑝 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑟 =    
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Where 𝐼(. ) is an indicator function for the subscripted expression and the conditional 
probabilities/densities are obtained from (B.5).  
Finally, the sample log-likelihood is obtained as follows: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐿 = log (𝐿 )
=
 (B.7) 
on maximization of which we obtain maximum likelihood estimates for the five param-
eters 𝛽 , 𝛽 , 𝑠, 𝜔 , 𝜔  and one of the two mixing fractions (from which the other is 
computed using the delta method).  
Posterior probabilities for the two types are calculated as: 
𝑃 𝑖 = 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑦 …
=
𝛾 ∏ 𝑃 𝑦 = 𝑝 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 =
=




𝑃 𝑖 = 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑦 …
=
𝛾 ∏ 𝑃 𝑦 = 𝑝 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑟 =
=




The estimation is conducted in Stata 16, using the d0 estimator to account for the 
panel structure of the data. A starting value for the mixing fraction is obtained from 
the frequency table of buyer choices in Table B. 3. Starting values for the five parameters 
are (0, 1, 4, 0.11, -0.05), obtained from a process of trial and error. Bootstrapped stand-




B.4. Experimental instructions 
The experiment video instructions are available online at 
https://github.com/mjwalker19/Trade-Contingencies-in-Procurement-Interactions. A 
written version is provided below. Note: Horizontal sliders were used for the suppliers’ 
bidding decision and the shipping company’s price proposal. The initial values of these 
sliders were set at random in each interaction to avoid anchoring bias. 
 
You are now participating in an experiment in the economics of decision making. Based 
on your decisions and the decisions of other participants in the experiment, you can 
earn money which will be paid to you in private and in cash. Read these instructions 
carefully.  
 
Please turn to silent mode your cell phone or any other electronic device that you have 
brought with you. These electronic devices must be stored out of sight and not used for 
the duration of the experiment. Please do not communicate with other participants. If 
at any point you have a question, raise your hand and we will answer you as soon as 
possible. 
 
How you earn money 
 
The experiment today consists of 30 decision-making rounds . You will be paid for all 
these rounds. You earn money during the experiment by accruing points in each round. 
All the points that you earn during the experiment are converted to pounds sterling at 
the following rate: 
 
40 points = £1 
 
At the end of the experiment, you will be asked to complete a short questionnaire. Upon 
completion, you will immediately receive the monetary amount that you earned. The 
minimum amount that you will leave today’s session with is £4. 
 
Summary of the experiment procedure 
 
For today’s session, one third of you will be randomly assigned to the role of a shipping 
company, and two thirds of you assigned to the role of a supplier . You will be informed 
to which role you are assigned before the first round. You remain in the same role for 
the entire experiment.  
 
In each of the 30 rounds, a shipping company is matched with two suppliers in the room. 
This is called a matching group. The shipping company is looking to buy an engine from 




Note: Your matching group changes in each round. You are not matched with the same 
persons in consecutive rounds. 
 
All subjects assigned to a shipping company role begin each round with an endowment 
of 5 points. All subjects assigned to a supplier role begin each round with an endowment 




There are two phases in each round:  
1. Auction phase 
2. Price-setting phase 
----Arbitrator---- 
 
There are three phases in each round:  
1. Auction phase 
2. Price proposal phase 
3. Arbitration phase. 
In the auction phase, it is decided which supplier delivers the engine. Each supplier 
submits a bid. The lower bid wins the auction. The winning supplier at the auction 
delivers the engine. The losing supplier at the auction exits the round. 
 
The engine delivered to the shipping company can be of high or low quality . This is 
decided by the winning supplier during the auction and determines the shipping com-
pany’s value for the engine and the winning supplier’s delivery cost (see Table 1). 
Table - 1: Engine value and cost schedule 
 Low quality High quality  
Shipping company’s value 50 100 




In the price-setting phase, the shipping company observes the engine quality delivered. 
Then, the shipping company chooses a final price to pay the winning supplier. This price 
can be any amount from one quarter of the winning auction bid up to and including 
the winning auction bid. 
 






Note: Profit can be negative. Make your decisions carefully.  
 
We now explain the experiment procedure in detail. 
 
Auction phase:  
 The two suppliers in a matching group each submit a bid at an auction. 
 This bid can be any whole number from 30 up to and including 200. 
 Neither of the two suppliers can see the other’s choice of bid. 
 The supplier that submits the lower bid wins the auction. In the event of a tie, the 
computer chooses the winner at random. 
 The winning bid is not necessarily the final price paid by the shipping company. 
Instead, the winning bid determines the price range  that the winning supplier can 
receive: 
 the minimum price  in this range is one quarter of the winning bid. 
 the maximum price  in this range is the winning bid.  
 At the same time as submitting a bid, each supplier also selects an engine quality 
(high or low) to be delivered in the event of winning the auction. 
 The winning supplier at the auction proceeds to the next phase and incurs his/her 
engine delivery cost. 
 The losing supplier at the auction exits and earns the round endowment of 10 points 
(a profit of zero). 
Computer interface: 
In the auction phase, each supplier submits his/her bid by adjusting a slider in the 
upper part of the computer screen. As you adjust the slider, underneath you see the 
price ranges associated with the different possible bids. The first number in the brackets 
is the minimum price, which is one quarter of the selected bid. The second number is 
the maximum price, which is the bid itself. 
 
A supplier submits his/her quality by selecting one of two options in the lower part of 
the screen. 
 
On the right-hand side of the screen appears the engine value and cost schedule. 
Shipping company earns 5 + Profit, where Profit = value – final price 
Winning supplier earns 10 + Profit, where Profit = final price – cost  




Suppliers should attempt to make their decisions in the prescriptive time. For the first 
five rounds, you have 60 seconds to make your decisions. After round five, you have 30 
seconds to make your decisions. If you cannot make your decisions in time, the default 
bid is 200 and the engine quality is selected at random. 
Auction phase computer screen: 
 
Consider the following examples for the auction phase:  
1. Supplier A bids 160 and selects low quality. Supplier B bids 170 and selects high 
quality.  
 Supplier A wins the auction.  
 The winning bid is 160. 
 The price range is [40, 160]. 
 The engine is low quality 
 
2. Suppliers A and B both bid 128. Supplier A selects high quality and B selects low 
quality. 
 Suppliers A and B each have 50% probability of winning the auction. 
 The winning bid is 128. 
 The price range is [32, 128]. 
 If supplier A wins, the engine is high quality 
 If supplier B wins, the engine is low quality. 
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Price-setting phase:  
 The shipping company is informed about the price range and the engine quality 
selected by the winning supplier.  
 The shipping company is not informed about the quality selected by the losing sup-
plier. 
 The shipping company receives his/her engine value. 
 The shipping company chooses a final price from the price range to pay the winning 
supplier. 
Computer interface: 
In the price-setting phase, the shipping company’s price choice is submitted by adjusting 
a slider. As you adjust the slider, underneath you will see the profits associated with 
each price. 
 
The shipping company should attempt to make his or her decision in the prescriptive 
time. For the first five rounds, you have 60 seconds to make your decision. After round 
five, you have 30 seconds to make your decision.  If you cannot make your decision in 
time, the default price choice is the maximum price in the price range. 
Price-setting phase computer screen: 
 
At the conclusion of the price-setting phase, the round ends and profits are realised.  
Consider the following example scenarios:  
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1. The winning bid is 128 and so the price range is [32, 128]. The winning supplier 
selected a low quality engine. If the shipping company chooses a final price of 45: 
 
 
 Shipping Company Profit = 50 – 45 = 5 
 Winning Supplier Profit = 45 – 30 = 15 
 Losing Supplier Profit = 0 
 
2. The winning bid is 128 and so the price range is [32, 128]. The winning supplier 
selected a high quality engine. If the shipping company chooses a final price of 65: 
 
 Shipping Company Profit = 100 – 65 = 35 
 Winning Supplier Profit = 65 – 40 = 25 




Much of the information displayed to you during the experiment is stored in a table in 
the lower portion of the computer screen. Here is an example of this table filled with 
made up numbers for demonstration purposes. The information shown is not from an 




The table provides detailed information for each round. Suppliers see the winning and 
losing auction bids and which of these is their own bid. The shipping company and 
winning supplier also see the winning supplier’s engine quality delivered and the final 






Please answer the questions below. Raise your hand if you require assistance. Once you 
answer all the questions correctly, you will be assigned your role and guided through 
two training rounds. The main part of the experiment then begins. Note: The compre-
hension questions and training rounds have no influence on your payment.  
 Consider the following scenario.  
 
The winning auction bid is 140 and so the price range is [35, 140]. First, suppose the 
winning supplier selected a low quality engine, which is valued by the shipping company 
at 50 and costs the winning supplier 30. The shipping company chooses a final price of 
44. 
1. What is the Shipping Company Profit? 6  
 
2. What is the Winning Supplier Profit? 14 
 
3. What is the Losing Supplier Profit? 0 
 
Now suppose the winning supplier selected a high quality engine, which is valued by the 
shipping company at 100 and costs the winning supplier 40. The shipping company still 
chooses a final price of 44. 
4. What is the Shipping Company Profit? 56  
 
5. What is the Winning Supplier Profit? 4
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---- Arbitrator ---- 
In the price proposal phase, the shipping company observes the engine quality delivered. 
Then, the shipping company proposes a final price to pay the winning supplier. The 
shipping company’s proposed price can be any amount from one quarter  of the winning 
auction bid up to and including the winning auction bid. 
 
In the arbitration phase, an appeal is triggered if the shipping company’s proposed price 
is below the price that an arbitrator would set. The arbitrator’s price depends on its 
favoured profit ratio, which changes during the experiment. Whenever an appeal is trig-
gered, the arbitrator is available with 50% probability . If the arbitrator is available, the 
shipping company must pay the arbitrator’s price instead of the price proposal. Precise 
details will be given below. 
 




Note: Profit can be negative. Make your decisions carefully.  
 
We now explain the experiment procedure in detail. 
 
Auction phase:  
 The two suppliers in a matching group each submit a bid at an auction 
 This bid can be any whole number from 30 up to and including 200. 
 Neither of the two suppliers can see the other’s choice of bid. 
 The supplier that submits the lower bid wins the auction. In the event of a tie, the 
computer chooses the winner at random. 
 The winning bid is not necessarily the final price paid by the shipping company. 
Instead, the winning bid determines the price range  that the winning supplier can 
receive: 
 the minimum price  in this range is one quarter of the winning bid. 
 the maximum price  in this range is the winning bid .  
 At the same time as submitting a bid, each supplier also selects an engine quality 
(high or low) to be delivered in the event of winning the auction. 
Shipping company earns 5 + Profit, where Profit = value – final price 
Winning supplier earns 10 + Profit, where Profit = final price – cost  
Losing supplier earns 10 (Profit = 0) 
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 The winning supplier at the auction proceeds to the next phase and incurs his/her 
engine delivery cost. 
 The losing supplier at the auction exits and earns the round endowment of 10 points 
(a profit of zero). 
Computer interface: 
In the auction phase, each supplier submits his/her bid by adjusting a slider in the 
upper part of the computer screen. As you adjust the slider, underneath you see the 
price ranges associated with the different possible bids. The first number in the brackets 
is the minimum price, which is one quarter of the selected bid. The second number is 
the maximum price, which is the bid itself. 
 
A supplier submits his/her quality by selecting one of two options in the lower part of 
the screen. As you click on each option, underneath you see the arbitrator’s price asso-
ciated with your combination of bid and quality level selected. 
 
On the right-hand side of the screen appears the arbitrator’s favoured profit ratio and 
the engine value and cost schedule.  
 
Suppliers should attempt to make their decisions in the prescriptive time. For the first 
five rounds, you have 60 seconds to make your decisions. After round five, you have 30 
seconds to make your decisions. If you cannot make your decisions in time, the default 
bid is 200 and the engine quality is selected at random. 




Consider the following examples for the auction phase:  
1. Supplier A bids 160 and selects low quality. Supplier B bids 170 and selects high 
quality.  
 Supplier A wins the auction.  
 The winning bid is 160. 
 The price range is [40, 160]. 
 The engine is low quality 
 
2. Suppliers A and B both bid 128. Supplier A selects high quality and B selects low 
quality. 
 Suppliers A and B each have 50% probability of winning the auction. 
 The winning bid is 128. 
 The price range is [32, 128]. 
 If supplier A wins, the engine is high quality 
 If supplier B wins, the engine is low quality 
Price proposal phase:  
 The shipping company is informed about the price range and the engine quality 
selected by the winning supplier.  
 The shipping company is not informed about the quality selected by the losing sup-
plier. 
 The shipping company receives his/her engine value. 
 The shipping company proposes a final price from the price range to pay the winning 
supplier.  
Computer interface: 
In the price proposal phase, the shipping company’s proposed price is submitted by 
adjusting a slider. As you adjust the slider, underneath you will see the profits associated 
with each price. You will also see the price that the arbitrator would set for each proposal 
and whether an appeal to the arbitrator would be triggered. 
The shipping company should attempt to make his or her decision in the prescriptive 
time. For the first five rounds, you have 60 seconds to make your decision. After round 
five, you have 30 seconds to make your decision.  If you cannot make your decision in 









Arbitration phase:  
 The outcome of the arbitration phase depends on the decisions taken in the first two 
phases. 
 An arbitrator observes the winning bid, the shipping company’s proposed price and 
the proposed shipping company and winning supplier profits. 
 The arbitrator then sets its own price. The arbitrator cannot set any price, however. 
The arbitrator’s price can be from between the shipping company’s proposed price 
and the winning bid.  
 The arbitrator’s price is set to bring profits as close as possible to a favoured profit 
ratio, which varies between the first half and the second half of the experiment: 
 Either the arbitrator favours a 2 to 1 shipping company  to supplier profit ratio, 
i.e., the arbitrator favours an outcome in which the shipping company’s profit is 
double the winning supplier’s profit. 
 Or the arbitrator favours a 2 to 1 supplier to shipping company profit ratio, i.e., 
the arbitrator favours an outcome in which the winning supplier’s profit is double 
the shipping company’s profit. 
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 You will be informed about the arbitrator’s favored profit ratio immediately before 
the first round, and again when this ratio changes at the beginning of the sixteenth 
round. 
 If the shipping company’s proposed price is below the arbitrator’s price , then an 
appeal to the arbitrator is automatically triggered. If no appeal is triggered, then 
the final price remains the shipping company’s proposed price. 
 Following an appeal, the computer rolls a standard six-sided die to determine 
whether the arbitrator is available: 
 If the die comes up 1, 2 or 3, the arbitrator is unavailable,  and the final price 
paid by the shipping company remains the shipping company’s proposed price. 
 If the die comes up 4, 5 or 6, the arbitrator is available, and the final price paid 
by the shipping company is the arbitrator’s price. In this situation, a 2 point 
arbitrator fee is levied on the shipping company. 
 
At the conclusion of the arbitration phase, the round ends and profits are realised. 
 
Consider the following example scenarios:  
1. The winning bid is 128 and so the price range is [32, 128]. The winning supplier 
selected a low quality engine. The shipping company proposes a price of 39. 
 
If the arbitrator favours a 2 to 1 shipping company to supplier profit ratio, then 
the arbitrator’s price is also 39, because the shipping company’s proposed price 
already gives the winning supplier more than half the shipping company’s profit. No 
appeal is triggered. 
 Shipping Company Profit = 50 – 39 = 11 
 Winning Supplier Profit = 39 – 30 = 9 
 Losing Supplier Profit = 0 
 
2. The winning bid is 128 and so the price range is [32, 128]. The winning supplier 
selected a high quality engine. The shipping company proposes a price of 65. 
 
If the arbitrator favours a 2 to 1 supplier to shipping company profit ratio, then the 
arbitrator’s price is 80, at which price the winning supplier would earn double the 
shipping company’s profit. The shipping company’s proposed price is below the ar-
bitrator’s price and so an appeal is triggered. 
 
Suppose that the arbitrator is unavailable and so the final price remains 65: 
 
 Shipping Company Profit = 100 – 65 = 35 
 Winning Supplier Profit = 65 – 40 = 25 
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 Losing Supplier Profit = 0 
Suppose instead that the arbitrator is available and so the final price is 80. An 
arbitrator fee of 2 points is subtracted from the shipping company’s profit. 
 Shipping Company Profit = 100 – 80 – 2 = 18 
 Winning Supplier Profit = 80 – 40 = 40 




Much of the information displayed to you during the experiment is stored in a table in 
the lower portion of the computer screen. Here is an example of this table filled with 
made up numbers for demonstration purposes. The information shown is not from an 




The table provides detailed information for each round. Suppliers see the winning and 
losing auction bids and which of these is their own bid. The shipping company and 
winning supplier also see the winning supplier’s engine quality, the shipping company’s 
proposed price, whether an appeal is triggered and the arbitrator’s availability, and the 








Please answer the questions below. Raise your hand if you require assistance. Once you 
answer all the questions correctly, you will be assigned your role and guided through 
two training rounds. The main part of the experiment then begins. Note: The compre-
hension questions and training rounds have no influence on your payment.  
 Consider the following scenario.  
 
The winning auction bid is 140 and so the price range is [35, 140]. First suppose the 
winning supplier selected a low quality engine, which is valued by the shipping company 
at 50 and costs the winning supplier 30. The shipping company proposes a price of 44.  
Let the arbitrator favour a 2 to 1 supplier to shipping company profit ratio. The arbi-
trator’s preferred price is no higher than the shipping company’s proposal (and remem-
ber it cannot be any lower), because a price of 44 already gives the winning supplier 
more than double the shipping company’s profit. No appeal is triggered. The final price 
remains 44. 
1. What is the Shipping Company Profit? 6  
 
2. What is the Winning Supplier Profit? 14 
 
3. What is the Losing Supplier Profit? 0  
 
Now suppose the winning supplier selected a high quality engine, which is valued by the 
shipping company at 100 and costs the winning supplier 40. The shipping company still 
proposes a price of 44.  
Again, let the arbitrator favour a 2 to 1 supplier to shipping company profit ratio. The 
arbitrator’s preferred price is now 80, which is higher than the shipping company’s 
proposal and so an appeal is triggered. 
The die is rolled and the arbitrator turns out to be available. The final price is now 80. 
An arbitrator fee of 2 points should be subtracted from the shipping company’s profit. 
4. What is the Shipping Company Profit? 18  
 





B.5. Post-experiment questionnaire and subject characteristics 
Age: Interval variable.  
Years. 
Mean 22.71, Median 22, Standard deviation 4.03, Minimum 18, Maximum 39 
 
Gender: Categorical variable. 
Male 50.93%; Female 48.15%; Other 0.00%; Prefer not to Say 0.93%. 
 
Field of studies: Categorical variable. 
Arts and Education 16.67%; Economics and Finance 11.11%; Business and Management 
13.89%; Social Sciences and Law 10.19%; Medicine and Health Sciences 14.81%; Engi-
neering and Natural Sciences 33.33%; Not a Student 0.00%. 
 
Nationality: Categorical variable: 
Central and Eastern Asia 2.78%; Central and Western Africa 4.63%; Central, South 
America and the Caribbean 1.85%; Europe (excl. UK) 29.63%; Middle East and North 
Africa 2.78%; North America 1.85%; Oceania 0.00%; South and Eastern Africa 0.93%; 
South-East Asia 6.48%; Southern Asia 3.70%; UK 45.37%. 
 
Income: Categorical variable.  
When you were 16 years of age, what was the income of your parents in comparison to 
other families in your country? 
Far below average 4.63%; Below average 15.74%; Average 37.04%; Above average 
36.11%; Far above average 6.48% 
 
Risk Indices: 
Based on Dohmen et al. (2011). Likert scale from 0 “Completely unwilling to take risks” 




7) Are you generally a person who is fully willing to take risks or do you try to avoid 
taking risks? 
Mean 6.30, Median 7, Standard deviation 2.35, Minimum 0, Maximum 10 
 
8) How would you rate your willingness to take risks in financial matters? 
Mean 4.70, Median 5, Standard deviation 2.53, Minimum 0, Maximum 10 
 
Trust Index: Average of three variables. 
Questions taken from the “General Social Survey” consistent with the approach of Glae-
ser et al. (2000). 
 
4) Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t 
be too careful in dealing with people?  
“Most people can be trusted” 29.63% or “Can’t be too careful” 70.37% 
 
5) Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, 
or would they try to be fair? 
“Would try to be fair” 31.48% or “Would take advantage of you” 68.52%  
 
6) Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are 
mostly just looking out for themselves? 
“Try to be helpful” 38.89% or “Just look out for themselves” 61.11% 
 
Trust Strangers: Dummy variable. 
You can’t count on strangers anymore. 




C Appendix for Chapter 4 
C.1. Supplemental theoretical results 
Proof of Lemma 4.1.  The proof is based on Theorems 1 and 2 in Lang and Rosenthal 
(1991). By assumption 𝛿 𝑅 > 𝐸 and so, from the equilibrium expression for 𝜇(𝑞), the 
entry probability is between zero and one for all 𝑞. From the equilibrium expression for 
𝐹(𝑝, 𝑞), we have 𝐹(𝐸/(1 − 𝑞 + 𝛿 𝑞), 𝑞) = 0, 𝐹(𝑅, 𝑞) = 1 and 𝐹 (𝑝, 𝑞) > 0 and so 𝐹  
satisfies the properties of a c.d.f. 
For any potential supplier, the indifference condition for entry, required by the mixed 
strategy equilibrium, is 
(1 − 𝑞 + 𝛿 𝑞)𝑝[1 − 𝜇(𝑞)𝐹(𝑝, 𝑞))] = 𝐸, 
where the left-hand-side is the sum of two terms: the expected profit when his 
competitor does not enter, 1 − 𝜇(𝑞); and the expected profit when his competitor does 
enter but submits a higher bid, 𝜇(𝑞)(1 − 𝐹(𝑝, 𝑞)). Since 𝑅 is in the equilibrium price 
support and 𝐹(𝑅, 𝑞) = 1, we can obtain the symmetric expression for 𝜇(𝑞) from the 
indifference condition. Using 𝜇(𝑞), we recover 𝐹(𝑝, 𝑞) by substitution. 
Next, we check the equilibrium price support. Bidding at a level above 𝑅 or below a 
price of 𝐸/(1 − 𝑞 + 𝛿 𝑞) would yield the potential suppliers an expected loss. Thus, the 
set of best responses for either supplier in the second stage must be no entry along with 
bids from the interval [𝐸/(1 − 𝑞 + 𝛿 𝑞),𝑅]. 
The unconditional price c.d.f. is  
𝐻(𝑝, 𝑞) = 1 − [𝜇(𝑞)(1 − 𝐹(𝑝, 𝑞))] , 
where in the event of no bids, 𝑅 is assigned as the winning price random variable. 
From 𝜇(𝑞) and 𝐹(𝑝, 𝑞), this simplifies to 𝐻(𝑝, 𝑞) = 1 − (𝐸/(1 − 𝑞 + 𝛿 𝑞)𝑝) .96 
Conditional on at least one bid being submitted, the c.d.f. is  
 
96 This represents the probability that the winning bid is less than or equal to 𝑝. 
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𝐺(𝑝, 𝑞) = ( )
−[ − ( )]
,  
from which we obtain the expression in the lemma using 𝜇(𝑞).  
By the equilibrium supplier indifference condition above, expected total welfare 𝑊(𝑞) 
is based on expected buyer surplus. ∎ 
Lemma C.1. Suppose that 𝛿 > 𝛿  and 𝛿 ∈ ( , 1). There exists a unique symmetric 
Nash equilibrium of the entry and pricing stage characterised as follows: the potential 
supplier with the higher discount factor enters with probability 𝜇 = 1 and submits a 
bid according to the c.d.f. 𝐹 (𝑝, 𝑞), the potential supplier with the lower discount factor 
enters with probability 𝜇 (𝑞) and submits a bid according to the c.d.f. 𝐹 (𝑝, 𝑞), where 
𝜇 (𝑞) = 1 −
( − + )
  ,                 
𝐹 (𝑝, 𝑞) =
1 −
( − + )
          𝑓𝑜𝑟      𝑝 ∈ 𝑝,𝑅  
1                          𝑓𝑜𝑟       𝑝 = 𝑅     
,    
𝐹 (𝑝, 𝑞) =
−( − + )
−( − + )
                𝑓𝑜𝑟      𝑝 ∈ 𝑝, 𝑅 ,  and     
𝑝 = (1 − 𝜇 (𝑞))𝑅.            
Proof of Lemma C.1.  The proof follows Marquez (1997) and Thomas (2002), who gen-
eralise the simultaneous Bertrand entry model to account for heterogeneous entry costs. 
Suppose that the two potential suppliers possess different discount factors and that 𝛿 >
𝐸/𝑅 for each supplier. Any supplier for which this is not satisfied would have no influ-
ence on the analysis. 
First, order the discount factors of the two suppliers such that 𝛿 > 𝛿 , where the 
supplier 1 has the (absolute) higher discount factor, and supplier 2 has the lower dis-





maximum bid in the mixing distribution support of the two suppliers must cover the 
reserve price in equilibrium. The minimum bid in the support must win with probability 
one and be the same across suppliers.97 As a result, the expected profit of any entering 
 
97 Technical details of why the mixing distributions of at least two firms in equilibrium must have 
the same support can be found in Lemma 1 of Marquez (1997). 
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supplier in the second stage must be the same after accounting for differences in discount 
factors. We denote this expected profit by 𝐸[𝜋∗(𝝁)].  
An equilibrium in which only one potential supplier enters is not stable because that 
supplier would submit a bid equal to 𝑅 and the other supplier would have an incentive 
to enter with probability one and marginally undercut the price.  
For supplier 2 to enter profitably in equilibrium requires 𝐸[𝜋(𝝁, 𝛿 )] ≥ 0. It follows 
that 𝐸[𝜋(𝝁, 𝛿 )] > 0 and so supplier 1 enters with probability one. Supplier 1 could 
guarantee herself (1 − 𝜇 )(1 − 𝑞 + 𝛿 𝑞)𝑅 gross of the entry cost by submitting a bid 
equal to the reserve price and so will never submit a bid less than (1 − 𝜇 )𝑅. The 
probability of winning at this price is one and so to guarantee the same expected profit 
for all 𝑝 ∈ [𝑝, 𝑅], the minimum bid cannot be above (1 − 𝜇 )𝑅. We obtain 𝑝 =
(1 − 𝜇 )𝑅. Since in equilibrium supplier 2 is indifferent over entry, it must hold that 
(1 − 𝜇 )(1 − 𝑞 + 𝛿 𝑞)𝑅 = 𝐸 and this can be rearranged for the expression 𝜇 . The fol-
lowing equality must hold for supplier 1,  
(1 − 𝜇 )𝐹 (𝑝, 𝑞)(1 − 𝑞 + 𝛿 𝑞)𝑝 = (1 − 𝜇 )(1 − 𝑞 + 𝛿 𝑞)𝑝. 
This solves for 𝐹 (𝑝, 𝑞). Likewise, for supplier 2, we have 
(1 − 𝐹 (𝑝, 𝑞))(1 − 𝑞 + 𝛿 𝑞)𝑝 = 𝐸. 
This solves for 𝐹 (𝑝, 𝑞).  
From the resulting expressions, we can infer that Supplier 2 randomises entry and 
earns zero expected profit in equilibrium. By contrast, supplier 1 enters with probability 
one and earns an expected profit equal to: 
( − + )
( − + )
− 1 𝐸. ∎ 
Definition. Sufficient Difference. To fully characterise equilibria in the penalty space, 






This restriction ensures that, in expectation, the highest threshold penalty for a Strong 
buyer to pay on-time is less than or equal to the lowest threshold penalty for a Weak 
buyer. That is, the range of the two functions 𝑐 (𝑝 ) and 𝑐 (𝑝 ) do not overlap. The 
restriction is without loss of generality. If we were to drop this restriction, then the 
interval 𝑐 ∈ [𝑐 (𝑝 − ), 𝑐 (𝑝 )] may be degenerate but the remainder of the space is 
unaffected. To demonstrate that it is not too large to be uninteresting, consider the 
following parameter values: 𝐸 = 25, 𝑅 = 100 and 𝛿 = 0.5. We use these parameter 
values in our experiment. In Figure C. 1, we graph 𝛿  against 𝛿  for discount factor 
values above or equal to 0.5. As the Weak buyer type’s discount factor tends to one, the 
required Strong type’s discount factor tends to the 45 degree line. For example, 𝛿 =
0.75 would require a value of 𝛿 = 0.85. Since, per Lemma 4.1, the difference between 
𝑝  and 𝑝  (the buyer’s expected benefit from making payment on-time) is also decreasing 
in the seller’s discount factor 𝛿 , Sufficient Difference is everywhere lower in stronger 
seller populations. 
 
Figure C. 1. Sufficient Difference. 
 
 
𝛿 = 0.5 
𝛿 = 1 
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Proof of Low Cost Proposition. In the continuation game associated with 𝑚 = 1, 
both buyer types have a dominant strategy to pay at 𝜏 = 1 for all 𝑐 ≥ 0. Potential 
suppliers anticipate this and, per Lemma 4.1, randomise at this information set accord-
ing to 𝜇(1) and 𝐹(𝑝, 1). 
A. Penalty interval: 𝑐 < 𝑐 (𝑝 ). In this interval, both buyer types would pay late in the 
continuation game associated with 𝑚 = 0, incurring the penalty 𝑐. The potential 
suppliers’ expectation of late payment at this information set is 𝑞 = 1. Potential 
suppliers’ best response, independent of their posterior belief 𝑦, is to randomise 
according to 𝜇(1) and 𝐹(𝑝, 1). But this is exactly the same as at 𝑚 = 1. As a con-
sequence, both buyer types can deviate to 𝑚 = 1, avoid incurring the cost of reneg-
ing on a standard payment term and receive the same expected price. Thus, both 
types would earn a higher expected profit and the unique equilibrium involves pool-
ing on 𝑚 = 1 and late payment by both types. The potential suppliers’ posterior 
belief about the buyer’s type is unchanged from their prior belief, i.e.,  𝑧 = 𝑥. Beliefs 
are not specified off the equilibrium path. 
B. Penalty interval: 𝑐 ∈ 𝑐 (𝑝 ), 𝑐 (𝑝 − ) . Consider a separating equilibrium in which 
a Strong buyer sends 𝑚 = 0 and pays on-time and a Weak buyer sends 𝑚 = 1 and 
pays late. In such an equilibrium, potential suppliers would attach an expectation 
of late payment 𝑞 = 0 to receipt of a message 𝑚 = 0. Per Lemma 4.1, they would 
best respond by randomizing according to 𝜇(0) and 𝐹(𝑝, 0). Given this randomiza-
tion, a Strong buyer would pay on-time because in this penalty interval, 𝑐 ≥ 𝑐 (𝑝 ) 
and so 𝑞 is correct. The Weak buyer has a dominant strategy to pay late at 𝑚 = 1. 
Since this is a separating equilibrium, the potential suppliers’ know the buyer’s type 
at the second stage with certainty: 𝑦 = 1 and 𝑧 = 0. Beliefs are not specified off the 
equilibrium path. A Strong buyer would prefer this separating equilibrium to a pool-
ing equilibrium on 𝑚 = 1 in which both types pay late if 𝛿 > − ( − ). 
Suppose that a Weak buyer were to deviate to 𝑚 = 0 and form a pooling equi-
librium. By Sufficient Difference, we have 𝑐 < 𝑐 (𝑝 ) and so a Weak buyer would 
never pay on-time in the continuation game associated with 𝑚 = 0. If the Strong 
buyer still makes payment on-time, then per Lemma 4.1, potential suppliers would 
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best respond at this information set by randomizing entry with 𝜇(1 − 𝑥) and bids 
on 𝐹(𝑝, 1 − 𝑥). Yet given this randomization, a Strong buyer would also pay late, 
because 𝑐 < 𝑐 (𝑝 − ). Thus, potential suppliers best respond by randomizing ac-
cording to 𝜇(1) and 𝐹(𝑝, 1), independent of their posterior belief 𝑦. This is exactly 
the same as in the continuation game associated with 𝑚 = 1. As a consequence, 
both buyer types would deviate to 𝑚 = 1 and avoid incurring the cost of reneging 
on an intention to pay on-time, receive the same expected price and earn a higher 
expected profit. By the same logic, a separating equilibrium in which the Strong 
buyer sends 𝑚 = 1 and the Weak buyer sends 𝑚 = 0 would collapse.  
Finally, note that updating of off-the-path posterior beliefs need not be consistent 
with Bayes’ rule. Thus, in this case, a pooling equilibrium on 𝑚 = 1 in which both 
types pay late may also exist when 𝛿 > − ( − ) if we specify 𝑦 ∈ [0, 𝑥). Such 
a specification is objectionable, however, because it implies that a Weak buyer is 
more likely to deviate to a standard payment term than a Strong buyer despite 
having less to gain. ∎ 
Proof of Corollary 4.2. Follows from Lemma 4.1 and the Low Cost Proposition . ∎ 
Proof of High Cost Proposition. In the continuation game associated with 𝑚 = 1, both 
buyer types have a dominant strategy to pay at 𝜏 = 1 for all 𝑐 ≥ 0. Potential suppliers 
anticipate this and, per Lemma 4.1, randomise at this information set according to 𝜇(1) 
and 𝐹(𝑝, 1).  
Penalty interval: 𝑐 ≥ 𝑐 (𝑝 − ).  First, consider a pooling equilibrium in which both 
buyer types send 𝑚 = 0 and pay on-time. In such an equilibrium, potential suppliers 
would attach an expectation of late payment 𝑞 = 0 to receipt of a message 𝑚 = 0. Per 
Lemma 1, they would best respond by randomizing entry and bids according to 𝜇(0) 
and 𝐹(𝑝, 0). Given this randomization, both buyer types would pay on-time because in 
this penalty interval, 𝑐 > 𝑐 (𝑝 ). Thus, 𝑞 is correct. For neither type to have an incen-
tive to deviate to 𝑚 = 1, we require that the Weak buyer’s discount factor is high 
enough, 𝛿 > − ( − ).  The no-deviation condition for a Strong buyer is redun-
dant. Since buyer types pool their messages in the first stage, the potential suppliers’ 
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posterior belief about the buyer’s type on the equilibrium path is unchanged from their 
prior, i.e.,  𝑦 = 𝑥. The same caveat on multiplicity of equilibria applies as in the penalty 
interval B of the Low Cost Proposition . Similarly, if 𝛿 < − ( − ) < 𝛿 , then a 
Weak buyer would prefer to send a message 𝑚 = 1 and pay late; the Strong buyer would 
prefer to send 𝑚 = 0 and pay on-time in exchange for an identical supplier entry and 
bid randomization. Since this is a separating equilibrium, the potential suppliers’ know 
the buyer’s type at the second stage with certainty. Thus, 𝑦 = 1 and 𝑧 = 0. Finally, if 
𝛿 < − ( − ) then the unique equilibrium involves pooling on 𝑚 = 1 and the proof 
follows the Low Cost Proposition . ∎ 
Proof of Corollary 4.3. Follows from Lemma 4.1 and the High Cost Proposition . ∎ 
Proof of Free-rider Proposition. In the continuation game associated with 𝑚 = 1, both 
buyer types have a dominant strategy to pay at 𝜏 = 1 for all 𝑐 ≥ 0. Potential suppliers 
anticipate this and, per Lemma 4.1, randomise at this information set according to 𝜇(1) 
and 𝐹(𝑝, 1). 
Penalty interval: 𝑐 ∈ 𝑐 (𝑝 − ), 𝑐 (𝑝 − ) . Consider a pooling equilibrium in which 
both buyer types send 𝑚 = 0, the Strong type pays on-time and the Weak type pays 
late. In such an equilibrium, potential suppliers would attach an expectation of late 
payment 𝑞 = (1 − 𝑥) to receipt of a message 𝑚 = 0. Per Lemma 4.1, they would best 
respond by randomizing entry and bids according to 𝜇(1 − 𝑥) and 𝐹(𝑝, 1 − 𝑥). Given 
this randomization, the Strong type would pay on-time and the Weak type would pay 
late because in this interval, 𝑐 (𝑝 − ) ≤ 𝑐 < 𝑐 (𝑝 − ).  Thus, 𝑞 is correct. For the Weak 
type to have no incentive to deviate to an extended payment term at any penalty in the 
interval, we require 𝛿 > − − − ( − − ). The no-deviation condition for a Strong 
type is redundant. Since buyer types pool their messages in the first stage, the potential 
suppliers’ posterior belief about the buyer’s type on the equilibrium path is unchanged 
from their prior, i.e.,  𝑦 = 𝑥. Beliefs are not specified off the equilibrium path and the 
same caveat on multiplicity of equilibria applies as in the penalty interval B of the Low 
Cost Proposition .  
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Consider the alternative pooling equilibrium in which both buyer types send 𝑚 = 0 
and pay on-time. In such an equilibrium, potential suppliers would attach an expectation 
of late payment 𝑞 = 0 to receipt of a message 𝑚 = 0. Per Lemma 1, they would best 
respond by randomizing entry and bids according to 𝜇(0) and 𝐹(𝑝, 0). Given this ran-
domization, only the Strong type would pay on-time if 𝑐 < 𝑐 (𝑝 ); thus, this equilib-
rium is not possible at penalties below that level. If 𝑐 > 𝑐 (𝑝 ), then both types would 
pay on-time and the proof follows the High Cost Proposition . Finally, note that 
𝛽 (𝑅 − 𝑝 ) ≥ 𝛽 − (𝑅 − 𝑝 − ) for all 𝑥.∎ 




C.2. Supplemental empirical results 
Table C. 1 – Experiment outcomes for the pooled online and lab samples. 
Treatment LC HC FR Test 
Panel A: Payment decisions (0 = UD; 1 = AD)  
Intended payment 0.54 (0.20) 0.36 (0.10) 0.28 (0.11)  
 LC > FR: [0.022] HC < LC: [0.032] FR = HC: [0.229] 𝑯𝟏(𝒊) 
      Weak Buyer 0.55 (0.25) 0.44 (0.25) 0.34 (0.16)  
      Strong Buyer 0.52 (0.22) 0.28 (0.12) 0.23 (0.08)  
 W = S: [1.00] W = S: [0.31] W = S: [0.063] 𝑯𝟏(𝒊𝒊) 
Final payment late 0.89 (0.13) 0.35 (0.09) 0.48 (0.13)  
  HC < LC: [0.001]  𝑯𝟐(𝒊) 
      Weak Buyer 0.91 (0.17) 0.47 (0.27) 0.79 (0.22)  
      Strong Buyer 0.84 (0.13) 0.25 (0.13) 0.19 (0.08)  
 W = S: [0.31] W = S: [0.31] W > S: [0.016] 𝑯𝟐(𝒊𝒊) 
Panel B: Bidding, prices and profits 
Bid 69.93 (9.84) 57.88 (7.61) 59.59 (6.30)  
     Intention UD 69.09 (10.56) 54.94 (7.88) 56.38 (7.10)  
     Intention AD 70.47 (9.73) 65.20 (10.53) 68.02 (5.67)  
 UD = AD: [0.16] UD < AD: [0.047] UD < AD: [0.016] 𝑯𝟑(𝒊) 
Price 65.40 (11.02) 52.27 (5.99) 55.49 (7.06)  
    LC > FR: [0.12] HC < LC: [0.032] FR > HC: [0.35] 𝑯𝟑(𝒊𝒊) 
Buyer profit 33.75 (5.20) 44.65 (6.41) 40.35 (4.30)  
 LC < FR: [0.021] HC > LC: [0.013] FR < HC: [0.15] 𝑯𝟑(𝒊𝒊𝒊) 
      Weak Buyer 37.85 (5.40) 46.50 (7.26) 42.17 (5.22)  
      Strong Buyer 28.29 (6.60) 42.93 (5.96) 38.55 (5.86)  
Seller profit 25.68 (2.06) 26.71 (2.37) 27.18 (2.20)  
   LC = FR: [0.12] HC = LC: [0.12] FR = HC: [0.65] 𝑯𝟑(𝒊𝒊𝒊) 
Notes: Displayed are mean (SD) values for the key experiment outcomes based on 6 independent cohorts 
per treatment, with p-value from specified non-parametric comparison test in square brackets. For one-
sample comparisons, Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test; for two-sample comparisons, Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 
test. We employ a one-sided test when the theory predicts a direction and a two-sided test when the 
theory predicts equivalence. N’th  or  in a row corresponds to n’th p-value in the same row.  
indicates non-parametric test supports prediction of corresponding hypothesis at 5% level;  indicates 
non-parametric test fails to support prediction of corresponding hypothesis at 5% level. UD = Upon 




Table C. 2 – Logit regression analysis of buyer payment decisions (0 = UD; 1 = 
AD) with controls. 
Dependent variable Intended payment Final payment Penalty = 1 
 𝛽 ̂ 𝛽 ̂ 𝛽 ̂
HC -0.49 -3.34*** -5.49*** 
 (0.53) (1.01) (1.37) 
FR -1.68*** -3.64*** -2.82** 
 (0.45) (0.70) (1.17) 
Weak 0.72* 0.52 -0.49 
 (0.38) (0.54) (0.63) 
HC * Weak  0.55 2.06 
  (1.09) (1.35) 
FR * Weak  2.10** 4.52*** 
  (0.90) (1.43) 
Risk general -0.21* -0.1 0.1 
 (0.12) (0.17) (0.15) 
Risk financial 0.18 0.03 -0.21 
 (0.14) (0.17) (0.18) 
Business & Mgmt ma-
jor -1.13*** -1.78*** 0.35 
 (0.41) (0.66) (0.58) 
Female 1.42*** -0.15 -2.59*** 
 (0.51) (0.42) (0.62) 
US National 1.09** 0.38 -1.24* 
 (0.52) (0.54) (0.75) 
Above average income 0.15 0.14 0.2 
 (0.49) (0.69) (0.63) 
Age 0.16** 0.25* -0.03 
 (0.08) (0.14) (0.10) 
Period -0.01 0.01 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant -4.82** -2.56 3.16 
 (2.27) (3.69) (2.79) 
Observations 850 700 700 
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -489.40 -319.31 -215.38 
Wald test statistic 186.30*** 309.71*** 261.41*** 
Notes:  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Coefficient estimates on the logit scale (𝛽), with robust 
standard errors in parentheses clustered at the subject level. The omitted experimental treatment is 
LC. The models are estimated using Logistic regression. The Wald test statistic is based on a Chi-





Table C. 3 – OLS regression analysis of bids and profits with controls. 
Dependent variable Bid Buyer profit Seller profit 
HC -16.89*** 20.58*** 1.54 
 (3.71) (2.80) (1.58) 
FR -8.88*** 10.52*** 2.72 
 (3.43) (2.12) (1.84) 
Intention AD (0.06) 0.4 -4.00*** 
 (1.85) (1.85) (1.29) 
HC * Intention AD 11.64*** -13.20*** 0.94 
 (4.23) (4.02) (2.31) 
FR * Intention AD 10.75*** -13.16*** 3.06* 
 (4.05) (3.76) (1.80) 
Weak  9.13*** -0.2 
  (2.57) (0.99) 
HC * Weak  -2.33 -3.21* 
  (3.79) (1.79) 
FR * Weak  -1.66 -5.92*** 
  (3.42) (2.08) 
Risk general -1.13 0.44 -0.47 
 (0.99) (0.55) (0.34) 
Risk financial 1.35 -0.8 0.11 
 (1.05) (0.69) (0.34) 
Business & Mgmt major -5.14* -2.57 -0.6 
 (2.85) (2.00) (0.87) 
Female 1.43 2.27 1.54** 
 (3.20) (2.00) (0.76) 
US National 3.42 2.11 -1.66 
 (4.07) (2.52) (1.45) 
Above average income -0.08 -1.57 1.82** 
 (2.83) (2.72) (0.80) 
Age 1.01** 0.07 0.07 
 (0.44) (0.33) (0.15) 
Period 0.67*** -0.32*** 0.09* 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.05) 
Constant 38.33*** 30.92*** 27.10*** 
 (11.68) (10.52) (4.13) 
Observations 1,590.00 850 1,590 
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.24 0.14 0.04 
Wald test statistic 30.22*** 7.25*** 3.15*** 
Notes:  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Coefficient estimates are presented, with robust 
standard errors in parentheses clustered at the subject level. The omitted experimental treatment 
is LC. The models are estimated using OLS regression. The Wald test statistic is based on an F-
test of joint regression significance. AD = After Delivery. 
195 
 
Table C. 4 – Random effects analysis of bids, transaction prices and profits. 
Dependent variable Bid Price Buyer profit Seller profit 
HC -15.28*** -16.41*** 20.36*** 1.36 
 (3.76) (3.95) (3.36) (1.61) 
FR -9.11*** -9.97*** 10.85*** 3.14* 
 (3.42) (3.73) (2.44) (1.90) 
Intention AD 0.79 0.76 1.29 -3.90*** 
 (1.34) (2.10) (1.76) (1.21) 
HC * Intention AD 9.31** 10.18*** -13.22*** 0.73 
 (3.87) (3.72) (3.99) (2.16) 
FR * Intention AD 9.79*** 12.84*** -14.10*** 3.23* 
 (3.72) (3.00) (3.57) (1.69) 
Weak   9.43*** 0.50 
   (2.49) (1.11) 
HC * Weak   -2.62 -3.71** 
   (3.83) (1.82) 
FR * Weak   -1.69 -6.78*** 
   (3.40) (2.18) 
Period 0.57*** 0.48*** -0.34*** 0.06 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.05) 
Constant 62.44*** 59.80*** 30.62*** 26.80*** 
 (2.68) (3.14) (2.36) (1.38) 
Observations 1,650.00 682.00 850.00 1,650.00 
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subject random effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.03 
Wald test statistic 243.66*** 126.86*** 128.59*** 47.22*** 
Notes:  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Coefficient estimates are presented, with robust 
standard errors in parentheses clustered at the subject level. The omitted experimental treatment 
is LC. The models are estimated using random effects panel regression. The Wald test statistic is 





Table C. 5 – Regression analysis of decision-making split by experimental phase. 
Dependent variable Intended payment AD Final payment AD Bid 
Periods 1-15 16-30 1-15 16-30 1-15 16-30 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HC -0.85* -1.07 -2.80*** -4.28*** -12.23*** -25.01*** 
 (0.51) (0.66) (0.88) (1.15) (3.49) (5.02) 
FR -1.24** -1.61** -2.88*** -4.78*** -7.86** -13.22*** 
 (0.51) (0.67) (0.80) (1.22) (3.47) (4.37) 
Weak 0.72** 0.61 0.75 -0.12   
 (0.30) (0.48) (0.61) (0.85)   
HC * Weak   0.49 0.79   
   (1.03) (1.26)   
FR * Weak   1.44* 3.08***   
   (0.86) (1.13)   
Intention AD     0.99 -1.71 
     (2.30) (2.39) 
HC * Intention AD     5.17 21.78*** 
     (3.33) (6.66) 
FR * Intention AD     10.40** 13.73*** 
     (4.94) (4.40) 
Period -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.94*** 0.60*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.18) (0.22) 
Constant 0.2 -0.01 2.03*** 3.58** 58.24*** 76.93*** 
 (0.66) (1.08) (0.62) (1.57) (3.63) (3.47) 
Observations 510 340 419 281 990 660 
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald test statistic 56.59*** 43.56*** 144.33*** 142.80*** 20.34*** 23.25*** 
Notes:  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Coefficient estimates, with robust standard errors in parentheses 
clustered at the subject level. The omitted experimental treatment is LC. Models 1 to 4 are estimated using 





Table C. 6 – Aggregate profit statistics for the HC-E cohorts. 
Cohort 1 2 3 4 
Intention UD     
Buyer profit         
  Weak Buyer 65.44 (15.47) 54.06 (22.94) 60 11.73 42.5 3.54 
    Strong Buyer 65.54 15.36 58.27 19.91 65 4.08 44.33 12.91 
Seller profit 21.39 (15.48) 23.66 (18.26) 24.44 (17.56) 32.75 (26.79) 
Intention AD     
Buyer profit         
  Weak Buyer 49.39 (24.32) 45.83 20.61 67.69 (14.99) 58.49 (17.89) 
    Strong Buyer 42.85 (27.74) 45.53 12.07 59.44 (17.91) 40.36 (18.05) 
Seller profit 20.5 (13.04) 24.81 (10.5) 15.33 (12.16) 19.17 (13.76) 







Table C. 7 – Determinants of seller entry in the HC-E treatment. 
Dependent variable Entry 
Intention AD -0.13* 
 (0.07) 
Risk general 0.01 
 (0.03) 
Risk financial -0.03 
 (0.03) 




US National -0.39*** 
 (0.13) 









Cohort fixed effects Yes 
R-squared 0.08 
Wald test statistic 4.72*** 
Notes:  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Coefficient estimates are presented, 
with robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the subject level. The models 
are estimated using OLS regression on data from the HC-E treatment only. The 






Table C. 8 – OLS regression analysis of bids, transaction prices and profits in the 
HC-E treatment. 
Dependent variable Bid Price Buyer profit Seller profit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HC-E -10.81*** -11.17*** 12.26*** -6.10*** 
 (3.52) (3.56) (4.36) (1.94) 
Intention AD 10.37*** 11.33*** -11.94*** -3.05* 
 (3.56) (3.29) (3.24) (1.79) 
HC-E * Intention AD 5.65 3.84 3.26 -1.57 
 (5.08) (4.66) (5.28) (2.42) 
Weak   6.88** -3.15** 
   (2.86) (1.40) 
HC-E * Weak   -2.73 3.29* 
   (3.87) (1.99) 
Period 0.41*** 0.27** -0.25** 0.08* 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.05) 
Constant 49.32*** 46.11*** 49.43*** 28.45*** 
 (2.81) (2.88) (2.92) (1.41) 
Observations 1,001 538 580 1,160 
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.16 0.2 0.14 0.05 
Wald test statistic 26.69*** 19.24*** 10.06*** 7.27***  
Notes:  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Coefficient estimates are presented, with robust 
standard errors in parentheses clustered at the subject level. The omitted experimental treatment 
is HC. The models are estimated using OLS regression. The Wald test statistic is based on an F-





Table C. 9 – Logit regression analysis of buyer payment decisions (0 = UD; 1 = 
AD) in the HC-E treatment. 
Dependent variable Intended payment Final payment 
 𝛽 ̂ 𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑥⁄  𝛽 ̂ 𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑥⁄  
 (1) (2) 
HC-E 0.78* 0.19* 0.90* 0.22* 
 (0.45) (0.11) (0.48) (0.11) 
Weak 0.62 0.15 0.74 0.18 
 (0.45) (0.11) (0.47) (0.12) 
Period -0.02 -0.005 -0.02 -0.004 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
Constant -1.26**  -1.53**  
 (0.59)  (0.61)  
Observations 580 538 
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -328.46 -297.83 
Wald test statistic 144.64*** 147.19*** 
Notes:  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Coefficient estimates on the logit scale (𝛽) and 
average marginal effects (𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑥⁄ ), with robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the 
subject level. The omitted experimental treatment is HC. The models are estimated using Lo-
gistic regression. The Wald test statistic is based on a Chi-squared test of joint regression 
significance. UD = Upon Delivery, AD = After Delivery. 
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Figure C. 2. Within-buyer relative payment frequencies (0 = UD; 1 = AD) by 






Figure C. 3. Payment strategies (0 = UD; 1 = AD) by buyer ID (panel) and type 
(shape) for each treatment, conditional on at least one seller being eligible, weighted 















C.3. Experimental implementation and instructions 
Online Implementation. 
At the beginning of each experimental session, subjects were admitted into a virtual 
registration room one-by-one. After identity verification, their on-screen names were 
anonymised, videos switched off and they were moved to a second room. Once everyone 
had arrived in this second room, we played a pre-recorded video of the experiment 
instructions (see web links below), to ensure that the description of the game is common 
knowledge and to enhance replicability.  
To preserve anonymity, while ensuring that subjects remained present and did not 
communicate with others, subjects were transferred to one of several breakout rooms 
and asked to switch on their webcam video. Each room contained an experimenter and 
a subset of subjects who were guaranteed never to interact with one another during the 
session (subjects knew this). Subjects were then randomly assigned their role and com-
pleted a short comprehension quiz, before proceeding to two practice rounds. During 
this time, they could ask the experimenter questions via a private chat facility. The 
main experiment then began.  
At the end of a session, subjects’ webcams were switched off and they were returned 
to the registration room, where we explained that their payments would be mailed out 
to them on pre-paid debit cards by the end of next business day. Two sellers suffered 
(unrelated) internet outages mid-session (one in the LC treatment and one in the FR 
treatment). From the point of disconnection, bids for these sellers were replaced with a 
random number from the available bid interval. The remaining subjects in the cohort 
were unaware of the outage. All bid and transaction price data involving these two 





Web links to access the experiment video instructions. 
The instructions pertain to the online experimental sessions with 30 (+ 2 practice) 
rounds. The videos for the sessions with 20 (+ 2) rounds are identical except for the 
adjusted exchange rate. The instructions for the lab sessions differ only (and unavoida-
bly) on logistical issues, such as the processing of payments. Copies of the video instruc-
tions and transcripts used in the lab sessions are available on request. 
LC:  
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Wc268Aq3m5nuvtDVPH9Q0c6pVSc9HVV1/view?usp=sharing        
HC:  
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1cqDXuiZP5C-1lDZqYEgzsU4I5DEVlli_/view?usp=sharing   
FR:  
https://drive.google.com/file/d/13R0QIqoqOM-6eDwJwOTGf0V8zfMyp7RG/view?usp=sharing    
HC-E:  





Instructions transcript with screenshots.98  
Welcome. This is an experiment studying economic decision-making in auctions. 
 
How you earn money 
 
The experiment today consists of 32 decision-making rounds . In each round of the 
experiment, you will have the opportunity to earn points.  
 
The first two rounds are for practice purposes only, and you will not receive any payment 
for points earned in the first two rounds. You will be paid for all points earned in the 
remaining rounds, which are converted to US dollars at the following rate: 
 
80 points = $1 
 
These earnings are in addition to a show-up fee of $5. At the end of the experiment, 
you will complete a short questionnaire. Upon completion, you will be directed to a 
separate survey page on which you will be asked to provide some details to enable us to 




For today’s session, one third of you will be randomly assigned to the role of a buyer, 
and two thirds of you assigned to the role of a seller. You will be informed to which role 
you are assigned before the first round. You remain in the same role for the entire 
experiment.   
 
In each round, a buyer is randomly grouped with two sellers. This trio participates in 
an auction, in which the buyer seeks to purchase a single unit of a customized good 
from one of the two sellers in the trio. You will not know the identity of any person in 
your trio. You will be randomly re-assigned to a new trio each round.  
 
The buyer’s valuation for a customized unit is 100 points. ----[HC-E] Each seller can 
choose whether or not to customize the unit. The buyer has zero value for a non-cus-
tomized unit and so will only purchase from a seller who chooses to customize the unit. 
Any seller who chooses not to customize the unit can return it to the experimenter in 
exchange for 25 points. [LC, HC, FR] The sellers, however, are not always eligible to 
customize the unit. Specifically, sellers are only eligible to customize the unit with a 
certain probability (precise details to be given later). The buyer has zero value for a 
non-customized unit and so will only purchase from a seller who is eligible to customize 
the unit. Any seller who is not eligible to customize the unit can return their unit to 
the experimenter in exchange for 25 points. ---- 
 
 
98 Where relevant, treatment-specific information is demarcated using the following format: ----
[treatment X] … information … [treatment Y] … information … ----. 
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If at least one seller ----[HC-E] chooses [LC, HC, FR] is eligible---- to customize the unit, 
a transaction takes place and the auction determines the transaction price.  
 
The buyer can pay for the unit using either one of the following methods: upon delivery 
or after delivery . The seller prefers to receive payment upon delivery. The buyer prefers 
to make payment after delivery. How valuable payment after delivery is to the buyer 
depends on the buyer’s type (precise details to be given later). The buyer is informed 
about his/her type at the beginning of each round, which can be either type 1 or type 
2. The buyer’s type changes between rounds and is never revealed to the sellers. The 
sellers only know that the buyer in their trio is either of type 1 or of type 2, with equal 
chance. 
 
How does a transaction between a buyer and seller take place? 
 
In each round, every trio of one buyer and two sellers will undergo a three stage process 
to determine if there is a transaction, the transaction price and the payment method. 
This process consists of a pre-auction stage, an auction stage and a post-auction stage. 
 
Pre-Auction Stage:   Before the auction, the buyer is randomly assigned his/her type 
for the round, either type 1 or type 2. The buyer then announces his/her intended 
payment method for the unit. Specifically, the buyer can announce an intention to pay 
the seller upon delivery or after delivery of the unit. 
 
The sellers do not participate in the pre-auction stage and wait to participate in the 
auction stage.  
 
----[LC] The probability of a seller being eligible to customize the unit in any round is 
one-half (50%) . [HC, FR] The buyer’s intended payment method announced in the pre-
auction stage determines the probability with which sellers are eligible to customize the 
unit in the round.  
 
If the buyer intends to pay for the unit upon delivery , the probability of a seller being 
eligible to customize the unit is [HC] three-quarters (75%) [FR] two-thirds (66.67%) .  
 
[HC, FR] If the buyer intends to pay for the unit after delivery , the probability  of a 
seller being eligible to customize the unit is one-half (50%) . ---- 
 
Auction Stage:  ----[HC-E] When the auction begins, the sellers observe the buyer’s 
intended payment method. Each seller chooses whether or not to customize the unit 
and, if he/she chooses to customize it, submits a bid for which he/she would be willing 
to deliver it to the buyer. This bid can be any whole number from 25 to 100 (inclusive). 
When deciding, neither seller can see the choices of the other seller in his/her trio.    
 
If both sellers in the trio customize the unit , then the buyer purchases a unit from the 
seller that submitted the lower bid. This seller acquires the right to proceed to the post-
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auction stage, and his/her bid becomes the transaction price. The seller that submitted 
the higher bid exits without selling the customized unit and earns 0 points for the round. 
If both sellers submit the same bid, the seller from whom the buyer purchases is chosen 
at random (with equal chance).  
 
If only one seller in the trio customizes the unit , then the buyer purchases a unit from 
this seller. This seller acquires the right to proceed to the post-auction stage and his/her 
bid becomes the transaction price. The seller that chose not to customize exits the round 
and returns his/her non-customized unit to the experimenter for 25 points.  
  
If neither seller in the trio customizes the unit , then the round ends without a trans-
action. In this case, each seller returns his/her non-customized unit to the experimenter 
for 25 points, and the buyer earns 0 points for the round. 
 
[LC, HC, FR] When the auction begins, the sellers observe the buyer’s intended payment 
method and the probability with which they are eligible. Each seller submits a bid for 
which they would be willing to deliver a customized unit to the buyer. This bid can be 
any whole number from 25 to 100 (inclusive). When submitting a bid, neither seller can 
see the bid of the other seller in his/her trio.  
 
After both sellers have submitted their bids, the computer separately determines 
whether each seller is eligible to customize the unit, according to the probability de-
scribed in the pre-auction stage. Whenever a seller is determined to be eligible, his/her 
unit is customized for the buyer and can no longer be returned to the experimenter.  
 
If the computer determines that both sellers in the trio are eligible , then the buyer 
purchases a unit from the seller that submitted the lower bid. This seller acquires the 
right to proceed to the post-auction stage, and his/her bid becomes the transaction 
price. The seller that submitted the higher bid exits without selling the customized unit 
and earns 0 points for the round. If both sellers submit the same bid, the seller from 
whom the buyer purchases is chosen at random (with equal chance).  
 
If the computer determines that one unique seller in the trio is eligible , then the buyer 
purchases a unit from the eligible seller. This seller acquires the right to proceed to the 
post-auction stage and his/her bid becomes the transaction price. The non-eligible seller 
exits the round and returns the non-customized unit to the experimenter for 25 points.  
  
If the computer determines that neither seller in the trio is eligible , then the round 
ends without a transaction. In this case, each seller returns his/her non-customized unit 
to the experimenter for 25 points, and the buyer earns 0 points for the round. ---- 
 





Post-Auction Stage:   This stage is only reached if at least one seller ----[HC-E] chose 
[LC, HC, FR] is eligible ---- to customize the unit. The buyer observes the transaction 
price and selects a final payment method for the customized unit. The buyer can select 
to make payment to the seller upon delivery or after delivery of the unit. The final 
payment method selected can differ from the buyer’s intended payment method an-
nounced in the pre-auction stage. 
 
The seller prefers to receive payment upon delivery. Both types of buyer prefer to make 
payment after delivery. The buyer types differ, however, in how valuable this is. For a 
given price, payment after delivery is more valuable for a type 1 buyer than for a type 
2 buyer. 
 
If the buyer selects final payment upon delivery , then: 
 the buyer’s earnings are his/her unit valuation of 100 – transaction price;  
 the seller’s earnings are the transaction price. 
If the buyer selects final payment after delivery , then: 
 a type 1 buyer’s earnings are his/her unit valuation of 100 – (0.75 × transaction 
price);  
 a type 2 buyer’s earnings are his/her unit valuation of 100 – (0.95 × transaction 
price); 
 the seller’s earnings are 0.5 × transaction price. 
A penalty of ----[LC] 1 [HC-E, HC] 16 [FR] 8 ---- points is levied on any buyer who 
announced an intention to pay upon delivery in the pre-auction stage but selected 
final payment after delivery in the post-auction stage.  This penalty is subtracted from 
the buyer’s earnings. The penalty is collected by an independent third party outside of 
the experiment (it is not collected by the seller). 
 




Summary of how earnings for the round are calculated 
 
Seller’s earnings (in points) 
 
Customized unit & lower bid  
OR Only seller to customize the unit: 
 
If the buyer makes final pay-




If the buyer makes final pay-
ment after delivery 
 
0.5 × transaction price 
Customized unit & higher bid: 0 
Non-customized unit: 25 
 
Buyer’s earnings (in points): 
 
At least one seller customized 
the unit: 
Intends to pay  
upon delivery  
Intends to pay  
after delivery 
 
If the buyer makes final pay-
ment upon delivery 
 
100  
–  transaction price  
100  
–  transaction price 
 
If a type 1 buyer makes final 




–  0.75 × transaction price 
–  [1, 16, 8] 
 
100  
–  0.75 × transaction price 
 
If a type 2 buyer makes final 
payment after delivery 
 
100  
–  0.95 × transaction price 
–  [1, 16, 8] 
 
100  
–  0.95 × transaction price 
 










Consider the following baseline scenario. 
 
Pre-Auction stage : The buyer is randomly assigned to type 1. The buyer announces an 
intention to make payment upon delivery. ----[LC, HC, FR] The probability of a seller 
being eligible to customize the unit in the round is [one-half (50%), three-quarters (75%), 
two-thirds (66.67%)].---- 
 
Auction stage : Seller 1 ----[HC-E] chooses to customize the unit and---- submits a bid 
of 48. Seller 2 ----[HC-E] chooses to customize the unit and---- submits a bid of 67. ----
[LC, HC, FR] The computer determines that both sellers are eligible to customize the 
unit in the round.---- Seller 1 proceeds to the post-auction stage. Seller 2 exits without 
making a transaction. The transaction price is equal to Seller 1’s bid of 48. 
 
Post-Auction stage : The buyer makes final payment to Seller 1 upon delivery. 
 
The earnings for the round are as follows: 
 
 Seller 1 earns 48 
 Buyer earns 100 – 48 =  52 
 Seller 2 earns 0 
 
Alternative 1: Now suppose that in the Auction stage of the baseline scenario, ----[HC-
E] Seller 2 had chosen not to customize the unit [LC, HC, FR] the computer had de-
termined that Seller 2 is not eligible to customize the unit. ---- 
 
 Seller 1’s earnings are unchanged from baseline; i.e., 48 
 Buyer’s earnings are unchanged from baseline; i.e., 52 
 Seller 2 earns 25 
 
Alternative 2: Now suppose that in the Auction stage of the baseline scenario, ----[HC-
E] neither seller had chosen to customize the unit [LC, HC, FR] the computer had de-
termined that neither seller is eligible to customize the unit. ---- 
 
 Seller 1 earns 25 
 Buyer earns 0 
 Seller 2 earns 25 
 
Alternative 3: Now suppose that in the Post-Auction stage of the baseline scenario, 
the buyer had made final payment to Seller 1 after delivery. 
 
 Seller 1 earns 0.5 × 48 = 24 
 Buyer earns 100 − (0.75 × 48) − [1, 16, 8] = [63, 48, 56] 




Alternative 4: Now suppose that in addition to Alternative 3 of the baseline, in the 
Pre-Auction stage the buyer had announced an intention to make payment after deliv-
ery. 
 
 Seller 1’s earnings are unchanged from Alternative 3; i.e., 24 
 Buyer earns 100 − (0.75 × 48) = 64 
 Seller 2’s earnings are unchanged from Alternative 3; i.e., 0 
 
Alternative 5: Now suppose that in addition to Alternative 4 of the baseline, in the 
Pre-Auction stage the buyer had been assigned to type 2. 
 
 Seller 1’s earnings are unchanged from Alternative 4; i.e., 24 
 Buyer earns 100 − (0.95 × 48) = 54.4 
 Seller 2’s earnings are unchanged from Alternative 4; i.e., 0 
How to use the computer program 
 
After all participants have successfully answered a comprehension quiz, the computer-
ized auction rounds will begin.  
 
Picture 1 gives an example of what your computer screen will look like in the Pre-
Auction stage. Buyers observe their randomly assigned type for the round, which ap-
pears underlined ----[LC, HC, FR], and the seller eligibility probability [HC, FR] asso-
ciated with each option----. Buyers must then select their intended payment method, by 
choosing one of the two options and clicking submit. 
 






















Picture 2 gives an example of what your computer screen will look like in the Auction 
stage. ----[HC-E] Sellers observe the buyer’s intended payment method and must choose 
whether or not to customize the unit. If they choose to customize the unit, they must 
also submit a bid for the round, by entering a number between 25 and 100 in the box 
provided and clicking submit. [LC, HC, FR] Sellers observe the buyer’s intended pay-
ment method and their eligibility probability. Sellers must then submit a bid for the 







































Picture 3 gives an example of what your computer screen will look like in the Post-
Auction stage. Buyers observe the outcome of the Auction stage and, if at least one 
seller ----[HC-E] chooses to customize the unit [LC, HC, FR] is eligible ----, must select 
their final payment method for the round, by choosing one of the two options and 
clicking submit. The buyer earnings associated with each option are displayed under-
neath. 
 
























Consider the following scenario.  
 
Pre-Auction stage : The Buyer is randomly assigned to type 1. The Buyer announces 
an intention to make payment upon delivery. 
 
----[LC, HC, FR] 
 
1. What is the probability of a seller being eligible to customize the unit? Select one 
of the following options. 
 one-half (50%) [LC] 
 three-quarters (75%) [HC] 
 two-thirds (66.67%) [FR] 
 
Auction stage : Seller 1 ----[HC-E] chooses to customize the unit and---- submits a bid 
of 60. Seller 2 ----[HC-E] chooses to customize the unit and---- submits a bid of 77. ----
[LC, HC, FR] The computer determines that both sellers are eligible to customize the 
unit in the round. ---- Seller 1 proceeds to the post-auction stage. Seller 2 exits without 
making a transaction. The transaction price is equal to Seller 1’s bid of 60. 
 
----[LC, HC, FR] 
 






1. What does Seller 2 earn? [0] 
 
2. What would Seller 2 have earned if he/she had chosen not to customize the unit? 
[25] 
 
----[LC, HC, FR, HC-E] 
 
Post-Auction stage : The Buyer makes final payment to Seller 1 upon delivery. 
 
3. What does Seller 1 earn? [60] 
 
4. What does the Buyer earn? [40] 
 
If, in the Post-Auction stage , the buyer had instead made final payment to Seller 1 
after delivery. 
 
5. What would Seller 1 earn?  [30] 
 




C.4. Post-experiment questionnaire and subject characteristics 
Age: Interval variable.  
Years. 
Online sample: Mean 24.31, Standard deviation 3.47, Minimum 19, Maximum 35.  
Lab sample: Mean 22.72, Standard deviation 3.95, Minimum 19, Maximum 37.  
 
Gender: Categorical variable. 
Male (1); Female (2); Other (3); Prefer not to Say (4). 
Online sample: 57.14%; 42.11%; 0.75%; 0%. 
Lab sample: 55.77%; 42.31%; 1.92%; 0%. 
 
Field of studies: Categorical variable. 
Arts and Education (1); Economics and Finance (2); Business and Management (3); 
Social Sciences and Law (4); Medicine and Health Sciences (5); Engineering and Natural 
Sciences (6); Not a Student (7). 
Online sample: 2.24%; 3.73%; 59.70%; 23.88%; 0%; 6.72%; 3.73%. 
Lab sample: 11.54%; 19.23%; 13.46%; 30.77%; 11.54%; 11.54%; 1.92%. 
 
Nationality: Categorical variable: 
Central and Eastern Asia (1); Central and Western Africa (2); Central, South America 
and the Caribbean (3); Europe (excl. UK) (4); Middle East and North Africa (5); North 
America (6); Oceania (7); South and Eastern Africa (8); South-East Asia (9); Southern 
Asia (10); UK (11) 
Online sample: 7.46%; 1.49%; 0%; 0%; 1.49%; 16.42%; 0%; 0%; 22.39%; 50%; 0.75%. 
Lab sample: 0%; 3.85%; 1.92%; 23.08%; 1.92%; 0%; 0%; 1.92%; 1.92%; 7.69%; 57.69%. 
 
Income: Categorical variable.  
When you were 16 years of age, what was the income of your parents in comparison to 
other families in your country? 
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Far below average (1); Below average (2); Average (3); Above average (4); Far above 
average (5) 
Online sample: 1.49%; 7.46%; 47.01%; 39.55%; 4.48%. 
Lab sample: 9.62%; 9.62%; 38.46%; 36.54%; 5.77 %. 
 
Risk Indices: 
Based on Dohmen et al. (2011). Likert scale from 0 “Completely unwilling to take risks” 
to 10 “Completely willing to take risks”. 
9) Are you generally a person who is fully willing to take risks or do you try to avoid 
taking risks? 
Online sample: Mean 6.62, Standard deviation 1.91, Minimum 2, Maximum 10.  
Lab sample: Mean 6.43, Standard deviation 2.14, Minimum 0, Maximum 10.  
10) How would you rate your willingness to take risks in financial matters? 
Online sample: Mean 5.57, Standard deviation 2.05, Minimum 0, Maximum 10.  
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